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In the second half of the 20th century, a series of reforms in Mexico’s health system
with the goal of expanding coverage gave rise to Seguro Popular de Salud, or Popular
Insurance, a financial protection mechanism designed to guarantee the right for
healthcare for every citizen. The intention of Seguro Popular was to expand access to
health services for over 50 million uninsured individuals by eliminating out-of-pocket
health payments with the ultimate aim to improve the population’s health.
The objective of this thesis is to assess the impact of Seguro Popular on health
outcomes, healthcare access, inequality and financial protection. The first chapter
introduces the study and describes the programme. The second chapter is an
assessment of the impact of Seguro Popular on Mexican population’s health status
and on utilisation of healthcare. Exploiting the time and space variation in the
introduction of Seguro Popular, treatment effects are estimated using difference-in-
differences specifications with variations in identification strategies. Results show that
the programme had significant effects on reducing infant mortality rates. However,
there were no clear effects on the adult health outcomes examined and on healthcare
utilisation.
The aim of the third chapter is to find the effect of Seguro Popular on children’s
nutritional status; and to estimate the change in pure health inequality derived
from the programme. Taking advantage of the staggered roll-out of Seguro Popular,
children’s height-for-age z-scores are assessed using a changes-in-changes approach.
Results show that of Seguro Popular had a slightly positive effect on children’s height.
Moreover, the benefits were marginally larger for children in the lowest tail of the
height distribution which represents a reduction of pure inequality in health.
The fourth chapter is an assessment of the antipoverty effect of Seguro Popular.
Using instrumental variables, this study presents local average treatment effects of
Seguro Popular on out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures, catastrophic expenditures
and impoverishing. Results show a small reduction in out-of-pocket healthcare
payments, although no clear effect on catastrophic payments or on impoverishing.
However, the programme slightly reduced poverty overall and had a positive effect
on households’ welfare.
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Chapter 1
Preface
The three chapters on this thesis contribute to the existing literature that evaluates
one of the most ambitious health reforms in Mexico in recent years: Seguro Popular de
Salud (Popular Health Insurance, henceforth Seguro Popular or SP). The population
of Mexico in 2000 was nearly 100 million; however, only half of its citizens had
healthcare insurance at that time. Seguro Popular aimed to remove barriers to
accessing healthcare by eliminating co-payments required of citizens when receiving
health services. The end goal was to provide coverage to the approximately 50
million citizens who had no healthcare coverage. After being enacted into law,
the programme was officially implemented in 2004, and progressively expanded
throughout the country until national adoption was completed in 2012. Seguro
Popular continued only until 2019, however, when the newly elected government
cancelled the programme in favour of a new system.
1.1 The Mexican healthcare system
The public healthcare system in Mexico is composed of two main subsystems that
provide most of the nation’s health care: a social security system that serves formal
sector employees and their families; and, a non-contributory system that covers the
remainder of population, including people outside the formal sector of the economy,
those who are self-employed, and the unemployed. According to the National System
of Statistical and Geographical Information (INEGI),1 56.9% of Mexicans in 2019
were informally employed; this figure is likely even higher now, since, by the end of
2020, more than one million private businesses had to close as a consequence of the
1https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2019/enoe_ie/enoe_ie2019_
05.pdf
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COVID-19 pandemic2. Notably, the majority of the population receives health care
insurance via the non-contributory system.
There are large differences between these two sub-systems: formal sector employ-
ees and their families, either private sector workers or government employees, are
entitled to receive health care services from the main public contributory sources of
insurance, that is, social security. Social security benefits, including pensions, health
care, daycare, disability and life insurance, among others, are provided by different
institutions. The largest social security provider is the Mexican Social Security
Institute (IMSS) which is financed mostly by payroll taxes and covers all formal
private sector employees. Government employees are beneficiaries of a different social
security system: the Government Worker’s Social Security and Services Institute
(ISSSTE), with equivalent benefits to IMSS. There are also other sources of insurance
that account for a small fraction of the population including PEMEX (Mexican
Petroleum) that provides social security for employees of state-run oil enterprise and
SEDENA (National Defence).
The population in the informal sector are households not eligible for social security
and therefore rely on government funded assistance services from the Ministry of
Health (SSA) financed by the government through general revenues. Before the
creation of Seguro Popular, this was a non-contributory system which charged a fee
according to socioeconomic status. However, prior to 2002, per patient expenditure
for individuals enrolled in SSA was about half the amount than for those enrolled
in IMSS (Nigenda et al., 2015). Both systems are provided and subsidised by
the government, but are independent systems with different governing bodies and
completely independent infrastructures; and, by law, citizens could only be affiliated
with either IMSS or SP.
The private sector is also divided into two main types of service providers with
large variations in costs, quality and availability. Individuals with private insurance
coverage or the capacity to pay for their health care out-of-pocket have access to
a high quality modern network of private hospitals located in urban areas. Poorer
urban and rural families without insurance use lower-priced health services with
variable quality, including informal midwives and traditional healers (Flamand and
Jaimes, 2015; Sosa-Rubi et al., 2009).
Table 1.1 compares the largest health providers in the public sector before the
creation of Seguro Poular. Depending on the source, the proportion of the popu-
lation who were covered by IMSS lies between 31 and 46 million3; the proportion
2INEGI. Estudio sobre la demografía de los negocios EDN 2020. https://www.inegi.org.mx/
contenidos/programas/edn/2020/doc/EDN2020Pres.pdf
3The lower value is estimated by the national Survey of Health and Nutrition (ENSANUT 2000)
and the higher value is reported by IMSS and ISSSTE as referenced in Table 1.1.
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who were covered by ISSSTE was estimated to be between 5 and 10 million. Con-
sidering the nation’s total population size was 97 million, the proportion of the
population with no health insurance was estimated between 41 and 57 million –
that is, approximately half. There was a wide difference in public spending per
capita between the two systems; hence the need for a system to address this inequality.
Table 1.1 Healthcare coverage before Seguro Popular (2000)
Insurance Covered population (millions)a,b Public spending per capita (MXN)c
IMSS 31.51 - 46.53 4,654 - 3,151
ISSSTE 5.75 - 10.07 3,956 - 6,922
Not covered 57.5 - 40.98 680 - 954
a Encuesta Nacional de Salud y Nutrición (ENSANUT 2000)
b Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinión Pública, "Seguimiento y resultados de las políticas públicas y
gestión gubernamental de la administración vigente: www.diputados.gob.mx/cesop/
c Per capita figures were calculated using budget information in Evolución del Gasto en Salud. Centro de
Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas. Cámara de Diputados. H. Congreso de la Unión DEPF/103/2007
MXN: Mexican pesos
1.2 Historical context of healthcare in Mexico
The structural inequalities of healthcare in Mexico have their origin in the foundation
of the national health system in 1943 when both IMSS and SSA were created.
IMSS was conceived as a response to the increasing healthcare demand of a growing
working class that resulted from rapid economic development (Barraza-Lloréns et al.,
2002). IMSS provided workers with social security benefits including healthcare
and financial security for retirement, disability or death. Affiliation was mandatory
for formal-sector workers and their families. However, informal workers could enrol
voluntarily. The Ministry of Health (SSA) was created in the same year to provide
public health, sanitation, and to allocate resources to provide health care to those
who were uninsured. It was believed that over time, with rapid industrialisation,
formal employment would increase along with social security coverage and that
government services for the uninsured would only de required for a small fraction of
the population (Nigenda et al., 2015).
However, access to social security did not grow at the expected rate. Despite a
few decades of sustained economic growth, labour markets did not formalise at the
expected rate, nor did social security coverage increase (Flamand and Jaimes, 2015).
Moreover, the financial crises in the 1970s and 80s resulted in an increase of informal
employment creating a larger proportion of the population who were reliant on the
social assistance services. The social security model based on labour status was
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insufficient to expand healthcare coverage and distribute its benefits equitably. This
large gap in healthcare coverage deepened health and socioeconomic inequalities as
access was not determined by need but by labour supply status. Those the informal
sector of the economy were therefore doubly disadvantaged: both earning lower
income and being unable to access social security benefits.
As a response to the increasing gap in access to high quality health services, in
1982, the government started a series of reforms to decentralise health services. In
1983, the Mexican Constitution was revised to include access to healthcare as a
citizen’s right, rather than merely a labour benefit4. However, by the year 2000, 58%
of health financing came from out-of-pocket health expenditures (Gómez-Dantés
and Ortiz, 2005). This situation imposed a greater burden on poorer households.
Furthermore, families were exposed to the risk of catastrophic healthcare expenditures
– i.e. healthcare expenditures that exceed a reasonable proportion of household
income or total expenditure in a year, typically over 20% of total income; or even
impoverishing healthcare expenditures – i.e. expenditures sufficiently large enough
to push a household below the poverty line (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003).
Around 3 million families had catastrophic expenditures in 2004; and, in addition
to the regressivity of private payments, government expenditure was regressive as
well: public resources were higher for the insured families than for the uninsured
(Gómez-Dantés et al., 2004). (See Table 1.1)
The prevailing situation where half of the population was not entitled to high
quality and effective healthcare was not compatible with the constitutional reform
of 1983. To implement this universal human right, it was necessary to introduce a
new mechanism to expand coverage to the non-salaried workers and their families,
to uncouple healthcare from labour status (Flamand and Jaimes, 2015). Seguro
Popular originated in that context as a mechanism to provide resources for states
and highly specialised hospitals to reduce health access inequities for the unprotected
population. The goal was to delegate financial decisions for healthcare spending
to local authorities, proximal to where health services were needed. The intention
was that resources per SP affiliate would eventually match the resources per social
security affiliate to guarantee the same quality standards. Moreover, in order to
tackle inequity in resource allocation, the budget would depend on the number of
affiliates by state, such that states with more affiliates would receive more resources.
Overall, the result would be to reduce the role of political factors in health financing
decisions.
4The WHO Constitution included the right to healthcare as a human right since 1946. https:
//www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/human-rights-and-health
The UN included the right to healthcare as human right in the Universal Human Rights Declaration,
1948. https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
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Seguro Popular started with a pilot phase in 2002-2003 and was formally included
in the Ley General de Salud5 (Healthcare General Law) in 2004. SP would aim to
progressively cover more than 50 million uninsured Mexicans, who were about half
of the total population, over a period of 7 years. This new general bill on health that
established the social protection system was approved by Congress in April 2003.
This law guaranteed access to almost 100 interventions that cover 90% of outpatient
services and 70% of inpatient interventions with no co-payment: Mexican families
not covered by formal social security programs would receive services free of charge.
1.3 Implementation of Seguro Popular
Seguro Popular was specifically targeted to the informal, poor, indigenous poor,
and uninsured workers with a goal of achieving universal health insurance coverage
(although in a two-tiered system) and reducing catastrophic spending on health.
Previously, SSA charged fees below full cost depending on the declared income of
the user. SP is financed by both state and federal taxes and beneficiary families
excluding the two lower deciles of income. However, virtually no family pays to
become affiliated. Since states receive funding for every affiliated family, they have a
strong incentive to enrol as many families as possible.
Government healthcare expenditures increased by 85% with the introduction of
Seguro Popular (Flamand and Jaimes, 2015). Seguro Popular ’s budget in that same
year was over ten times that in 2004, going from 3.4 billion pesos (301 million USD)6
to 71.2 billion pesos (3.7 billion USD)7 in nominal terms. Affiliation also grew over
ten times from 5.3 million people in 2004 to 53.5 million by 2019. In the same period,
the share of out-of-pocket expenditures decreased from 60% of the total healthcare
expenditure (Wirtz et al., 2012) to 40% in 20198. To increase the equity of public
health financing, beneficiary families are entitled by law to the value in money of the
healthcare received by families with formal social security benefits (such as IMSS
services).
The insurance consists of four different modules of defined services that are
administered free of charge. The first two, which have been in place since the start
of the programme, are the Catálogo Universal de Servicios de Salud (CAUSES) and
5Ley General de Salud. http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Documentos/Federal/pdf/wo11037.
pdf
6The exchange rate in 2004 was 11.29 MXN per USD and in 2019 1 USD equalled to 19.25 MXN
7Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación http://www.transparencia.seguro-popular.gob.mx/
index.php/transparencia-focalizada/11-pef/54-presupuesto-de-egresos-de-la-federacion-pef-2019
8OECD. Health at a glance. Mexico, 2019. https://www.oecd.org/mexico/
health-at-a-glance-mexico-EN.pdf
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the Fondo de Protección contra Gastos Catastróficos (FPGC). The former defines
the principal set of covered interventions and medicines. At the programme’s start in
2004 it covered 91 essential health interventions and the 142 medications associated
with them (Ruvalcaba and Vargas, 2010). These covered over 90 percent of the
disease burden in Mexico (Popular, 2007). By 2012, coverage had been expanded to
284 interventions and 391 medications, covering 95 percent of the disease burden
(Knaul et al., 2012) and extended coverage to 60 million people. The FPGC is a
trust fund, jointly financed by the federal and state governments, that covers costly
interventions which may result in catastrophic outcomes (death or bankruptcy, or
both) for the household affected. In 2012, the FPGC covered 58 interventions in
areas such as cancer treatment, cardiovascular problems or organ transplants.
Fig. 1.1 Timing of Seguro Popular ’s implementation
SP roll-out was completed by 2012 after 52.6 million people had been enrolled
(Figure 1.1). The roll-out occurred in stages at both the geographic and individual
level. The program was intended to reach areas with greatest need first, but in
practice the roll-out was arbitrary, determined mainly by logistical and political
factors, rather than health need. Fortunately for the purpose of evaluation, the nature
of the roll-out created the conditions for a natural experiment. Implementation
began in 2002 with a pilot in 26 municipalities from 5 states and full roll-out started
in 2004. The actual geographic roll-out happened as follows: out of 32 states, 5
joined the program for the pilot in 20029, 15 additional states joined by the end of
9Aguascalientes, Campeche, Colima, Jalisco and Tabasco.
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200210, six more additional states joined before the end of the pilot in 200311 and
from the remaining six, three joined in 200412 and the last three in 200513 (Conti
and Ginja, 2020).
SP affiliation within states was primarily targeted to the poorer indigenous
population in rural areas and the poorest quintile. Geographically, at the state level,
the roll-out was a result of negotiations with the federal government; and each state
decided when to enrol their citizens. Geographical roll-out was completed by 2006,
and by 2012, with 52 million affiliates (Knaul et al., 2012) population roll-out was
finalised (Fig. 1.1).
Each year, the state and federal governments negotiated the target number of
households the state would enrol in each quarter of the following year until states
reached their official final target (theoretically equal to the number of uninsured
households in their state). Officially, the states that were primarily targeted were
those with: low insurance coverage, high numbers of uninsured individuals in the
first six income deciles, the ability to provide services, high demand for enrolment,
and a sufficient budget (Conti and Ginja, 2020). Within states, Seguro Popular
was rolled out at the municipality level, meaning that a municipality could begin
affiliating enrolees once their health care facilities met minimum infrastructure and
human resource requirements (Knox, 2008). However, some affiliated municipalities
met the minimum requirements in terms of healthcare facilities and personnel while
others did not (Gakidou et al., 2006).
The timing in the roll-out of Seguro Popular has been used by other studies as
an instrument for program affiliation (Galárraga et al., 2010; Sosa-Rubi et al., 2009).
The programme was designed to be targeted to the poor and indigenous (Knaul
et al., 2005), but previous studies have found that this was not necessarily the case.
Roll-out may have been influenced by political factors as well; for example small
states can achieve full coverage quickly and this can be used to win votes during
election times (Barros et al., 2008). Bosch et al. (2012) determined that the roll
out was essentially random, while Barros et al. (2008) and Knox (2008) discuss the
political motivations behind the timing of affiliation. Turrini et al. (2016) argue that
the roll out was not random and that the municipalities that received access to SP
first were more highly educated, had higher expenditures, and higher rates of formal
employment.
10Baja California, Chiapas, Coahuila, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, México, Morelos, Oaxaca,
Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas and Zacatecas.
11Baja California Sur, Michoacán, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Veracruz and Yucatán.
12Nayarit, Nuevo León and Querétaro.
13Chihuahua, Distrito Federal and Durango.
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The decentralisation process that resulted in SP had many risks; one was the
possibility of corruption from local authorities. Indeed, the decision for SP cancella-
tion was based more on cases of corruption in local governments rather than due
to inadequate performance of the programme (Reich, 2020). The newly created
INSABI that replaced Seguro Popular in January 2020, is a health system with the
aim of matching the benefits of the insured and uninsured by centralising funding
and establishing the federal government as the only funder and provider. However,
there are not explicit rules for allocating financial resources or information on sources
of the additional financing needed (Reyes-Morales et al., 2020). The main drivers
of the implementation of INSABI were political and ideological principles, rather
than the result of deep analysis, planning and evidence from past evaluations (Reich,
2020).
1.4 Previous evaluations of Seguro Popular
Impact evaluations inform the effectiveness of public policies and should be an
important source of information when deciding to introduce, enhance or cancel
programmes. Undeniably, there are political factors that would determine if a policy
would ever be implemented. In the case of Mexico, the prevailing inequality in access
and outcomes made necessary a deep reform and whether or not Seguro Popular
effectively addressed the problem is an evaluation question.
SP has been evaluated in other studies. A few notable examples are described
here. The Ministry of Health and the independent National Institute of Public
Health commissioned a team from Harvard University to conduct an external and
independent evaluation of SP. The evaluation team, led by King et al. (2009, 2007),
conducted a randomised study at the time of implementation of the programme. They
developed an approach to conduct large-scale randomised public policy experiments
that are robust to political interventions. They defined 12,824 contiguous geographic
regions as health clusters including an actual or future health clinic and the population
catchment area around it. From the 32 states, 13 participated in the evaluation
with 7,078 health clusters. For the study, 74 pairs from seven states were selected.
These 148 clusters included 1,380 localities, approximately 118,569 households and
534,457 individuals. From each pair, they randomly selected one health cluster to
receive encouragement for individuals to affiliate with SP and everything needed to
implement the programme (health facility, drugs, doctors, etc.) while the other health
cluster in the pair did not receive anything additional. They conducted a baseline
household survey at the time of randomisation, and follow-ups ten months after
and repeatedly at other intervals. To avoid any bias due to the loss of information,
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instead of the classical randomisation, they use matched pair randomisation, which
consists in first selecting pairs of health clusters that are matched on a large set of
characteristics, and then, randomly choosing one cluster from the pair to receive
treatment. This design provides better balance: on the pair level by matching on the
selected variables and on average by randomisation on the variables that were not
selected. More importantly, it protects the design from the loss of clusters by finding
a pair from the other clusters or deleting the remaining pair. The third part of the
process was a parametric adjustment to estimate the quantities of interest. Instead
of a difference in means, they would adjust parametrically adding pretreatment
covariates, including remaining confounders and interactions. Their design produces
unbiased inference even if two of the three steps in their procedure suffers any
disruptions. Results from the study showed a reduction in catastrophic payments
but no effects on health outcomes or utilisation. Moreover, he study only allows
for inference in the study areas or similar communities. According to the authors,
generalisation of results would have needed further experiments in different areas in
subsequent exercises.
Gakidou et al. (2006) found that catastrophic expenditures are lower for SP
insured people. They analysed several outcomes and their evolution in the early
years of Seguro Popular. Their results show positive results of SP; however, they do
not find causal impacts and only show associations. The authors found that around
16-18% of total population without social security or private insurance enrolled in
Seguro Popular by the first quarter of 2006. The largest fraction of those affiliates
were from the two lowest income deciles in communities with medium and low levels
of development. The authors found an association between private expenditure in
healthcare and enrolment. Expenditure increased from 2000 to 2003, but declined
after Seguro Popular enrolment more than doubled in 2005. The number of nurses
and doctors employed by the Ministry of Health per 1000 population increased from
0.83 to 0.94 between 2001 and 2005. Seguro Popular enrolees were found to have
a higher probability of healthcare use than uninsured individuals conditional on
perceived need. Using a multivariate random-effects regression model, the authors
found that enrolment to SP is associated with an increase of all-cause hospitalisation
rates. The authors, using a logistic regression model, estimated levels of effective
coverage – defined as the delivery of appropriate high quality interventions to those
who need them – and found that the insured population was more effectively covered
than the uninsured and the differences were statistically significant. Gakidou and
colleagues show a decline in mortality on the SP insured population for all causes
combined for the major-cause groups since 2000. However, they note that this
trend started before SP roll-out. They analyse the impact of SP on protection
against financial risk using logistic regressions and find that the proportion of covered
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individuals paying for medication was significantly lower than that in uninsured
individuals. Moreover, affiliates had 14% lower expenditures in drugs than uninsured
people. Finally, logistic regression results show that SP protects against catastrophic
payments at the population level.
Sosa-Rubi et al. (2009) evaluated the impact of SP on pregnant women’s access to
obstetrical services. They analysed data from 3,890 uninsured women who gave birth
between 2001 and 2006 using a multinomial discrete choice model of the selection
of healthcare provider to give birth between an SP facility, a private health unit
or a non-accredited clinic run by the Ministry of Health (MoH). They address the
possible endogeneity of the decision to enrol in Seguro Popular through instrumental
variables. Results show that the women from SP-participant households had a
much stronger preference to use a SP-facility than to use a MoH clinic; they also
preferred to attend an SP facility rather than to pay out-of-pocket to use a private
clinic, but the association was weaker. They found heterogeneity in the treatment
effects according to women’s education and health, as well as household assets and
residence strata. Taking advantage of the gradual introduction of the programme
as identification strategy, they use binary indicators for the year (2002, 2003 and
2004) the women’s municipality of residence was officially incorporated to Seguro
Popular as instruments. However, they only looked at outcomes from 2006 in a
cross-sectional study and they may have been unable to control for unobservable
characteristics in that year. Extending this analysis by adding data from other years
would be useful to reduce bias.
In a subsequent study, Harris and Sosa-Rubi (2009) complement the analysis by
Sosa-Rubi et al. (2009) by employing a latent class model to assess the impact of
Seguro Popular on number of prenatal visits in a cross-sectional sample of 4381 women
who gave birth between the years 2002 and 2005. They assume that women belong
to a latent class according to healthcare choice that can be modelled as a function of
observable covariates. They find a positive impact on access for obstetric services
on pregnant women; specifically, they show that enrolment in SP was associated
with a mean increase in 1.65 prenatal visits during pregnancy. The authors identify
that 59% of the effect is due to an increase in prenatal care among women who had
little or no access to care. They use an ordered probit model and try to address
the endogeneity of the voluntary enrolment to SP. Similarly to Sosa-Rubi et al.
(2009), the fact that the analysis is conducted on cross-sectional data from a single
year, may not address the endogenity issue. Moreover, the instrumental variable
in Harris and Sosa-Rubi (2009), may not satisfy the exogeneity assumption. They
use a locality-level variable for the percentage penetration of Seguro Popular among
the eligible population. The authors claim that penetration depends on investments
on healthcare infrastructure made by each state and on their efforts to inform the
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population about the availability of the programme. Therefore, it is treated as an
exogenous variable. However, the level of penetration among eligible population may
be affected by individuals factors related with their decisions to enrol and with class
membership.
The present study concludes a year after the cancellation of SP, which provides
sufficient information to evaluate SP over its whole duration. The cancellation of
SP also coincides with the new coronavirus pandemic. By December 2020, there
were more than 83 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 and more than 1.8 million
deaths worldwide. At that time, Mexico with 123,845 deaths had the fourth highest
mortality count by COVID-19 after USA, Brazil and India and the 13th for most
confirmed cases. COVID-19 is expected to be, in 2020, the second largest cause
of death in the country, overcoming diabetes mellitus, the second mortality cause
in 2019 with 101,257 deaths14. For the first time in 30 years, an infectious disease
is among the top five causes of death. This situation is challenging the capacity
of health systems around the world both in developed and in developing countries,
further emphasising the critical importance of health systems evaluation towards its
optimisation.
1.5 Supply-side considerations of Seguro Popular
A policy expansion of this magnitude would be expected to have influence on
both the demand- and the supply-side incentives. This study primarily focuses
on the demand-side, specifically on the change in enrollees’ behaviours. There
are, however, supply-side incentives at play. Seguro Popular changed the provider
payment mechanisms. The funding came from three sources: a contribution from the
state, called ’the social fee’; a second contribution came from the federation and the
states; the third came from an enrolling fee paid by the affiliated families according
to their income level. Around 5/7 of the total is paid by the federal government and
the rest by the other actors (Frenk Mora, 2004). The poorer 20% of affiliates are
exempted from the enrolment fees. An important change in the financing mechanism
was the basis on which the budget was assigned. Previously, resources were allocated
according to bureaucracy size: states would receive funds according to installed
infrastructure regardless of population served size. The policy was reformed to
allocate funds according to affiliated families. The idea was to match resources with
needs. The more affiliation, the more funding received. The incentives introduced
14The first largest cause of death in 2019 was heart conditions with 149,368 deaths.
https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2019/EstSociodemo/Defunciones
Registradas2019.pdf
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were for states to affiliate as many families as possible. However, states received
a fixed amount by affiliated family; therefore there was an incentive for efficiency.
Moreover, the mechanism of fund allocation was transparent through an auditable
registry of beneficiaries.
The intention for affiliation to be voluntary was to introduce an incentive for
providers to offer high quality services. In that way, providers would avoid de-
affiliation and not lose any resources. However, in practice, family fees were not
required for affiliation, and therefore, families did not have strong incentives to
de-affiliate. Families would remain beneficiary and use a combination of Seguro
Popular and private health services according to their needs and preferences. The
policy was designed to increase availability of resources, and to use them efficiently
while providing high quality healthcare. There is evidence of increased availability
of resources (Celhay et al., 2019; Huffman and van Gameren, 2019). In practice,
therefore, the threat of de-affiliation was not credible, thus, it did not introduce an
incentive for high quality services.
Changes to incentives have to be taken into account when evaluating a policy
like Seguro Popular. An evaluation of a health insurance programme for the poor
in Colombia (Miller et al., 2009) identifies the change in incentives from both the
demand and the supply side introduced by the ’Subsidised Regime’ (SR) programme.
SR is a health insurance programme targeted to the poor. It differs from Seguro
Popular in that the enrolees are fully subsidised to purchase insurance from private
insurers approved by the government. Insurers must provide standardise benefit
packages in exchange for standardised premiums. SR unlike SP operates as a health
insurance. Under SR as Seguro Popular, providers receive a fixed amount per enrollee
to use on primary healthcare. The incentive is in both cases to constrain primary care
expenditure. This is the efficiency incentive described above. For specialised services,
providers receive a fee for each service they provide in the case of SR. For SP, the
resources for the specialised services come from a fund for catastrophic healthcare
expenditures on a by service basis as well. In the SR case, the incentive is to provide
all reimbursable services; similarly, in the case of SP, the incentive is to provide the
services included in the interventions covered by the catastrophic fund.
1.6 The present evaluation of Seguro Popular
The second chapter of the thesis is an evaluation of the impacts of Seguro Popular on
the health status of adults with a focus on hypertension as a known underlying cause
of metabolic conditions, such as cardiovascular disease and diabetes, and on the
change in utilisation of health services. Using a panel dataset that covers from 2002
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to 2012, treatment effects are estimated using difference-in-difference specifications.
The third chapter is concerned with the distributional effects of the SP programme.
Using both cross-sectional and longitudinal data, the chapter evaluates the effect
of the programme on childhood nutritional health. The fourth chapter of the
thesis is an assessment of the financial protection mechanism of Seguro Popular.
The study, using a repeated cross-sectional dataset on households’ income and
expenditure, estimates the programme’s impact on out-of-pocket healthcare payments,
catastrophic payments and impoverishment and its antipoverty and distributional
effects. Treatment effects are estimated by fixed effects and instrumental variables for
average effects; while distributional effects are estimated using non-linear difference-
in-differences methods. Given that the policy targets people with no social protection
in the lower income deciles it is reasonable to think that a reduction in out-of-pocket
payments for healthcare would have positive effect in welfare and we would expect a
higher effect on the poorest.
Chapter 2
Impact of Seguro Popular on
healthcare utilisation and health
outcomes
Abstract
Over the last 30 years, the Mexican government started an ambitious expansion of
the health system with the aim of granting universality of healthcare coverage for
more than 50 million unprotected individuals. Seguro Popular de Salud, a health
social insurance programme, was introduced with the goal of tackling the prevailing
inequality in healthcare access. Exploiting the time and space variation in the
introduction of Seguro Popular, the present study uses differences-in-differences
specifications with variations in identification strategies to estimate the programme’s
impact on health outcomes with an emphasis on risk factors for adult metabolic
conditions, and the effect on utilisation of health services. Results show that the
programme had no effects on health outcomes or health care utilisation; however,
there is a long-run effect on mortality rates for different age groups. Intention-to-treat
effects showed a reduction in the mortality rate of 24 deaths per 1000 births, 14 years
after the introduction of Seguro Popular among poorer municipalities. Moreover, the
impact seems to be increasing in a sustained trend. The policy also had an impact
on the mortality rate among children under 10 years of age to a lesser degree.
2.1 Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines universal coverage as access to
effective and high quality healthcare to all people when needed without the risk of
financial hardship (WHO, 2010). WHO (2005) defines the necessary actions to attain
universal coverage. These are, among others, that health systems financing must
allow for a method of healthcare prepayment to spread the risk across the population
to prevent catastrophic and impoverishing health payments for households; to ensure
the equitable distribution of good quality infrastructure and human resources to
provide in turn equitable and good-quality healthcare; to develop a sustainable
financing mechanism for the health system; and to meet the healthcare needs of the
population, improve its quality, and to reduce poverty1.
1https://www.who.int/health_financing/documents/cov-wharesolution5833/en/
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According to the Mexican government, with the enrolment of over 50 million
people into Seguro Popular, Mexico in 2012 had attained universality of access
to healthcare with a comprehensive healthcare package and financial protection
(Reich, 2020). While evidence suggests that there are still people with no healthcare
coverage2, catastrophic healthcare expenditures (King et al., 2009; Knaul et al., 2005;
Sosa-Rubí et al., 2011), as well as impoverishment (Knaul et al., 2018) were reduced.
Importantly, the challenge remained to ensure to provide more equitable and high
quality health services across the population. The aim of this study is to evaluate
the progress in universalisation of healthcare coverage in the Mexican health system
with the introduction of Seguro Popular in terms of improving health status and
healthcare utilisation.
2.2 Background
2.3 The impact of universal health insurance in
other countries
High costs are one of the main barriers to accessing healthcare. Health insurance
seeks to overcome this barrier by managing funds through risk-pooling mechanisms,
so that the burden of cost of a treatment does not solely fall on the individual
receiving it, but is shared across a group of individuals. In this kind of system
access is expanded and individuals are financially protected. There is an increasing
interest for countries to reach universal healthcare coverage. Moreno-Serra and Smith
(2012) conducted a literature review on the impact of universal healthcare coverage,
and found that universal healthcare coverage improves citizens’ health and brings
economic benefits through expanding access to health services and protecting against
out-of-pocket and catastrophic expenditures. Moreover, findings suggest that the
benefits of universal coverage will be larger for less healthy and more financially
vulnerable individuals.
In a systematic review, on the impact of social health insurance in low- and
middle- income countries, Acharya et al. (2013) found that uptake of services is less
than expected; they also found no strong evidence of impact on utilisation or health
status. However, there were, in some cases, some impacts on financial risk protection
from out-of-pocket expenditures but the effect on the poor was weaker compared to
the general population. They found that enrolment rates varied across programmes
2CONEVAL. Evolución de las dimensiones de pobreza 1990-2018. https://www.coneval.org.mx/
Medicion/Paginas/Evolucion-de-las-dimensiones-de-pobreza-.aspx
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and were determined by many factors. In some cases, female-headed households,
elderly-headed households, family size and education attainment had positive effects
on enrolment; while initial health conditions or distance to health centres did not
show an effect. On utilisation, they did not find a higher probability of care seeking
resulting from enrolling. Moreover, they did find different results for the same
insurance programme in the literature. From 15 studies reporting utilisation, they
found that 9 reported a higher utilisation rate among the insured. However, they
note that the increase does not translate necessarily to improved welfare as it could
be the result of moral hazard. On financial protection, the authors found that only 4
out of 16 studies reported conclusive indications of lower average OOP expenditures
for the insured. They found seven studies reporting mixed results of insurance on
financial protection and two showed no effect. Five studies reported lower incidence
of catastrophic healthcare expenditures. From the literature reviewed, Acharya et al.
(2013), only found that six studies reported on health outcomes and among those
studies only two reported an improvement in health of covered population. They
explain that if there is not an improvement on quality of services, utilisation will not
grow and health status will not improve.
In a more recent systematic review, Erlangga et al. (2019) reported findings of
public health insurance impact on healthcare utilisation, financial protection and
health status from 68 studies published between 2010 and 2016. Overall, having
health insurance was found to increase healthcare utilisation. The effect of utilisation
on curative care was found to be positive in 30 out of 38 studies. Preventive care was
found to have a less clear effect: only 4 out of 7 studies reported a positive effect,
two studies reported a negative effect and one did not find any effects. Among a
subsample of studies that controlled for biases more rigorously, seven studies reported
a positive relationship between insurance and utilisation; one reported no effect; and
one study reported a negative impact. Financial protection findings were less clear,
although overall they seem favourable. From the 34 studies that reported on the
effect of insurance out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure, 17 found a reduction on
health expenditures, 15 found no statistically significant effects and two studies found
that insurance increased out-of-pocket expenditure. From the 14 studies reporting
an effect on catastrophic healthcare expenditures, nine reported a reduction on the
risk of incurring catastrophic expenditures, three found no effect and two found
that insurance increase the risk. Two studies of the sample reported no effect on
impoverishment and four studies reported no effect on non-healthcare consumption.
There were limited results of the relationship between public health insurance and
health outcomes. However, there was some evidence of a health improvement impact
of the insurance. From 12 studies reporting health effects, 9 reported a positive
effect, one found a negative effect and two found no effect. Erlangga et al. (2019),
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conclude that public health insurance seems to have an effect on utilisation, no clear
effect on financial protection and a promising effect on health status, but that further
research is needed.
Results from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, an experimental study
conducted in the United States from 1974 to 1982, that randomly assigned people
to different insurance healthcare plans, showed that 87% of the participants of
the free care plan used any service vs only 68% of the participants on the 95%
co-payment plan (Manning et al., 1987). Nevertheless, it had limited effects on
health outcomes (Newhouse et al., 1993). More recently, evidence from the Oregon
Health Insurance Experiment in 2008, which randomly gave uninsured low-income
adults the opportunity to apply for Medicaid, one year after the lottery, showed that
the treatment group had higher healthcare utilisation, lower out-of-pocket medical
expenditures and better self-reported physical and mental health than the control
group (Finkelstein et al., 2012).
There is also growing literature on the effects of healthcare coverage expansion in
developing countries. In a large panel dataset for 153 countries, Moreno-Serra and
Smith (2015) showed that expanded health coverage by increases in public spending
results in lower child mortality with larger effects observed in lower-income countries.
Thailand introduced an equitable universal healthcare coverage system in 2001 that
reduced the incidence and intensity of catastrophic and impoverishing out-of-pocket
healthcare payments (Somkotra and Lagrada, 2008); and reduced post-neonatal
mortality and out-of-pocket expenditure (Gruber et al., 2014).
Latin American countries, since the 1990s, have been strengthening health systems
towards a universal health coverage to provide financial protection, reduce inequalities
in health and access, and improve health outcomes. The aim has been the expansion
of services especially to the poor and uninsured population. Most of these countries
have complemented these reforms with a complete package of benefits to alleviate
poverty and social inequalities. Brazil and Cuba, for example, introduced tax-
financed universal healthcare systems (Atun et al., 2015). The universal health
insurance in Colombia increased access and utilisation of healthcare and reduced the
incidence catastrophic health expenditures especially for the most vulnerable people
(Giedion and Uribe, 2009). In Argentina, Plan Nacer, an insurance programme that
offers reproductive and child healthcare to uninsured families, increased the use and
quality of healthcare. Moreover, it had an impact on health status by reducing the
probability of low birthweight and the risk of in-hospital mortality (Gertler et al.,
2014).
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2.3.1 The epidemiological context in Mexico
A rise in life expectancy, together with the decline in childhood mortality and general
mortality, has led to a change in disease profile of the Mexican population. In
the past three decades, infectious diseases have no longer been among the main
mortality causes in Mexico, but have been over-taken by non-communicable diseases
and injuries (Soto-Estrada et al., 2016). In the mid-twentieth century, 50% of deaths
were due to common infections, maternal and infant mortality and diseases related
to malnutrition. The infant mortality rate is currently 12 deaths per 1000 births
(Soto-Estrada et al., 2016), which represents a 50% reduction from 2000 (OECD,
2016). By 2010, these illnesses account for less than 15% of deaths in the country,
while non-communicable diseases and injuries represent 75% and 11% of deaths,
respectively (Dantés et al., 2011). Metabolic and chronic conditions are of particular
importance. The leading causes of death are heart disease and diabetes mellitus.
From 2000 to 2012, the prevalence of overweight in adults rose from 62% to 72.5%;
37% children are overweight or obese, while 32% of adults are obese (OECD, 2016).
Prevalence of diabetes is above 15%, greater than the average among OECD countries,
which is 6.94%. Despite its epidemiologic transition, Mexico still has marginalised
populations where infectious and maternal and infant mortality are the main causes
of death (Soto-Estrada et al., 2016).
Public investment in healthcare in Mexico has increased from 2.4% to 3.2% of
GDP in the last ten years; in the same period Seguro Popular has covered more than
50 million people. Out-of-pocket expenditures have reduced noticeably, from 60%
(Wirtz et al., 2012) to 41%3 and impoverishing expenditures, previously prevalent
at 3.3% of the population, are currently only about 0.8% (OECD, 2016). However,
the proportion of health budget assigned to administrative expenditure is at 10%,
the highest in the OECD. Health expenditures account for 5.5% of GDP, while the
OECD average is 8.8% (OECD, 2016).
2.3.2 Contribution to the literature
Evidence suggests that Seguro Popular ’s impacts on health outcomes varied with
the timing of introduction. Early studies found that Seguro Popular had from
non-existent in most cases to very mild treatment effects. However, more recent
evaluations have found positive impacts on health of beneficiaries. For example, a
randomised study was designed and implemented with cooperation from the Mexican
government when SP was first introduced to estimate its impacts on health care
3Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Health at a Glance 2019: Mexico.
https://www.oecd.org/mexico/health-at-a-glance-mexico-EN.pdf
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utilisation, health, and financial protection ten months after programme introduction
(King et al., 2009, 2007). At the outset of this study, the authors claimed that
ten months would be ample time to measure changes in utilisation due to the
programme. Indeed, the authors found a decline in 23% in out-of-pocket healthcare
payments. However, the study found no effects of the programme on health outcomes
or healthcare utilisation. According to the authors, as the experiment was run in
a small number of arbitrarily selected municipalities, it may suffer from external
validity4 concerns common to randomised controlled trials (Deaton and Cartwright,
2018); and by being assessed ten months after implemented, this was arguably not
sufficient time for treatment effects on the health outcomes studied to be observed.
Barros et al. (2008) used a triple differences approach similar to the current study,
that, in addition to group and time dimensions, includes an intensity parameter
that indicates the degree of progress in individual affiliation with respect to target
affiliation by municipality. The intensity variable in the current study, in contrast, is
defined with respect to the maximum affiliation reached by municipality, which is a
more realistic measure. Moreover, the dataset used in Barros et al. (2008) is two
waves of the repeated cross sectional survey Encuesta Nacional de Salud y Nutrición.
Even though it is a representative survey, the estimates obtained may be biased as
the surveyed households are different across years. The strategy of the current study
is to take advantage of the longitudinal structure of the Mexican Family Life Survey
following individuals over ten years in three waves, which improves the estimations.
Pfutze (2014) found that Seguro Popular reduced infant mortality rate by 5 in
1000 births after five years of implementation. However, that study used only cross
sectional data and, therefore, does not address the bias caused by the endogenous
affiliation completely. Moreover, the census data, as the author notes, misses some
information on births and deaths. In contrast, the present study examines infant
mortality looking at mortality rates from 2000 to 2017 to capture short and long-run
effects using the dataset of all death certificates, which is not affected by recall bias.
Turrini et al. (2016) found a mild increase in height-for-age in children after the
programme has been established for several years. However, they compare different
children at different times. In contrast, the current study follows the same individuals
across three waves over 10 years, which improves estimations.
Pfutze (2015) finds evidence of reduced risk of a miscarriage of 0.04% for each
percentage point increase in coverage over the 2004-2008 period. However, it relies
on cross sectional data and considers affiliation to Seguro Popular starting in 2004,
which ignores the two years pilot phase, which could bias the results. Conti and Ginja
(2020) find a significant and clear impact of SP on health outcomes: according to
4External validity refers to how generalisable are the result of a study in a different context.
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their results, child mortality was reduced by 10% in poor municipalities. They exploit
the staggered timing of implementation of SP by comparing changes in mortality
rates for all age groups in municipalities that introduced it in different years between
2002 and 2010 and found a reduction in mortality rates among infants living in poor
municipalities. They also found that the introduction of Seguro Popular in poor
municipalities is associated with an increase in healthcare utilisation. Obstetric-
related hospital admissions had an immediate increase of 7% and with a 6% increase
in general hospital admissions. However, their analysis covers the first ten years of
the programme, while the present study extends the scope through 2017 to capture
short and long-term effects.
Given that the number of diseases, treatments, and medications covered by
Seguro Popular increased drastically between 2004 and 2012 (Knaul et al., 2012), it
is reasonable to think that utilisation of the programme may have increased as the
programme catalogue expanded and affiliates learned more about the improvements.
In fact, after the early experiment, most of studies found a positive impact of Seguro
Popular on utilisation. Gakidou et al. (2006) found that SP affiliates used more
inpatient and outpatient services than uninsured people; while Scott (2006) found
higher utilisation rates of public health services for SP affiliates than for the rest
of the uninsured. King et al. (2009) found no effect on utilisation. Sosa-Rubi et al.
(2009) found a positive impact of SP on access to obstetrical services. Harris and
Sosa-Rubi (2009) found that SP affiliation was associated with an increase by 1.65
prenatal visits during pregnancy. Knox (2016) also found an increase in use of
medical care. In another study using the original experimental data complemented
with administrative data, Spenkuch (2012) finds that programme affiliates are less
likely to use preventive health care services, a finding that he takes to be evidence
of moral hazard among beneficiaries. On the other hand, there is growing evidence
that Seguro Popular does reduce out-of-pocket health care expenditure (Barros et al.,
2008; Galárraga et al., 2010; Sosa-Rubí et al., 2011).
Most of the research on Seguro Popular on the impact of the programme on
health outcomes, use of health care services, and household spending on health care
have relied on cross-sectional data and cannot completely control for bias due to self-
selection into Seguro Popular5. Only a few studies have used panel data to measure
the causal impact of Seguro Popular on health outcomes using the geographic roll
out of the programme as a natural experiment: two of them look at early years of the
programme (Barros et al., 2008; Knox, 2008); one focuses only on urban areas (Knox,
2016); one looks at children health outcomes (Turrini et al., 2016); and another looks
5Individuals that enrol in Seguro Popular expect a higher benefit than individuals that choose
not to enrol.
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at the municipality-aggregated data (Conti and Ginja, 2020). In this study, the
natural variation of implementation timing on the municipality level will be used to
estimate the impact of Seguro Popular on health outcomes and utilisation among a
panel of adults.
2.4 Objective
The main function of public health insurance is to protect individuals from financial
risk caused by health shocks and allow them to smooth consumption over time.
People in the lower income groups and those outside the formal economic sector
are particularly vulnerable to financial hardship caused by paying for healthcare
out-of-pocket. In low- and middle-income countries, governments aim for universal
healthcare coverage through extending the social health insurance that mainly covers
the formal sector to the informal sector. This is funded through taxes and generally
offering a reduced package (Acharya et al., 2013). Another alternative to provide
financial protection to the poor is through subsidised voluntary household enrolment
schemes offering a pre-defined benefit package. These schemes are completely
subsidised or charge a premium well below the actuarial fair price (Acharya et al.,
2013).
Selection into insurance may introduce bias in the evaluation results. One way
is through adverse selection. Individuals who voluntarily enrol might have a higher
probability of needing the services than those who do not, and those differences
in need may be highly associated to health outcomes. Therefore, a comparison of
the health outcomes between voluntarily insured and the uninsured will result in
biased estimation. The impact of the programme may be underestimated because
on average the affiliated will have lower levels of health. In addition to this problem,
it is possible that the programme could be partly responsible for the rise in certain
conditions, especially those that are metabolic and chronic as a result of moral hazard.
Moral hazard is present in public health insurance when covered individuals do not
use preventive care or even neglect their health since the price of treating illness
has fallen. The presence of moral hazard complicates the estimation of programme
effects. In this case, increases in utilisation may be observed, but with a limited
or even negative impact on the health of the insured. Measuring preventive health
utilisation and health outcomes can provide insight into whether the insured are
engaging in moral hazard (Spenkuch, 2012).
A way to reduce these types of biases is to assign the programme randomly among
the population. In a randomised evaluation design approach, any change in the
outcomes can be attributed to the programme and the likelihood of confounding by
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these factors will reduced. In observational or non-experimental frameworks, which
are more common in health policy research, assignment of individuals to treatment
is not randomised but based on population characteristics that can be observed or
unobserved. The alternative in these contexts, is to identify a source of exogenous
variation in the assignment to treatment that is independent to the outcomes in
question to reduce the bias of estimates (Jones and Rice, 2011).
Following the definition of universal healthcare coverage given by WHO (2010),
the aim of this study is to assess the degree of success Seguro Popular achieved in
creating universality of healthcare coverage in Mexico in terms of access to healthcare
and health status of affiliates. Health outcomes are divided into general health
measurements and self-reported health status. The health variables of interest
for this study are related to metabolic diseases and chronic conditions. Previous
evaluations of SP focus on child health because health status in young ages is more
reactive to health insurance programmes and therefore effects are easier to detect
(Conti and Ginja, 2020; Pfutze, 2014; Turrini et al., 2016). However, given the global
epidemiological transition, where infectious diseases (more commonly prevalent in
young children) are no longer among the principal causes of death, and chronic
conditions (more prevalent among adults) and accidents are more prominent in
mortality causes, the focus for assessing the programme effects should also be on
these types of conditions. While the declining importance of infectious diseases in
comparison to metabolic and chronic conditions in terms of mortality and morbidity
is a common trend in the world (Murray et al., 2015), it is important to assess the
contribution of Seguro Popular to this transition.
2.5 Data
To evaluate improved access to healthcare and health outcomes, the data are taken
from Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) (Rubalcava and Teruel, 2006, 2013),
a panel survey that spans the temporal and spatial roll-out of SP. The first wave
(MxFLS1) was conducted in 2002, before the official SP implementation; the sec-
ond (MxFLS2) occurred in 2005-2006, one year after implementing; and the third
(MxFLS3) was conducted in 2009-2012. The baseline sample was representative
at the regional, rural, urban, and national levels. It contained a sample of 35,677
individuals in 8,440 households, located in 150 communities spread over 16 states.
MxFLS includes extensive information on health-related outcomes including self-
reported health, illness, use of health care, healthcare expenditures, mental health,
maternal health and infant health outcomes as well as anthropometric measures and
biomarkers including cognitive ability. The survey contains detailed information on
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socioeconomic status at the household level and on the individual level. MxFLS also
included information on social programmes; for each household member, of at least
14 years old, the survey collects information on whether household members received
benefits from social programmes and if they are covered by health insurance (and if
so, from what source). The information on individual enrolment to SP comes from
this survey. The survey also includes information on the availability of health care
services within a municipality.
Additionally, administrative datasets were consulted. To estimate effects on
mortality rates by age groups, administrative data on population, deaths and births
are utilised to construct death rates by municipality for the years from 2000 to 2018.
The data comes from the National Population Council (CONAPO)6 and the National
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) from Mexico7. The information on
municipality-level enrolment comes from an administrative dataset of the total of
individuals affiliated to the programme at the end of the year from 2002 to 2019.
This data is used to construct an indicator of the roll-out at the municipality level.
Related literature considers Seguro Popular to be introduced to a municipality once
10 families or more are affiliated (Bosch and Campos-Vazquez, 2014; Conti and Ginja,
2020; Del Valle, 2014). As the data used in this study only specifies the number of
individuals and not family membership, the threshold used here is 40 individuals,
defining an average household to be composed by 4 individuals. Results do not
change significantly when this specification is altered.
In this study, the effects of Seguro Popular are estimated on four types of outcomes:
mortality rates, health measure outcomes, self-report health outcomes and healthcare
utilisation. Impacts on mortality rates are estimated for infants, children from 1 to
10 years old, adults of 20 years old and older adults of 60 and above.
The health measure outcome variables considered are high blood pressure and
anaemia. These conditions are representative of the disease profile in Mexico, where
given the high prevalence of overweight and obesity, metabolic conditions as diabetes
and cardiac ailments are the main causes of death (OECD, 2016); and at the same
time, infectious diseases and malnutrition-related conditions are still prevalent among
poorer population (OECD, 2016). High blood pressure has remained constant in
Mexico during the years analysed in this study. In 2000, hypertension prevalence
was 30.1% and in 2012 it was 31.4%(Campos-Nonato et al., 2013). In contrast, the
prevalence of other metabolic conditions as obesity and diabetes has worsened in
6Proyecciones de la Población de México y de las Entidades Federativas, 2016-2050 y
Conciliación Demográfica de México, 1950-2015. CONAPO. https://www.gob.mx/conapo/acciones-
y-programas/conciliacion-demografica-de-mexico-1950-2015-y-proyecciones-de-la-poblacion-de-
mexico-y-de-las-entidades-federativas-2016-2050
7Mortalidad general. INEGI. https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/mortalidad/?ps=microdatos
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those years. Overweight and obesity prevalence had a statistically significant increase
of almost 10 percent points growing from 61.8% in 2000 to 71.3% in 2012 (Barquera
et al., 2013). The hypothesis of this study is that the apparent no change in high
blood pressure may be the result of opportune detection or treatment caused by an
improved access to healthcare of Seguro Popular enrolled families.
Anaemia is a nutritional condition caused by insufficient iron intake. The preva-
lence in Mexico in 2012 was 11.5% among non-pregnant women and 17.9% among
pregnant women (Shamah-Levy et al., 2013). Anaemia prevalence declined between
2000 and 2012 by 10 percent points among non-pregnant women, and by 13.5 p.p.
among pregnant women. The reduction in prevalence observed may have been
caused by improved nutrition in women in general or by an opportune detection
and appropriate treatment. Health interventions may reduce iron deficiency by
prescribing iron supplements (Shamah-Levy et al., 2013). The objective of this work
is to examine if there is an impact of Seguro Popular in that reduction. Moreover,
there is evidence of increased utilisation of obstetric services among Seguro Popular
recipients (Harris and Sosa-Rubi, 2009; Sosa-Rubi et al., 2009) this may have had an
impact on anaemia detection and treatment among pregnant women.
The self-report health outcomes analysed are individuals’ assessment of current
and past health. The healthcare utilisation variables included are outpatient health-
care visits in the last 4 weeks, inpatient visits in the last 12 months and health
insurance coverage status.
Finally, the socio-economic and demographic covariates included are, on the
individual level: age, sex, civil status, and years of education; on the household
level, household size, income level and whether if any of the household members
received benefits from Oportunidades, a conditional cash transfer programme; and a
marginalisation index on the municipality level.
2.6 Methods
The main hypothesis of this study is that the healthcare coverage expansion intro-
duced by Seguro Popular will increase utilisation by reducing its cost, which will
result in improved population health.
Identification strategy
This study uses two definitions of treated population to test the hypothesis depending
on the enrolment level. The main strategy is to use the municipality-level affiliation.
People that decide to enrol in the programme may have different unobservable
characteristics than people that decide not to enrol. Therefore, simply comparing
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outcomes of the affiliated to the non-affiliated will give biased estimations. To account
for those differences, the treated population is defined as individuals residing in
municipalities where the programme has already been roll-out regardless of their
affiliation status. Comparing outcomes of people according to municipality level
affiliation rather than individual voluntary affiliation reduces the self-selection bias
introduced by the differences between individuals who decide to enrol and individuals
that do not. Therefore, the parameters estimated are intent-to-treat effects on the
treated. An alternative strategy uses individual level affiliation to find average
treatment effects on the treated. People who report being enrolled in the programme
are compared with the eligible population that reported not being enrolled. To
account for the possible bias, treatment and control individuals are matched at
the baseline sample before implement a difference-in-differences (DD) estimation.
However, the approach using municipality-level identification to account for selection
bias is preferred.
A simple comparison between municipalities that are enrolled with those that
are not, would be biased as there may be unobserved factors that explain enrolment.
By comparing before-and-after outcomes in the treated municipalities, a DD design
controls for observed and unobserved factors in the group that are constant over time;
and by comparing the before-and-after outcomes in the untreated municipalities but
shared comparable conditions as the participants, bias introduced by time varying
factors are accounted for.
The treatment effect is the change in the potential outcome of an individual i
after receiving the intervention compared to a control.
∆i = y1i − y0i (2.1)
where the superscript 1 represents treatment and 0 represents control. Thus, the
evaluation problem is a missing data problem, as we never observe y1i and y0i at the
same time (Holland, 1986). To solve this problem, the DD design first takes the
before-and-after comparison for the treated as
(Yi1|Ti = 1) − (Yi0|Ti = 1) (2.2)
where Yi1 is the potential outcome after treatment; and Yi0 is the before treatment
potential outcome. Ti is the treatment indicator that denotes treatment if T = 1,
and T = 0 if control. The before-and-after comparison for the control group is given
by
(Yi1|Ti = 0) − (Yi0|Ti = 0) (2.3)
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The DD estimator results from taking the difference between the previous two
expressions:
DD = E[(Yi1|Ti = 1) − (Yi0|Ti = 1)]˘E[(Yi1|Ti = 0) − (Yi0|Ti = 0)] (2.4)
For DD to be valid, it is necessary that there are no time-varying differences in
outcomes between groups which means that changes in outcomes follow parallel
trends. This assumption can be tested by looking at the trends followed by treated
and comparisons before treatment. The DD estimator in a regression framework is
given by:
Yit = τtt ∗ Ti + αtt + γTi + εit (2.5)
where DD = τ , α represents the time trend effects, γ the time invariant group effects
and ε an error term assumed to be independent and identically distributed.
2.6.1 Intent-to-treat effects
To estimate the treatment effects of SP, the gradual roll-out of the programme is used
as the identification strategy. Nationally, SP was implemented at the municipality
level starting from 2002 in a pilot stage with 7% of municipalities; 15% in 2003. The
official start in the programme was 2004 with approximately 30% of municipalities
across the country and continued progressively, reaching more than 99% in 2011
(Fig. 2.1). These numbers differ slightly from the MxFLS sample used here, where
individuals are followed on three different survey waves, 2002, 2005-2006 and 2009-
2012. In the first wave, 24% of the sample surveyed live in a municipality where the
programme was implemented in 2005; by the second wave, 76% of the households live
in a municipality where the programme was roll-out in between 2002 and 2006; and by
2009, the whole population lives in a treated municipality and are intention-to-treat
cases.
As the programme targets the uninsured population, eligible individuals are those
who are not affiliated to social security. By law, an individual protected by any
institution of social security cannot be affiliated to Seguro Popular8.
To estimate intention-to-treat effects, the treated population is defined as those
individuals living in a municipality where the programme was already implemented at
the time of the survey in 2002, 2005 or 2009, and who are eligible for the programme.
In Figure 2.2, the continuous line represents the treated population, and the dashed
lines the three observation points. All outcomes are observed before and after one
8Ley General de Salud. http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Documentos/Federal/pdf/wo11037.
pdf
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Fig. 2.1 Municipality level roll-out by year
and two years of affiliation for the 2005 wave. For the 2009 wave, outcomes are
observed from zero to five years of affiliation. Population who voluntarily enrol to SP
are likely to be different from the ones who do not, and probably those differences
are related to the outcome of interest. For that reason, intent-to-treat effects are
estimated as the difference between eligible and non-eligible population.
The first approach to estimate treatment effects is a difference-in-differences
design (DD). The treated group consists of individuals from families that reported
not being protected by social security and the control group consists of individuals
from families affiliated to social security. The outcomes of treatment and controls
are compared before and after treatment. Treatment does not occur at the same
time across municipalities, but in different years between 2002 and 2008 in the
municipalities included in the survey. The time of treatment is re-centred for all
municipalities so that all observations before t = 0 belong to the pre-treatment period
and all observations after t = 0 belong to the post-treatment period (see Table 2.1).
Between the first and the second period, 70% of the sample became treated. Those
municipalities have one observation in the pre-treatment period and two observations
in the after-treatment period. The 30% that remained untreated in the second wave,
are individuals with residence in municipalities where policy adoption takes place after
the second wave and before the third wave (see Fig. 2.3). Those municipalities have
two observations in the pre-treatment period and one after treatment. Individuals
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Fig. 2.2 Municipality level roll-out by year (MxFLS sample)











Notes. This table shows the population and timing
definitions for equations 2.6 and 2.9
who were always-treated: those living in municipalities who became treated in 2002,
by the start of the survey, were dropped from this specification. The model used
to estimate intention-to-treat effects, compares the outcomes between eligible and
non-eligible population over time and is defined as:
yimt = αtt + γgm + x′imtβ + τSPimt + ηi + δt + µm + εimt (2.6)
where yimt refers to all health and utilisation outcomes for individual i residing in
municipality m at time t; the estimation of the programme effect is the coefficient τ on
the interaction of time and eligibility SP = t ∗ g; the covariates ximt account for time-
varying, municipality, household and individual socio-demographic characteristics; α
represents the time-specific group-invariant effects; gm are the group-specific time-
invariant effects; and εimt is a random error term that captures all omitted factors
and is assumed to be uncorrelated with other regressors. Additional individual, ηi,
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municipal, µm, and year, δt, fixed effects are included to control for differences across
individuals, municipalities and years. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at
the individual level.
Fig. 2.3 Timing of Seguro Popular roll-out and MxFLS sample
A second approach to estimate the programme impacts is a two-way fixed effects
(TWFE) model. This specification only considers eligible population. As described
earlier, 70% of the municipalities adopt the programme between waves 1 and 2; and
the remaining 30% between the second and third waves. All municipalities become
treated by the third wave, which means the untreated group is empty for the third
wave. The late adopter municipalities are used as a control in this specification. To
estimate the intention-to-treat effects, this approach defines a panel data regression
model:
yimt = x′imtβ + τSPimt + ηi + δt + µm + εimt (2.7)
where the outcomes yimt are regressed on the roll-out indicator SPimt that takes
a value of one for municipalities that are participating in Seguro Popular in a
given year and 0 if they have not implemented the programme yet. As in the
specification described in equation 2.6, the time of treatment is re-centred for all
municipalities so that all observations before t = 0 belong to the pre-treatment
period and all observations after treatment belong to the post-treatment period.
The approach includes fixed effects for years, δt, to capture any time-variant shocks
and individual, ηi, and municipal, µm, fixed effects to control for time-invariant
fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the individual level and
εimt is a random error term that captures all omitted factors and is assumed to be
independent and identically distributed.
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The previous two specifications (eqs. 2.6 and 2.7) depend on the validity of the
parallel trends assumption, which means that the differences between treated and
control populations do not vary over time. To test that assumption, this section
presents an event study model as the main strategy to find programme effects. The
approach allows for heterogeneous treatment effects depending on the length in
time of exposure to treatment before and after the policy expansion. Moreover, it
looks for any trends in the outcomes in the pre-treatment periods. The impact of a
programme like SP is likely to vary over time as demand for health services increase
with affiliation of additional households (Knaul et al., 2012). The treated population
is defined as eligible individuals (those without social security coverage) living in
municipalities where the programme has already been adopted, and the controls are
eligible individuals from municipalities where the programme has not been adopted
yet. There is information from six years over three waves (2002, 2005-2006, 2009-2012)
and four possible years of adoption (2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007). That means there
are individuals observed from 5 years before implementation (those observed in 2002
in municipalities that adopted in 2007) to 10 years after implementation (observed
in 2012 that adopted in 2002)(see Fig. 2.3).
Defining years under treatment j as the difference between year of observation and
year of adoption, equation 2.8 shows treatment effects represented by the coefficients
τj of the interaction between year of observation t and year of implementation T :
ymit = ηi + µm + δt + x′mitβ +
−2∑
j=−5
τ 0j SPmt +
10∑
j=0
τ 1j SPmt + εimt (2.8)
where SP is an indicator that equals one if the municipality m offers the pro-
gramme in time t; the τj terms represent the differential effect for each year separately
from 5 years prior to the programme to 10 years after. The dummy variable that
corresponds to the period of one year before treatment j = −1 is omitted and taken
as the base year similarly to Conti and Ginja (2020) and Bailey and Goodman-
Bacon (2015). The first set τ 0 captures all the differences if any by year before
the programme, and the second set τ 1 are the differential effects by year under
treatment, all effects are estimated with respect to j = −1. So that any statistical
significance in the pre-treatment τ coefficients would imply a violation of the parallel
trends assumption. The fixed effects terms of equation 2.8 are ηi, to control for
time-invariant individual unobservables; µm, a set of dummy variables to account
for municipality-level effects; δt is the effect on any period common to all units;
covariates ximt account for time-varying household and individual socio demographic
characteristics; and the error term εimt, captures all the remaining omitted factors
and is assumed to be random and independent from other regressors.
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The models described so far account for variations in time and space in the
roll-out, but not for programme intensity – understood as the proportion of people
affiliated each year with respect to the maximum number of people reached in a
single year over the programme’s life (2020-2019) –. Those models assume that the
programme has been rolled-out in a given municipality if at least 10 households
are beneficiaries of the programme consistent with previous studies (Bosch and
Campos-Vazquez, 2014; Conti and Ginja, 2020; Del Valle, 2014). This assumption
does not take into account differences in the proportion of people that are in fact
enrolled in the programme. The following specification is a model that includes
an indicator of coverage at the population level to a triple-differences specification
that takes differences in intensity of coverage by municipality over time (pre and
post-treatment) and individual SP eligibility (covered by social security or not). The
model is similar to the one used in Barros et al. (2008) except for the definition of
intensity, in their case with respect to the target population and in this case with
respect to population eventually enrolled. The definitions of groups is similar to the
specification in equation 2.6, where the treated are individuals with no social security
affiliation after roll-out and the controls are those with social security benefits. The
model estimated is:
yimt =τ1intmt + τ2gi + τ3tt + τ4intmtgi + τ5intmttt+
τ6gitt + τ7intmgitt + x′imtβ + ηi + µm + δt + εimt
(2.9)
where the coefficient of β7 measures the programme effects as the triple interaction
of municipal intensity, time and eligibility. Programme intensity intmt is calculated
as the ratio of number of people covered by SP in a municipality on a given year
divided by the maximum number of people covered in any year between 2002 and
2019. Intensity in this context can be interpreted as the probability of an individual
i in a treated municipality m at year t to be affiliated to the programme. The model
includes the three variables, the three double interactions and a set of individual
covariates. Programme intensity can be interpreted as the probability that a given
individual is covered by the programme in a given year. Therefore, it tries to
proxy actual treatment effects by multiplying the intention-to-treat effects by the
probability of being covered by the programme. The model includes individual, ηi,
municipality, µm, and year, δt, fixed effects to account for the arbitrary roll-out across
municipalities; and εimt is the idiosyncratic error assumed to be random, independent
and identically distributed.
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2.6.2 Average treatment effects
The previous section describes the main strategy of correcting the possible selection
bias by estimating intention-to-treatment effects. In that case, the programme
impact is estimated on the eligible population but not necessarily on the population
effectively treated. This section presents an alternative strategy in which the treated
population are those families that reported being affiliated to Seguro Popular ; and the
controls are those individuals who are eligible to receive the programme, i.e. are not
covered by the social security, but are not enrolled in Seguro Popular. As affiliation
the programme is voluntary, there is a risk that the endogenous decision to enrol
introduce a bias in the estimations. The possible selection bias is addressed by the
combination of matching and difference-in-differences approaches. This specification
controls for observable and unobservable sources of bias by matching affiliates to
non-affiliates at the baseline level using entropy balance; and by estimating the
programme impact using difference-in-differences design. Programme beneficiaries
were matched to eligible population but not SP recipient using socio-demographic
characteristics such as age, sex, years of education, marital status, household income,
and whether the household is in a rural area. The sample was preprocessed by
entropy balancing to reach covariate balance between the beneficiary population and
the non-beneficiaries. The approach consists of a maximum entropy re-weighting
scheme that generates the weights that balance the treated and control groups with
respect to a set of covariates (Hainmueller and Xu, 2013). Entropy balance provides
a generalisation of the propensity score approach without the need for computing
the balance checks to verify that the weights match the covariate distributions. The
method allows for balance with respect to the mean or to higher moments (variance,
skewness) (Hainmueller, 2012). The resulting weights are used to estimate the
treatment effects using a weighted difference-in-differences model. To ensure that
treated individuals have comparable observations with the control group, only those
observations within the common support are used in the estimations.











Notes. This table shows population and timing
definitions for equation 2.10.
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There are two different specifications using the actual treatment indicator. The
survey only includes information about Seguro Popular affiliation for the second
(MxFLS-2) and third (MxFLS-3) waves. Therefore, the first specification compares
outcomes from affiliates to non-affiliates from those waves using a treated only
population who shift from untreated to treated (see Table 2.2). The second approach
includes the first wave into the analysis assuming no one was treated in 2002. The
assumption is reasonable as the programme was implemented in 2002 and it is
unlikely that by the time of the survey in the same year, any treated population
did experience already an impact. Moreover, only 7% reported being enrolled by
the second wave, therefore, the percentage insured by the first wave was probably
significantly lower. The model defined to estimate average treatment effects on the
treated (ATT) for both specifications is defined as:
yit = αtt + γgi + τSPit + x′itβ + ηi + µm + δt + εit (2.10)
where yit are health and utilisation outcomes at the individual level; the coefficient τ
of the interaction between group and time represents the estimation of the programme
effect; the covariates xit account for time-varying household and individual socio-
demographic characteristics; αt are the time-specific group-invariant effects; γi are
the group-specific time invariant-effects; ηi individual fixed-effects and εit is a random
error term that captures all omitted factors.
In summary, there are six strategies to test the hypothesis that SP improved
health status; the first is an intention-to-treat effects estimation that compares
outcomes from eligible to non-eligible population before and after municipality-level
roll-out; the second is a two-way fixed-effects estimation on eligible population
before and after treatment; the third approach is a felixible event study design that
captures the effect in time and tests the parallel trends assumption; the fourth is a
model of triple differences that takes into account programme’s intensity; the fifth
strategy consisted in comparing the population that reported being affiliated to the
programme with eligible population that reported non-affiliation to Seguro Popular
using two MxFLS: and finally a sixth strategy extends it to include three waves of
data. The primary approach is the event study design with the other five are used





Table 2.3 shows pre- and post-treatment summary statistics of the complete set of
outcomes and control variables for eligible population (people without social security)
and non-eligible population (people with social security). The socio-demographic
characteristics used as covariates at the individual level were age, sex, civil status and
years of education; at the household level the covariates include household size, asset
index, rural area and whether the household receives Oportunidades. On average, as
the survey follows the same individuals over time, age after treatment (43) is higher
to before treatment age (39); before treatment the sample was 44% male, and 42%
after treatment; the percentage of married population is 64%, slightly lower before
treatment, compared to 69% after treatment; years of education increase slightly
after roll-out, from 6.3 to 6.51. On household level characteristics, household size
is larger before roll-out, 6.32 members on average compared to 6.06 before roll-out;
asset index is 5.07 before rollout and 5.51 after roll-out; the percentage of treated
population living in rural areas is higher 48% compared to 43%; and population
receiving Oportunidades is 23% before treatment and 20% after-treatment; people
who exercise regularly dropped from 13% to 11%; finally, people reported exercising
more regularly before roll-out and smoking did not change. The next set of variables
are health outcomes. Average body mass index (BMI) is higher after roll-out, 26.46
compared to 27.76; the percentage of overweight is 35% before and 37% after roll-out;
prevalence of obesity increased from 22% to 30%; blood pressure level was higher
at the pre-programme period, it was 9% compared to 7% before the programme
introduction; anaemia levels were higher at baseline, 14% against 10% at follow-up.
On the self-reported health side, the proportion of people that consider their health
to be good remained constant at 46%; but those who thought health was better
than last year declined from 22% at pre-treatment to 20% after the policy expansion;
similarly, the proportion of people believing their health will be better next year
dropped from 33% before roll-out to 30% after roll-out; the percentage of people
reporting having good health considering age and gender had a slight increase from
28% to 29% in average. For healthcare utilisation, the proportion of people who had
an outpatient visit to a hospital or clinic remained constant at 11% and outpatient
visits to doctor, only 1% both before and after roll-out; hospitalisations increased;
from 4% to 5%; and the likelihood of having health insurance had a striking increase
from 2% to 26% as people enrolled to SP.
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Health outcomes
Table 2.4 panel 1 displays programme intention-to-treat effects of SP, before and after
the municipality of residence implemented the programme. The effects on population’s
health levels are estimated by the approach described by equation 2.6, where the
model takes the differences on eligibility (not having social security protection) over
time. The term that captures the programme effects is the interaction between the
indicator of eligible individuals and the post-treatment indicator. Columns 1 and
2 show results on hypertension for the full sample and for the poorer quintile of
the sample respectively. Columns 3 and 4 refer to ITT effects on anaemia for both
samples. There are no significant effects in any of the two outcomes for the full
sample or the poorer population sample. All models include individual, municipality
and year effects.
The second panel in Table 2.4 shows the results of the two-way fixed effects
design described in equation 2.7 where the treatment variable is an indicator of a
municipality already participating in the programme with individual, municipality
and time fixed effects. The signs of the coefficients have the expected direction for
both outcomes and both samples but are statistically insignificant.
Panel 3 of Table 2.4 shows the programme impacts of the triple-difference model
described in equation 2.9. The model takes differences in programme municipality
intensity over time (pre and post-treatment) and individual SP eligibility (covered
by social security or not). Programme intensity is defined as the proportion of
individuals affiliated to SP in a municipality in a given year with respect to the
maximum affiliation reached by that municipality in any year between 2002 and
2019. This can be interpreted as the probability of being actually affiliated, therefore,
an approximation to average treatment effects rather than intention-to-treat-effects.
The likelihood of having hypertension or anaemia when changing the intensity of
programme affiliation did not seem to be affected.
Finally, the main results on health outcomes are shown on panel 4 of Table 2.4.
Treatment effects are estimated by breaking up the programme’s impacts on health
by time of exposure in a municipality as described in equation 2.8. In this approach,
there are three observations for each individual (2002, 2005-2006, or 2009-2012)
located in municipalities where the programme was implemented in any of the five
years between 2002 and 2007. Therefore, the survey has individuals from five years
before roll-out (observed in 2002 and roll-out in 2007), to 10 years after roll-out
occurred in a municipality (observed in 2012, roll-out in 2002). Time of exposure
is presented by year from -5 to 7 or more years of exposure. No effects of the
introduction of Seguro Popular over time are found with this specification for the
full sample or when considering only the poorer quintile in the sample.
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Self-reported health status
Table 2.5 shows the programme’s effects on some self-reported health indicators.
In panel 1, the difference-in-differences estimator finds no effects on self-reported
health; similarly to panel 2, the TWFE estimates. In panel 3, when accounting
for the geographical intensity of the programme, results show that people in the
poorer quintile subsample reported having 2.13 percent points worse health for every
additional percent point in programme coverage. This unexpected effect could be
caused by intense individual enrolment in areas with with greater need in terms of
healthcare access; and poorer population. The effect can be explained by health
status underlying levels in those specific areas. Only after the programme is well
established on those areas, we may expect an effect on health levels, and in self-
reported health status. Taking into account differences in time of exposure to the
programme, defined in equation 2.8, panel 4 shows no statistically significant effects
on the self-perception of health derived from different years after the introduction of
Seguro Popular.
Healthcare utilisation
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show intention-to-treat effects of SP on healthcare utilisation
indicators. In panel 1, Table 2.7 as expected, there is a positive effect on eligible
population (no social security protected living in a municipality that adopted the
programme) of 24.8 percentage points on the likelihood of having public or private
health insurance and 29.6 percentage points on poorer population. There is no effect
in outpatient visits in the last four weeks or hospitalisations in the previous year.
In panel 2, Table 2.7 the effects of roll-out over time had no effect on the likelihood
of having health insurance. Moreover, Table 2.6 shows no impacts of the programme
roll-out on outpatient visits or hospitalisations.
When taking into account the geographical intensity, defined as the proportion of
affiliates in a municipality in a given year with respect to the maximum number of
affiliates in that municipality in any year, Table 2.6 shows that SP had no effect on
healthcare visits. Table 2.7 shows a positive effect of SP on health insurance uptake
of 1.62 p.p. with an increase in intensity of 1 p.p. and an increase of 1.23 p.p. in
health insurance uptake for every p.p. of expanded coverage. The positive effects on
health insurance uptake with an increase in coverage are to be expected.
Panel 4 in Table 2.6 shows no effect on healthcare visits. Table 2.7 on a event-
study design, shows the effect of SP across time. Time since SP introduction has
a positive effect on health insurance uptake. Moreover, health insurance uptake
increases the longer Seguro Popular has been operating in a municipality for both
samples. The effect for poorer population is larger, which is consistent with Seguro
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Popular ’s target population. These main findings estimated by equation 2.8 are also
shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, where the coefficients of intention-to-treat-effects seem
to be no different than zero for all outcomes except for health insurance uptake.
Fig. 2.4 Intention-to-treat effects of Seguro Popular
Mortality
This section describes intention-to-treat effects of Seguro Popular on mortality rates
by age group shown in Figures 2.6 and 2.7. To construct mortality rates, deaths data
was aggregated at the municipality-year level for years 2000 to 2017. Programme
impacts were estimated by an event-study design specification described in equation
2.8. Regressions were weighted by the population size of each age group. Time of
exposure was divided in years from six years or more years before roll-out to 14 years
or more after roll-out. The year prior to implementation is used as the reference
year as other studies (Conti and Ginja, 2020; Miller et al., 2021). This specification
has the advantage of including past periods for any existing trends to verify that the
parallel trends assumption is satisfied.
Table 2.13 shows the effect of SP on infant mortality rates by municipality for
all and for specifically poorer municipalities. Results show a clear reduction in the
infant mortality rate from 2.2 deaths per 1000 births on poor municipalities after
one year in the programme, to over 24 deaths after roll-out. Given that the weighted
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Fig. 2.5 Intention-to-treat effects of Seguro Popular on poor population
average infant mortality rate was estimated at roughly 13 deaths per 1000 births
in poorer municipalities, it is an important decline as shown in Figure 2.7. When
including all municipalities there seems to be a mild mortality rate increasing trend
before and after the introduction of SP but it is not statistically significant. For
children under 10 years of age, Table 2.14 shows no effect on the full sample, but a
decline in mortality due to the introduction of SP on poorer municipalities. However,
as shown in Figure 2.7, mortality rates seem to be following a trend from before
the introduction of Seguro Popular which would suggest a violation of the parallel
trends assumption. Among adults over 20 years of age and over 60 years of age, there
are not intention-to-treat impacts of SP on weighted mortality rates for the whole
population or for the sample restricted to marginalised and underdeveloped areas.
2.7.2 Average treatment estimations
Descriptive statistics
Table 2.8 shows summary statistics for the baseline sample before and after matching
for beneficiaries of SP and non-beneficiaries. The entropy balancing routine was
implemented for the first, second and third statistical moments of the outcomes and
covariate distributions (variances and skewness are not shown here). Table 2.8 shows
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Fig. 2.6 Intention-to-treat effects on mortality rates
Fig. 2.7 Intention-to-treat effects on mortality rates in poor areas
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that, after the matching routine, the means of non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries
are similar. The assumption is that once the samples are balanced, any difference
between the outcomes of the treated and the comparisons will be due to membership
to Seguro Popular. There is one year difference between affiliated and non-affiliated,
this difference remains after balancing the samples. Sex of recipients was 43% male
and 46% among non-recipients; 59% of affiliates were married, while for non-affiliates
the share was 51%; recipients had 6.92 years of education, while non-recipients
had 7.68 in average; household size was 7.41 among recipients while non-recipient
households had in average 6.21 members; recipients were poorer; and more likely to be
a Oportunidades beneficiary, 21% compared to 8% among SP recipient. SP enrolees
had higher BMI and more likely to be overweight or obese. Among non-recipients,
36% were overweight and 27% were obese, for recipients, the proportions were 38%
and 28% respectively. Prevalence of anaemia was 13% and hypertension 8% for
both groups. Only 49% of beneficiaries reported good health, in comparison to 58%
of non-beneficiaries; recipients were 9% likely to leave activities for health reasons,
compared to 8% among non-recipients. Recipients were also more pessimistic about
their health, 23% reported health being better than the previous year, compared
to 26% of non-recipients; 34% predicts their health will be better the following
year, compared to 38% for non-SP covered; and 30% considers their health is good
compared to someone of same sex and age; for non-recipients the share was 34%.
For health utilisation, 13% of Seguro Popular affiliates had an outpatient visit to a
hospital or clinic in the previous 4 weeks, compared to only 10% of non-affiliates;
1% of both groups had an outpatient visit to the doctor; 5% of beneficiaries were
hospitalised in the last 12 months, for 4% of non-beneficiaries; among SP recipients
the 32% had health insurance, while only 7% among non-recipients. Given that
the definition of recipient is at least one person in the household enrolled to Seguro
Popular, it is possible that, individually, only 32% are covered by health insurance.
Health outcomes
Table 2.9 shows average treatment effects on the treated using difference-in-differences
estimation on health outcomes. Taking the difference of individual affiliation in
time, as described in equation 2.10, using two MxFLS waves without matching, first
panel results suggest no apparent effects of the policy on the complete sample or
on the lowest quintile of income sample. The second panel, combining difference-
in-differences with entropy balance on two waves, show a negative effect of the
programme, however those are not statistically significant for either sample. The
third panel, using two-way fixed effects regressions, shows no effect of affiliation on
the three-wave unmatched sample in average or for the lowest income quintile. The
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fourth panel, shows no effects on the balanced three-wave panel in general or for the
poorer population sample.
Self-reported health status
Table 2.10 displays the effects on self-reported health status estimated as described
bt equation 2.10. Panel 1 and 2, show no effects on the unbalanced or in the balanced
difference-in-difference estimations for the full sample and when restricting to the
poorer quintile. Panel 3, when adding the third wave in a TWFE design with an
unmatched sample, shows no effects. However, for the balanced sample in panel
4, there is a small negative effect of 5 percent points on health self-assessment of
affiliating to SP for the entire sample, however, it is only marginally significant
(p<0.1).
Healthcare utilisation
The difference-in-differences estimation using two MxFLS waves, in Table 2.11, shows
no change in outpatient visits related to SP affiliation for the full sample (columns
1 and 3) or for the lowest income quintile (columns 2 and 4) for both matched
and unmatched samples (panels 1 and 2). For the matched two-way fixed effects
specification in panel 4, results show a positive effect of healthcare utilisation resulted
from affiliating to SP on the full sample. Outpatient visits had 2.9 percentage points
increase and hospitalisations had a rise of 1.6 p.p. on average. Table 2.12 as expected
shows a strong and positive effect of Seguro Popular on the likelihood of having
health insurance for all specifications and both populations. Average treatment
effects on the treated of affiliating to SP varied from 65 to 75 p.p. in the likelihood
of taking-up health insurance.
2.8 Discussion
The implementation of the Seguro Popular in Mexico had the objective to close the
gap in access to healthcare and health status between the insured and uninsured
population by reducing the financial barrier to services. The differences in access
between those two groups where the uninsured had to pay for healthcare worsened the
existing inequalities. While existing literature suggests that SP has been successful
as a financial protection mechanism (Barros et al., 2008; King et al., 2009; Sosa-Rubí
et al., 2011), the evidence on whether or not health outcomes are improved is less
definitive. The present study focused on determining the programme’s effect on
health status and healthcare utilisation.
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This study used a few model specifications with different identification strategies.
First, it estimated intention-to-treat effects of eligible population compared to non-
eligible; the second, using only eligible population estimated a two-way fixed effects
model; the third is a triple difference specification that extends the first by adding a
variable that captures the probability for an individual of being treated, where the
treatment effects are the triple interaction of probability of being treated by eligibility
over time; the fourth intent-to-treat estimate, the main strategy, analyses the effects
by the number of years on the programme and the controls are the same individuals
before treated. Finally, using the actual treatment indicator, a difference-in-difference
approach using two waves and a TWFE on the three waves was run on a previously
matched sample.
Results of these analyses show an effect on health status. Even though there is
no apparent impact on morbidity measured by hypertension or anaemia, there is an
effect found in reducing mortality rates of children in poorer areas. Infant mortality
rates had a clear impact; while mortality rates of older children had a modest impact
of less than one death by 1000 children; impact on mortality rates of adults had no
effect. One explanation for a lack of impact on morbidity is inadequate data. The
MxFLS panel dataset used for assessing SP effect on health outcomes and utilisation
has data up until 20109, while the administrative dataset use for assessing mortality
rates has data for 2017. According to results in table 2.13, there is an impact of the
programme on infant mortality rates right after SP is introduced. However, the effect
gets statistically stronger 10 years or more after the programme has been introduced
in a municipality. It is possible that impact on different health outcomes will also
manifest in the long run. Estimated impact on healthcare coverage is consistent with
the long run effect of Seguro Popular on health outcomes. According to results, the
effect of the programme on coverage gets greater with time under treatment, and
stabilises as shown in Figs. 2.4 and 2.5; or when adding a third wave as shown in
table 2.12.
SP effect on perception of own health for poorer population seems to show a
negative impact for some specifications. Evidence suggests that even in the context
of universal coverage, poorer population living in marginalised areas have less access
to healthcare in comparison with higher income households (Bautista-Arredondo
et al., 2014; Colchero et al., 2019). The challenge is to reduce inequalities in access.
There is a growing literature on the effects of the universalisation of healthcare
on financial protection, increasing access and improving the health status of the
population (Acharya et al., 2013; Erlangga et al., 2019). However, the historical
9MxFLS-3 provides some data on 2011, 2012 and 2013 but only about 5% of the full three-wave
dataset.
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structure of the Mexican health system where access to higher quality healthcare is
linked to labour status introduced deep inequalities. Wagstaff (2010) finds that this
type of system with payroll financing fares badly covering the non-poor informal
sector until the economy has reached a high level of economic development. In
Mexico, the prevailing system has underperformed providing health coverage to also
the poor informal sector. While there are examples in the world where more than
one protection schemes can coexist, the pooled mechanism for the uninsured without
the full pack of benefits of social security has not been the solution as it does not
address the problem of inequality.
This analysis has some limitations. The dataset used for the morbidity and
utilisation outcomes spans from the start of the programme in 2002 to the end of
the individual level enrolment. However, using longer time series would help provide
a better assessment of the programme. Results from this analysis and other studies
suggest that the effects are probably larger on the long run, about 8 to 10 years after
implementation. Additional data points after 2012 would shed some light on potential
long-run effects. Likewise, the fact that the survey does not include information from
before 2002, makes it challenging to examine pre-existing trends. Having additional
data points before implementation would have been useful to disentangle the effects
of Seguro Popular. The limited number of health outcomes in the survey is another
challenge of this study. A few other health variables were added in the third round
and those could be analysed using a different approach or using a similar one if there
is a fourth round. Another limitation related to the available data is the lack of
information on Seguro Popular uptake in the first round. This is probably not a
serious limitation as the proportion of people that already had the programme in
2002 was very low.
There is a limitation related to the presence of endogeneity in the voluntary
programme affiliation. The resulting bias is reduced by the approaches used as
identification strategies but it is possible that some bias remains in the estimates.
The municipality level identification might reduce the self-selection bias, but as the
programme was not randomly assigned at the municipality level, some bias may
persist. Including municipality fixed effects in the regressions helped mitigate against
such biases even further. Similarly, combining difference-in-differences approach with
entropy balancing on the individual-level analysis, helped reducing bias. Although
the remaining level of bias is a limitation, the multiple specifications used may
convince the reader it is not concerning.
One of the contributions of this study is the choice of metabolic conditions as
outcomes. The effect of Seguro Popular has been largely evaluated on mortality and
childhood and reproductive conditions but to a much lesser degree on metabolic
health outcomes. Sosa-Rubí et al. (2009) find an increase in access to healthcare
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services and a health improvement on diabetic patients. The present study does not
find an improvement on metabolic health of affiliates. A contribution is the use of
long time series data on mortality covering almost the totality of the programme
duration since before its start. Similar analyses on mortality rates covers a shorter
period (Conti and Ginja, 2017). This analysis builds up on previous work and finds
insight from long-run exposure. This type of analysis may contribute to understand
the long-run effects of the programme.
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Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics
Before roll-out After roll-out
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
Socio-demographic
Age 9,685 38.81 36 10,753 43.63 41
Sex (male=1) 9,812 0.44 0 11,563 0.42 0
Civil status (married=1) 10,072 0.64 1 11,564 0.69 1
Years of education 7,967 6.31 6 8,975 6.51 6
Household size 10,072 6.32 6 11,565 6.06 5
Asset index 9,319 5.07 5.34 11,436 5.51 5.83
Rural area 10,072 0.43 0 11,565 0.48 0
Oportunidades recipient 8,616 0.23 0 8,839 0.2 0
Ever had serious accident? 10,072 0.1 0 11,563 0.1 0
Over 50 years old 10,072 0.26 0 11,564 0.33 0
Exercises regularly 10,072 0.13 0 11,564 0.11 0
Has ever smoked 10,072 0.14 0 11,564 0.14 0
Health outcomes
Body mass index 9,282 26.46 25.83 10,313 27.76 27.25
Overweight 9,282 0.35 0 10,313 0.37 0
Obesity 9,282 0.22 0 10,313 0.3 0
Hypertension 8,779 0.09 0 10,737 0.07 0
Anaemia 8,267 0.14 0 8,581 0.1 0
Self-reported health
Reports good health 10,072 0.46 0 11,564 0.46 0
Left activities for health related
reasons last 4 weeks 10,072 0.09 0 11,563 0.1 0
Reports health to be better
than last year 10,071 0.22 0 11,552 0.2 0
Predicts health to be better
next year 10,070 0.33 0 11,562 0.3 0
Reports good health
for age/gender 10,071 0.28 0 11,562 0.29 0
Healthcare utilisation
OP visit to hospital/clinic
during last 4 weeks 10,068 0.11 0 11,532 0.11 0
OP visit to dr/healer
during last 4 weeks 10,068 0.01 0 11,531 0.01 0
IP visit to hosp/clinic
during last 12 months 10,067 0.04 0 11,533 0.05 0
Social security/private
health insurance 10,072 0.02 0 11,565 0.26 0
Notes. This table shows a descriptive summary of the sample contained in MxFLS1-3. Before
roll-out refers to the data from municipalities where Seguro Popular was not yet rolled-out. After
roll-out refers to those municipalities that were already affiliated to Seguro Popular.
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Table 2.4 Seguro Popular intention-to-treat effects on health outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hypertension Hypertension Anaemia Anaemia
all poor all poor
1. Difference-in-differences 0.00946 -0.00531 0.00169 -0.0137
(0.0148) (0.0332) (0.0186) (0.0497)
Observations 16,167 5,129 12,332 3,596
2. Two-way fixed effects -0.0222 -0.0313 -0.0347 -0.0549
(0.0195) (0.0294) (0.0325) (0.0526)
Observations 8,521 3,615 6,215 2,453
3. Triple differences 0.0288 0.659 -0.00871 0.0316
(0.0218) (0.418) (0.0357) (0.688)
Observations 16,167 5,129 12,332 3,596
4. Event-study model
year -5 -0.115 -0.0439 0.0476 -0.0245
(0.0728) (0.131) (0.0729) (0.140)
year -4 -0.116** -0.0657 0.0472 -0.0312
(0.0503) (0.0863) (0.0584) (0.102)
year -3 -0.0840* -0.00403 0.00653 0.0208
(0.0438) (0.0703) (0.0534) (0.0874)
year -2 -0.0297 0.0215 -0.0215 -0.0476
(0.0358) (0.0554) (0.0441) (0.0628)
year 0 -0.0127 0.00115 -0.0873* -0.0990
(0.0314) (0.0467) (0.0498) (0.0810)
year 1 0.0119 0.0130 -0.0914 -0.0461
(0.0400) (0.0652) (0.0560) (0.0998)
year 2 0.0369 0.0542 -0.0950 -0.0409
(0.0458) (0.0701) (0.0713) (0.108)
year 3 0.0843 0.0389 -0.108 -0.0588
(0.0567) (0.117) (0.0848) (0.138)
year 4 0.0639 0.0406 -0.134 -0.0425
(0.0707) (0.129) (0.0982) (0.155)
year 5 0.0934 0.101 -0.179 -0.0438
(0.0812) (0.147) (0.113) (0.188)
year 6 0.104 0.0740 -0.170 -0.0763
(0.0937) (0.178) (0.125) (0.211)
year 7 0.105 0.0616 -0.176 -0.0276
(0.101) (0.162) (0.146) (0.239)
Observations 8,521 3,615 6,215 2,453
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
This table displays intention-to-treat effects of Seguro Popular on health outcomes. Panels
1 & 2 are estimations resulted from using equation 2.6; panel 3, uses equation 2.9 and panel
4 are estimations from equation 2.8. All estimations include year and municipality fixed
effects and a set of socio-demographic covariates including age, sex, civil status, years of
education, household size, asset index, rural residence and membership to Oportunidades.
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Table 2.5 Seguro Popular intention-to-treat effects on self-reported health









all poor all poor
1. Difference-in-differences 0.0225 -0.00997 -0.00193 0.00955
(0.0238) (0.0213) (0.0530) (0.0451)
Observations 16,695 16,682 5,299 5,295
2. Two-way fixed effects -0.0276 0.00653 -0.0472 0.0341
(0.0433) (0.0315) (0.0598) (0.0364)
Observations 8,805 8,796 3,734 3,731
3. Triple differences -0.625 -2.135*** -0.109 -0.730
(0.473) (0.672) (0.565) (0.952)
Observations 16,695 16,682 5,299 5,295
4. Event-study model
year -5 0.0948 -0.0755 -0.00861 0.358*
(0.220) (0.147) (0.193) (0.203)
year -4 0.0539 -0.0308 -0.0680 0.217
(0.166) (0.103) (0.164) (0.150)
year -3 0.0897 -0.0169 0.0775 0.159
(0.113) (0.0782) (0.112) (0.112)
year -2 0.107 0.00550 0.0889 0.0771
(0.0665) (0.0508) (0.0746) (0.0732)
year 0 -0.00412 0.0338 0.0530 -0.0448
(0.0732) (0.0484) (0.0824) (0.0718)
year 1 -0.0191 0.0370 0.0288 -0.166
(0.117) (0.0733) (0.117) (0.106)
year 2 -0.0200 0.0814 0.0737 -0.158
(0.170) (0.0912) (0.148) (0.135)
year 3 0.0109 0.0862 0.0293 -0.311
(0.230) (0.138) (0.208) (0.194)
year 4 -0.00709 0.105 0.101 -0.364
(0.281) (0.161) (0.254) (0.222)
year 5 -0.0571 0.118 0.0583 -0.474*
(0.336) (0.193) (0.298) (0.268)
year 6 -0.104 0.103 0.0911 -0.537*
(0.389) (0.216) (0.342) (0.307)
year 7 -0.155 0.192 0.0411 -0.540
(0.441) (0.254) (0.424) (0.359)
Observations 8,805 8,796 3,734 3,731
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. This table presents intention-to-treat effects of Seguro Popular on self-reporting health status.
Panels 1 & 2 are estimations resulted from using equation 2.6; panel 3, uses equation 2.9 and panel 4 are
estimations from equation 2.8. All estimations include year and municipality fixed effects and a set of
socio-demographic covariates including age, sex, civil status, years of education, household size, asset
index, rural residence and membership to Oportunidades.
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Table 2.6 Seguro Popular intention-to-treat effects on healthcare utilisation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outpatient visit
in last 4 weeks
Outpatient visit





all poor all poor
1. Difference-in-differences 0.00761 0.0347 0.00416 -0.00890
(0.0180) (0.0295) (0.0101) (0.0190)
Observations 16,668 5,293 16,667 5,292
2. Two-way fixed effects 0.00755 0.0341 0.00731 0.0168
(0.0210) (0.0364) (0.0134) (0.0291)
Observations 8,790 3,731 8,791 3,730
3. Triple differences 0.0438 -0.730 0.493 0.262
(0.269) (0.952) (0.353) (0.393)
Observations 16,668 5,295 16,667 5,293
4. Event-study model
year -5 0.00700 -0.00861 0.0101 0.358*
(0.0740) (0.193) (0.0282) (0.203)
year -4 0.00195 -0.0680 0.00401 0.217
(0.0601) (0.164) (0.0240) (0.150)
year -3 -0.0426 0.0775 -0.00329 0.159
(0.0414) (0.112) (0.0206) (0.112)
year -2 -0.0192 0.0889 -0.000808 0.0771
(0.0325) (0.0746) (0.0175) (0.0732)
year 0 -0.00765 0.0530 -0.00423 -0.0448
(0.0354) (0.0824) (0.0219) (0.0718)
year 1 -0.00853 0.0288 0.00211 -0.166
(0.0516) (0.117) (0.0219) (0.106)
year 2 -0.0153 0.0737 0.0205 -0.158
(0.0547) (0.148) (0.0221) (0.135)
year 3 -0.0110 0.0293 -0.0194 -0.311
(0.0702) (0.208) (0.0325) (0.194)
year 4 -0.0247 0.101 -0.00219 -0.364
(0.0888) (0.254) (0.0331) (0.222)
year 5 -0.0208 0.0583 -0.00741 -0.474*
(0.101) (0.298) (0.0382) (0.268)
year 6 0.0321 0.0911 0.00896 -0.537*
(0.119) (0.342) (0.0429) (0.307)
year 7 0.0138 0.0411 0.0291 -0.540
(0.142) (0.424) (0.0577) (0.359)
Observations 8,790 3,734 8,791 3,731
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. This table shows intention-to-treat effects of Seguro Popular on healthcare utilisation. Panels 1 &
2 are estimations resulted from using equation 2.6; panel 3, uses equation 2.9 and panel 4 are estimations
from equation 2.8. All estimations include year and municipality fixed effects and a set of socio-demographic
covariates including age, sex, civil status, years of education, household size, asset index, rural residence and
membership to Oportunidades.
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Table 2.7 Seguro Popular intention-to-treat effects on health insurance uptake
(1) (2)
Health insurance Health insurance
all poor
1. Difference-in-differences 0.248*** 0.296***
(0.0246) (0.0425)
Observations 16,695 5,299
2. Two-way fixed effects 0.0318 0.0443
(0.0398) (0.0524)
Observations 8,805 3,734




year -5 -0.0988 -0.239
(0.112) (0.152)
year -4 -0.0982 -0.208*
(0.0941) (0.112)
year -3 -0.0607 -0.179*
(0.0722) (0.100)
year -2 -0.0252 -0.103
(0.0574) (0.0872)
year 0 0.0450 0.0149
(0.0702) (0.0861)
year 1 0.161* 0.186
(0.0937) (0.125)
year 2 0.174 0.286**
(0.109) (0.134)
year 3 0.408*** 0.668***
(0.138) (0.153)
year 4 0.394** 0.619***
(0.171) (0.218)
year 5 0.507*** 0.821***
(0.192) (0.208)
year 6 0.484** 0.717***
(0.220) (0.255)
year 7 0.526** 0.779***
(0.258) (0.291)
Observations 8,805 3,734
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. This table shows intention-to-treat effects of Seguro Popular on
healthcare utilisation. Panels 1 & 2 are estimations resulted from using
equation 2.6; panel 3, uses equation 2.9 and panel 4 are estimations
from equation 2.8. All estimations include year and municipality fixed
effects and a set of socio-demographic covariates including age, sex, civil
status, years of education, household size, asset index, rural residence and
membership to Oportunidades.
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Table 2.8 Descriptive statistics of unmatched and matched samples
Unmatched sample Matched sample
SP non-recipients SP recipients SP non-recipients SP recipients
Variable N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
Socio-demographic
Age 5393 37.18 2274 38.38 2713 35.74 1347 36.86
Sex (male=1) 5741 0.46 2414 0.43 2813 0.44 1398 0.43
Civil status (married=1) 5775 0.51 2431 0.59 2812 0.57 1398 0.57
Years of education 4468 7.68 2051 6.92 2666 6.7 1344 6.68
Household size 5776 6.21 2431 7.41 2813 7.87 1398 7.58
Asset index 5588 6.26 2357 5.55 2802 5.46 1390 5.46
Rural area 5776 0.7 2431 0.41 2813 0.39 1398 0.36
Oportunidades recipient 5005 0.08 2168 0.21 2778 0.22 1384 0.22
Ever had serious accident? 5775 0.1 2431 0.09 2812 0.09 1398 0.09
Over 50 years old 5775 0.23 2431 0.23 2812 0.2 1398 0.21
Health outcomes
Body mass index 5156 27.07 2192 27.47 2589 26.65 1290 27.26
Overweight 5156 0.36 2192 0.38 2589 0.34 1290 0.36
Obesity 5156 0.27 2192 0.28 2589 0.24 1290 0.27
Hypertension 5069 0.08 2168 0.08 2477 0.1 1251 0.08
Anaemia 4446 0.13 1935 0.13 2260 0.16 1143 0.14
Self-reported health
Reports good health 5774 0.58 2431 0.49 2811 0.49 1398 0.49
Left activities for health related
reasons last 4 weeks 5773 0.08 2431 0.09 2810 0.1 1398 0.07
Reports health to be better
than last year 5765 0.26 2430 0.23 2807 0.24 1398 0.23
Predicts health to be better
next year 5774 0.38 2430 0.34 2812 0.35 1398 0.35
Reports good health
for age/gender 5774 0.34 2431 0.3 2812 0.29 1398 0.32
Healthcare utilisation
OP visit to hospital/clinic
during last 4 weeks 5763 0.1 2429 0.13 2806 0.12 1397 0.11
OP visit to dr/healer
during last 4 weeks 5763 0.01 2429 0.01 2806 0.02 1397 0.01
IP visit to hosp/clinic
during last 12 months 5762 0.04 2429 0.05 2807 0.04 1397 0.05
Social security/private
health insurance? 5776 0.07 2431 0.32 2813 0.04 1398 0.24
Notes. This table displays a descriptive summary of the sample contained in MxFLS1-3. The matching is conducted
by entropy balance. SP recipients refer to the households where at least one member declared being enrolled in SP;
non-recipients are households where no one of its members are social security beneficiaries.
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Table 2.9 Seguro Popular average treatment effects on health outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hypertension Hypertension Anaemia Anaemia
all poor all poor
1. Difference-in-differences -0.0251 -0.0536 -0.0674 -0.0919
(0.0301) (0.0584) (0.0815) (0.111)
Observations 1,078 456 648 280
2. Matched diff-in-diff -0.0427 -0.0634 -0.0282 -0.0294
(0.0442) (0.0754) (0.103) (0.106)
Observations 1,078 456 648 280
3. Two-way fixed effects -0.00812 -0.00412 -0.0229 -0.0189
(0.0132) (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0315)
Observations 11,142 4,861 8,128 3,356
4. Matched TW-FE -0.00381 -0.00465 -0.0224 -0.00647
(0.0129) (0.0294) (0.0192) (0.0479)
Observations 9,032 3,100 7,682 2,208
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. This table presents average treatment effects of Seguro Popular on health status.
Panels 1 & 2 are estimations using equation 2.10 on two MxFLS waves; panels 3 &4, using
the same model, extend to three waves. For specifications 2 & 4, data is preprocessed
by entropy balance to match affiliates to non-affiliates on observable charafcteristics. All
estimations include year and municipality fixed effects and a set of socio-demographic
covariates including age, sex, civil status, years of education, household size, asset index,
rural residence and membership to Oportunidades.
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Table 2.10 Seguro Popular average treatment effects on self-reported health status









all poor all poor
1. Difference-in-differences 0.0333 0.0972 -0.0110 0.0344
(0.0764) (0.119) (0.0697) (0.0895)
Observations 1,114 470 1,110 470
2. Matched diff-in-diff 0.0480 0.124 0.0271 0.135
(0.0936) (0.133) (0.0833) (0.116)
Observations 1,114 470 1,110 470
3. Two-way fixed effects -0.0287 -0.0257 -0.00150 -0.0181
(0.0211) (0.0339) (0.0201) (0.0313)
Observations 11,527 5,016 11,506 5,003
4. Matched TW FE -0.0419* -0.0170 0.0142 0.0175
(0.0233) (0.0576) (0.0185) (0.0442)
Observations 9,298 3,194 9,288 3,183
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. This table presents average treatment effects of Seguro Popular on self-reported health status.
Panels 1 & 2 are estimations using equation 2.10 on two MxFLS waves; panels 3 &4, using the same
model, extend to three waves. For specifications 2 & 4, data is preprocessed by entropy balance to match
affiliates to non-affiliates on observable charafcteristics. All estimations include year and municipality
fixed effects and a set of socio-demographic covariates including age, sex, civil status, years of education,
household size, asset index, rural residence and membership to Oportunidades.
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Table 2.11 Seguro Popular average treatment effects on healthcare utilisation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outpatient visit
in last 4 weeks
Outpatient visit





all poor all poor
1. Difference-in-differences 0.00501 -0.0381 0.00422 -0.000418
(0.0462) (0.0750) (0.0267) (0.0483)
Observations 1,110 468 1,110 468
2. Matched diff-in-diff -0.00872 -0.0545 -0.00583 -0.0124
(0.0517) (0.0763) (0.0309) (0.0496)
Observations 1,110 468 1,110 468
3. Two-way fixed effects 0.0245 0.0244 0.00807 0.00274
(0.0181) (0.0252) (0.00894) (0.0126)
Observations 11,511 5,011 11,512 5,010
4. Matched TW FE 0.0294** 0.0459 0.0160* -0.00101
(0.0146) (0.0430) (0.00878) (0.0210)
Observations 9,289 3,191 9,289 3,190
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. This table presents average treatment effects of Seguro Popular on healthcare utilisation. Panels 1
& 2 are estimations using equation 2.10 on two MxFLS waves; panels 3 &4, using the same model, extend
to three waves. For specifications 2 & 4, data is preprocessed by entropy balance to match affiliates to
non-affiliates on observable charafcteristics. All estimations include year and municipality fixed effects and a
set of socio-demographic covariates including age, sex, civil status, years of education, household size, asset
index, rural residence and membership to Oportunidades.
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Table 2.12 Seguro Popular average treatment effects on health insurance uptake
(1) (2)
Health insurance Health insurance
all poor
1. Difference-in-differences 0.695*** 0.647***
(0.0457) (0.0687)
Observations 1,114 470
2. Matched diff-in-diff 0.708*** 0.666***
(0.0491) (0.0710)
Observations 1,114 470
3. Two-way fixed effects 0.745*** 0.748***
(0.0147) (0.0200)
Observations 11,530 5,017
4. Matched TW FE 0.696*** 0.737***
(0.0134) (0.0260)
Observations 9,298 3,194
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. This table presents average treatment effects of Seguro Popular
on healthcare utilisation. Panels 1 & 2 are estimations using equation
2.10 on two MxFLS waves; panels 3 &4, using the same model, extend
to three waves. For specifications 2 & 4, data is preprocessed by entropy
balance to match affiliates to non-affiliates on observable charafcteristics.
All estimations include year and municipality fixed effects and a set of
socio-demographic covariates including age, sex, civil status, years of
education, household size, asset index, rural residence and membership to
Oportunidades.
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Table 2.13 Seguro Popular intention-to-treat effects on infant mortality rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Poor
Rate SE Rate SE
years after roll-out
-6 0.833 (1.456) 3.426 (2.819)
-5 0.446 (1.117) 2.594 (2.114)
-4 0.528 (0.866) 2.612 (1.632)
-3 0.505 (0.598) 1.984* (1.119)
-2 0.370 (0.299) 1.240** (0.620)
0 0.0386 (0.289) -1.048* (0.596)
1 -0.0822 (0.531) -2.211** (1.115)
2 -0.0974 (0.778) -3.622** (1.628)
3 0.136 (0.995) -4.922** (2.139)
4 0.205 (1.218) -6.765** (2.677)
5 0.237 (1.446) -7.857** (3.221)
6 0.475 (1.680) -9.221** (3.738)
7 0.698 (1.882) -10.15** (4.283)
8 1.031 (2.119) -11.66** (4.819)
9 1.021 (2.327) -13.41** (5.345)
10 1.378 (2.507) -15.28*** (5.886)
11 1.423 (2.697) -17.54*** (6.428)
12 1.817 (2.879) -19.18*** (6.989)
13 1.767 (3.077) -21.19*** (7.546)
14 1.869 (3.293) -24.25*** (8.163)
Constant 12.69*** (1.168) 19.61*** (2.383)
Observations 36,619 18,033
R-squared 0.483 0.452
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. This table displays intention-to-treat effects of Seguro Popular
on mortality rates. Both models are estimated using equation 2.8. Data
on mortality is aggregated at the municipality-year level and includes
from 2000 to 2017. Both regressions are weighted by number of births
in that year by municipality. The sample in column 3 includes only
municipalities with high or very high marginalisation index.
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Table 2.14 Seguro Popular intention-to-treat effects on children under 10 mortality
rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Poor
VARIABLES Rate SE Rate SE
years after roll-out
-6 0.0236** (0.0103) 0.0398* (0.0239)
-5 0.0179** (0.00810) 0.0193 (0.0183)
-4 0.0152** (0.00631) 0.0235 (0.0143)
-3 0.0117*** (0.00441) 0.0175* (0.00987)
-2 0.00630*** (0.00216) 0.0119** (0.00534)
0 -0.00341* (0.00206) -0.00878* (0.00511)
1 -0.00747** (0.00372) -0.0168* (0.00951)
2 -0.0110** (0.00532) -0.0298** (0.0140)
3 -0.0126* (0.00687) -0.0392** (0.0184)
4 -0.0150* (0.00831) -0.0551** (0.0231)
5 -0.0181* (0.00987) -0.0646** (0.0277)
6 -0.0195* (0.0114) -0.0760** (0.0325)
7 -0.0207 (0.0127) -0.0820** (0.0371)
8 -0.0221 (0.0142) -0.0967** (0.0419)
9 -0.0254 (0.0155) -0.110** (0.0465)
10 -0.0259 (0.0166) -0.125** (0.0511)
11 -0.0275 (0.0177) -0.138** (0.0557)
12 -0.0291 (0.0190) -0.152** (0.0603)
13 -0.0308 (0.0199) -0.165** (0.0649)
14 -0.0331 (0.0215) -0.183** (0.0712)
Constant 0.126*** (0.00833) 0.181*** (0.0233)
Observations 38,939 19,621
R-squared 0.606 0.541
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. This table displays intention-to-treat effects of Seguro Popular on
mortality rates. Both models are estimated using equation 2.8. Data on
mortality is aggregated at the municipality-year level and includes from
2000 to 2017. Both regressions are weighted by the population size of each
age group. The sample in column 3 includes only municipalities with high
or very high marginalisation index.
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Table 2.15 Seguro Popular intention-to-treat effects on mortality rates of adults over
age 20
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Poor
VARIABLES Rate SE Rate SE
years after roll-out
-6 0.234 (0.296) -0.341 (0.438)
-5 0.200 (0.224) -0.213 (0.328)
-4 0.129 (0.170) -0.130 (0.250)
-3 0.0612 (0.117) -0.0571 (0.169)
-2 0.0154 (0.0594) 0.00142 (0.0893)
0 -0.0670 (0.0576) 0.0750 (0.0900)
1 -0.119 (0.112) 0.163 (0.167)
2 -0.145 (0.165) 0.176 (0.248)
3 -0.225 (0.222) 0.127 (0.328)
4 -0.257 (0.275) 0.147 (0.410)
5 -0.320 (0.330) 0.111 (0.487)
6 -0.385 (0.380) 0.0644 (0.571)
7 -0.453 (0.433) 0.121 (0.655)
8 -0.533 (0.491) 0.0209 (0.741)
9 -0.554 (0.553) 0.148 (0.825)
10 -0.642 (0.608) 0.0921 (0.903)
11 -0.669 (0.661) 0.0136 (0.975)
12 -0.739 (0.716) 0.0367 (1.054)
13 -0.727 (0.773) 0.142 (1.117)
14 -0.702 (0.831) 0.308 (1.188)
Constant 6.899*** (0.302) 7.241*** (0.406)
Observations 46,561 24,499
R-squared 0.907 0.788
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. This table displays intention-to-treat effects of Seguro Popular
on mortality rates. Both models are estimated using equation 2.8. Data
on mortality is aggregated at the municipality-year level and includes
from 2000 to 2017. Both regressions are weighted by the population size
of each age group. The sample in column 3 includes only municipalities
with high or very high marginalisation index.
2.8 Discussion 59
Table 2.16 Seguro Popular intention-to-treat effects on mortality rates of adults over
age 60
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Poor
VARIABLES Rate SE Rate SE
years after roll-out
-6 -0.714 (1.147) -1.948 (1.752)
-5 -0.137 (0.868) -1.583 (1.319)
-4 -0.264 (0.667) -1.079 (1.015)
-3 -0.355 (0.464) -0.889 (0.692)
-2 -0.214 (0.231) -0.169 (0.363)
0 0.0351 (0.232) 0.519 (0.369)
1 0.0911 (0.452) 1.064 (0.672)
2 0.215 (0.655) 1.539 (1.000)
3 0.155 (0.877) 1.817 (1.319)
4 0.164 (1.090) 2.088 (1.634)
5 0.0429 (1.297) 2.392 (1.943)
6 0.161 (1.509) 2.694 (2.250)
7 0.0468 (1.716) 2.866 (2.565)
8 -0.0213 (1.920) 3.102 (2.859)
9 0.135 (2.133) 4.091 (3.162)
10 -0.0860 (2.324) 4.078 (3.455)
11 0.113 (2.525) 4.303 (3.720)
12 -0.0186 (2.714) 4.767 (4.019)
13 0.308 (2.921) 5.548 (4.273)
14 0.532 (3.141) 6.171 (4.540)
Constant 28.68*** (1.158) 25.79*** (1.547)
Observations 46,490 24,452
R-squared 0.832 0.715
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. This table displays intention-to-treat effects of Seguro Popular
on mortality rates. Both models are estimated using equation 2.8.
Data on mortality is aggregated at the municipality-year level and
includes from 2000 to 2017. Both regressions are weighted by the
population size of each age group. The sample in column 3 includes
only municipalities with high or very high marginalisation index.
Chapter 3
Universal healthcare coverage
effects on health inequality
Abstract
The objective of the present study is to assess the effect of Seguro Popular, a
healthcare policy expansion, on childhood health and childhood health inequality.
Using non-linear difference-in-differences methods to estimate unconditional quantile
treatment effects, this analysis finds that the policy expansion had a mild positive
impact on the child height-for-age distribution. Additionally, comparing inequality
measures between the estimated and counterfactual health distributions, results show
that the policy had a marginal effect reducing childhood health inequalities.
3.1 Introduction
At the beginning of the 21st century in Mexico, the health system was divided in a
set of disconnected subsystems where roughly half of the population had no health
insurance, and more than half of the health spending was made out-of-pocket. These
inequalities in access to healthcare produced deep inequalities in health outcomes. To
address this situation, the Ministry of Health implemented a large-scale healthcare
expansion to guarantee every individual’s constitutional right to healthcare1.
Seguro Popular, a public health insurance programme was formally implemented
in 2004, with the aim of closing the gap in healthcare coverage. By 2000, only half
of the population (roughly 50 million people) were recipients of social security with
health benefits; the other half were not covered by social security and did not have
medical insurance. Moreover, about 60% of healthcare was covered by patients’
out-of-pocket payments. Seguro Popular was introduced to close the gap in access
to healthcare and indirectly improve the health in the population. The programme
was progressively implemented at the geographical and population level. Roll-out
at the municipality level was completed by 2009, while on the individual level took
nearly a decade. The staggered roll-out of the programme offers an external source
of variability in treatment exposure among households across municipalities that can
be used as an identification strategy.
1Ley General de Salud. http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Documentos/Federal/pdf/wo11037.
pdf
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There are previous studies on the impact of SP on health status. Programme
effects found in early evaluations range from mild to non-existent (Barros et al.,
2008; King et al., 2009, 2007) while more recent studies find positive impacts of the
programme on population’s health status (Conti and Ginja, 2017; Pfutze, 2014). A
large part of the literature has focused on the programme’s impact on improved access
to healthcare and on reducing out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures (Galárraga
et al., 2010; Grogger et al., 2015; Knaul et al., 2018; Sosa-Rubí et al., 2011) finding
substantial gains from the policy expansion. Previous SP evaluations use the staggered
roll-out of Seguro Popular as an identification strategy both for cross-section and
panel data analyses. In general, literature has focused on finding average effects, but
not on distributional impacts.
Using data from two national surveys, this study analyses the impact of SP along
the childhood nutritional health distribution and estimates the change in health
inequality that resulted from the introduction of Seguro Popular. The analysis is
conducted in two steps: first, a non-linear difference-in differences method is used to
assess children’s response to the programme by their change in nutritional status;
second, inequality measures in child malnutrition are compared before and after the
programme to evaluate the change in health inequality. The hypothesis is that if
Seguro Popular is reducing the inequalities in healthcare access, then it might be
reducing inequalities in health status. By being targeted by Seguro Popular, poorest
uninsured families – generally with the worst health outcomes – should receive the
greatest benefit from the programme.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Childhood nutrition
Undernutrition refers to the deficiency in a person’s intake of energy and/or nutrients.
It could be caused by an insufficient calorie intake or by the inability to absorb food
nutrients; but according to WHO (1995), it is generally the combination of both:
a poor diet and infections that impede the body’s ability to assimilate food. The
definition includes wasting (low weight-for-height), stunting (low height-for-age) and
underweight (low weight-for-age).
Child undernutrition is a global health problem with serious and long-lasting
social, economic and health-related consequences. Undernutrition is associated with
loss in health and human capital (Black et al., 2013). In a systematic review, Victora
et al. (2008) document the link between undernutrition and short adult height, less
schooling, reduced economic productivity and, for women, lower offspring birthweight.
Moreover, children who are undernourished at an early age and experience rapid
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weight gain later in childhood, have an increased risk of developing chronic diseases
(Uauy et al., 2008). Evidence suggests that nutrition status and specifically height-
for-age at age 2 was found to be the best predictor of human capital in later life
(Victora et al., 2008); moreover, investments in nutrition during early childhood –
before 3 years of age – have the highest impact on human capital (Hoddinott et al.,
2008).
By 2019, there were 191 million children undernourished globally, and around
4.5% of childhood mortality was linked to undernutrition (WHO, 2020). Developing
countries are especially affected by this problem. Prevalence of wasting and stunting
have declined in the recent decades from over 230 million children undernourished in
2000 but continues to be a public health problem especially in low and middle-income
countries (WHO, 2020). Undernutrition was a widespread problem in Mexico by the
time Seguro Popular was introduced. By 1999, the prevalence of stunting was 21.5%
while the prevalence of wasting was 2.1% (Shamah-Levy et al., 2020). Child nutrition
has improved in the last 2 decades: by 2018, around 14.2% children were stunted and
1.4% wasted. Although there was an significant decline, undernutrition continues
to be a public health issue among the poorest populations. Shamah-Levy et al.
(2020), highlight the fact that that prevalence of wasting was more than double in
rural (2.3%) than in urban areas (1.1%). The objective of this study is to determine
whether the improvement in childhood nutrition in Mexico is associated with the
introduction of Seguro Popular.
3.2.2 Previous literature
Childhood health and nutrition
Health events early in life can have long lasting impacts on health and socio-economic
outcomes. Currie and Almond (2011) provide an overview of the relationship between
health related negative events or conditions in early childhood and future long
term adult outcomes. Health shocks early in life can impair development, however
investments on early childhood can revert the damage. Public policy interventions
at a young age may help revert a negative shock.
Cash transfers programmes can help reduce the impact of health shocks. Aguero
et al. (2006) estimate the impact of an unconditional cash transfer programme on child
nutrition using continuous treatment methods. Taking advantage of the exogenous
variation in the programme roll-out, Aguero et al. (2006) find that large dosages of
Child Support Grant treatment early in life significantly improves childhood nutrition.
Behrman and Hoddinott (2001) evaluate the effects of Progresa (later renamed as
Oportunidades and then Prospera), a conditional cash transfer programme in Mexico
on children’s 12 to 36 month height. In addition to households’ transfers, children
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in the treatment group received a nutritional supplement. They found that the
programme increased average growth per year in children and reduced the probability
of stunting.
Adequate calorie intake can have significant effects on height. Griffen (2016)
estimated a height production function using data from a randomised nutrition
intervention in Guatemala 1969-1977. Study findings suggest that a 100 calorie
increase over a year would increase height by 0.06 cm. Calories explain 16% of height
difference between Guatemalan and US born children of Guatemalan immigrants.
However, infectious diseases are an hindrance to nutrient absorption. Abramovsky
et al. (2019) estimate child health production functions and found that better water,
sanitation and hygiene practices make nutrition intake more productive for children
of 6-24 months.
Infectious diseases can have a great impact on nutritional health. De Cao (2015)
studies the determinants of height from birth to age two using longitudinal data on
Filipino children. Results show that diseases play a major role in reducing height.
An extra episode of diarrhoea was found to reduce the height of boys by 2 to 2.2 cm
and girls by 3.2 to 3.5 cm. Black et al. (2008) estimated that undernutrition and its
consequences were responsible of 35% of child deaths.
Antenatal care programmes may also have important impacts on nutritional
health. Frankenberg et al. (2005) examine the impact of an expansion of health
services in Indonesia which consisted of placing over 50,000 midwives throughout the
country on children height-for-age. They exploit the exogenous variation in timing
of the reform, the biology of childhood growth and rich longitudinal data. Their
results show that nutritional status of children that are fully exposed to a midwife
during early childhood (ages 1 to 4) is significantly better than those who are partly
exposed cohorts from same communities and same age.
Genetic and environmental factors are also important. Black et al. (2013) exam-
ined the effect of maternal stature on childhood grow and found that the risk for
children to be stunted was 19.4% for the tallest mothers and 68.2% for the shortest.
The risk for offspring to be stunted and underweight was the lowest for the tallest
mothers (≥160 cm), the risk increased for shorter mothers and the children whose
mothers were under 145 cm had the highest risk.
While public health insurance may help close the gap, it might not be enough.
Currie (1995) examines the impact of Medicaid on children and finds that public
health insurance narrows the socio-economic gap in utilisation and health among
children. However, inequalities and inefficiencies persist, suggesting universality and
outreach are important components in health systems.
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Seguro Popular
A large part of research on Seguro Popular has focused on the programme’s impact
on health insurance coverage, use of health care services, and household spending on
health care. Other studies have found that Seguro Popular affiliates are healthier
than non-affiliates, using both cross-sectional data (Sosa-Rubi et al., 2009) and
repeated cross sections (Conti and Ginja, 2017).
A randomised study (King et al., 2009, 2007) was designed and implemented
with cooperation from the Mexican government when Seguro Popular was first
introduced to estimate its impacts on health care utilisation, health status, and
financial protection ten months after introduction. The study found no effects on the
outcomes of interest. Moreover, there are external validity concerns – the experiment
was run in a small number of carefully selected municipalities which were unlikely to
be representative of the entire country; and only covers ten months – arguably not
enough time for many health outcomes to respond to roll-out of health insurance.
Additionally, using the original experimental data complemented with administrative
data, Spenkuch (2012), finds that programme affiliates are less likely to use preventive
health care services, a finding that suggests moral hazard among beneficiaries. On the
other hand, there is growing evidence that Seguro Popular does reduce out-of-pocket
health care expenditure (Galárraga et al., 2010; Grogger et al., 2015; Knaul et al.,
2018).
Specifically on childhood health outcomes, Conti and Ginja (2017) exploit the
staggered timing of implementation of SP by comparing changes in mortality for
all age groups in municipalities that introduced it in different years between 2002
and 2010, and find a reduction on mortality of 10% among infants living in poor
municipalities. They also find that the introduction of SP in poor municipalities is
associated with an immediate 7% increase in obstetric-related hospital admissions
and with a 6% increase in overall hospital admissions.
Pfutze (2014) using data from the Mexican Census, estimates the impact of
Seguro Popular on infant mortality during the first 5 years operating by a weighted
probit approach correcting for selection bias and finds a decline in child mortality of
5 per 1000 infants.
Celhay et al. (2019), analyse the effects of the Medical Insurance Century XXI
(SMSXXI) a component of Seguro Popular introduced on December 1st, 2006 with
the aim to reduce out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures on children under 5 years
old from families with no social security benefits. Families of enrolled children were
automatically enrolled in Seguro Popular. SMSXXI gradually expanded its health
benefits from 108 interventions and procedures in 2006 to 150 in 2018, as well as its
geographical and population reach; although, by 2016 10% of the target population
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was still not covered (Celhay et al., 2019). In a comprehensive analysis of SMSXXI,
the authors examined several data sources using multiple econometric approaches
to assess policy impacts on health outcomes, healthcare utilisation and financial
protection. They used the timing variation on the geographic implementation as
well as the expansion on the interventions covered as the identification strategy to
estimate the programme’s effects. The programme was found to have an effect on
reducing infant mortality by 5% and late neo-natal mortality by 7%. These results
are consistent with those found by Conti and Ginja (2017). Moreover, the mothers
of enrolled children of 21 to 67 months were 7.2 percent points more likely to report
better health, 14.6 percent points less likely to report episodes of influenza and 4.8
percent points less likely to report diarrhoea episodes. Another important finding
was an increase on height-for-age z-scores of 0.052 SDs (0.434 cm) in primary school
children covered by insurance after 8 years of implementation. Children of more
vulnerable areas had higher benefits, gaining 0.181 SDs (0.879 cm). Previous studies
do not find an effect of Seguro Popular in height-for-age z-scores: Turrini et al. (2016)
show modest effects if any. However, Celhay et al. (2019) examine children in 2015,
8 years after implementation, compared to 2012 used in the other studies. It is
important to note that Celhay et al. (2019) estimate intention-to-treat effects by
assessing impacts on the eligible population not specifically on beneficiaries. The
fact that the SMSXXI eligible population is also SP-eligible makes it impossible to
disentangle ITT effects of each programme separately. Moreover, the authors do
not provide a close examination of possible declining pre-trends of mortality rates.
Descriptive diagrams seem to show a decreasing rate before implementation. The
authors provide a falsification test by shifting the implementation start by one year,
but given all considerations described, a close look at pre-trends would be more
adequate.
Only one study (Turrini et al., 2016) looked at childhood nutritional status.
They find that Seguro Popular had, at best, modest impacts on nutritional status.
According to the authors, supply-side obstacles may be important impediments
for the programme to succeed. They use the same data as the current study to
estimate average intention-to-treat effects on similar outcomes but with a different
identification strategy: they do not take advantage of the panel design of the survey
data and compare different children across waves. In contrast, the present study
follows children through the window period where they could have benefited from
the programme.
Most of previous studies focus on estimating the average effects of the programme;
this analysis considers more important to understand the distributional effect of
Seguro Popular than the mean impact. The particular interest in this analysis is the
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The data comes from two different household surveys from Mexico: the Mexican
Family Life Survey (MxFLS), and the Encuesta Nacional de Salud y Nutrición
(ENSANUT) or National Health and Nutrition Survey. The first one is a panel
survey that spans the temporal and spatial roll-out of SP; while the second is a
cross-sectional survey with five waves collected between 2000 and 2018.
The first wave (MxFLS1) was conducted in 2002, before the official implementation
of SP; the second (MxFLS2) in 2005-2006, one year after officially implementing;
and the third wave (MxFLS3) in 2009-2012, between 7 and 10 years after roll-out.
The baseline sample was representative at the regional, rural-urban, and national
levels. It contained data on 35,677 individuals in 8,440 households, located in 150
communities spread over 16 states. The second wave contacted close to 90% of the
original sample from 2002 including population who changed residence nationally or
internationally. The sample size in MxFLS2 expanded to 40 thousand people, due to
the additions on interviewer’s families. The third round followed the sample in the
previous two rounds and reached close to 90% of the original sample.
MxFLS includes extensive information on health-related outcomes including self-
reported health, illness, use of health care, healthcare expenditures, mental health,
maternal health and infant health outcomes, as well as anthropometric measures and
biomarkers including cognitive ability. The survey also contains detailed information
on socioeconomic status on the household and on the individual level. MxFLS
included information on whether each household member older than 14 received
benefits from social programmes and on health insurance coverage.
Main results obtained with data from MxFLS, are then verified using ENSANUT,
a probabilistic national survey with state rural and urban strata representativeness
(Romero-Martínez et al., 2013). It was collected in 2002, 2006, 2012 and 2018
with the main focus on the health and nutrition status of the population, their
determinants, as well as indicators of access to healthcare (Abúndez et al., 2006).
It includes information on household features, socio-demographic information of
household members, detailed information on health conditions through antropometric
measures, biomarkers, biological samples, immunisation records, diagnostic tests,
among others.
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The current study, used the 2006 and 2012 editions of the survey for the analysis.
ENSANUT 2006 contains data on 48,304 households with 206,700 individuals; of
which 24,098 are children, 25,166 teenagers, 45,446 adults; with 90,267 anthropo-
metrics. The 2012 edition included information from 50,528 households and 96,031
individuals with complete data, of which 28,209 are children, 21,519 adolescents,
46,303 adults aged 20 or older, and 14,104 ambulatory health services users.
Additionally, the information used to construct an indicator of the roll-out at
the municipality level comes from an administrative dataset that includes the total
number of individuals enrolled to the programme at the end of each year from 2002
to 2019.
3.3.2 Outcomes
Children’s nutritional status is commonly measured based on anthropometric indica-
tors such as height-for age, weight-for-age and weight-for-height. These indicators
are obtained by comparing height and weight measurements to reference curves and
each indicator provides different information on the process or outcome of nutrition.
This study uses height-for-age as a measure of linear growth and as an assessment of
long-term nutrition.
Anthropometric indices are usually expressed in z-scores, defined as the difference
between the value for an individual and the median value of the reference population
for the same sex and age (or height), divided by the standard deviation of the
population. Z-scores express the anthropometric index as a number of standard
deviations below or above the mean or median reference value. Indicators expressed
as z-scores have the advantage that they can be used to estimate summary statistics.
Height-for-age refers to long-term linear growth and deficits may reflect chronic
inadequacies in nutrition or health. Low health-for-age values compared to the
median child of same age and gender of reference, indicate “shortness”. Weight-
for-height is an indicator of current nutritional status and its short-term changes;
while weight-for-age is used to monitoring growth and to assess changes in the
magnitude of malnutrition over time. In any anthropometric indicator, the cut-off to
define malnourishment is generally z-score = −2. Values under -2, or two standard
deviations below the reference median reflect “stuntedness” or pathological shortness.




This study compares difference-in-differences results from two different surveys. In
the MxFLS survey, health outcomes come from three waves: the first was collected
in 2002, the second corresponds to 2005 and 2006 and the third wave was conducted
from 2009 to 2012. The programme’s roll-out started on 2002 as a pilot phase at the
municipality level and it was officially implemented in 2004 in stages. By 2008, all
the municipalities in the sample were participating in the programme. This means
that the first wave was collected before most of the municipalities implemented the
programme, in fact only around 7% of municipalities were taking part; by the second
wave, roughly three quarters of the sampled municipalities were participating but
only 12% of the households in the survey declared to be enrolled; and by the third
wave, all sampled municipalities were participating and 42% of households reported
to be beneficiaries of the programme. The two editions of the ENSANUT survey
used here are from 2006 and 2012, which means both are from the after-treatment
period.
Considering that childhood nutrition interventions have the most impact on
ages below 4, and almost all gains on nutrition occur in the first 60 months of age
(Frankenberg et al., 2005), children’s height-for-age would ideally be examined before
that window period and at a later stage when they are over 60 months of age. Being
exposed to the programme can occur in two ways: if the municipality of residence
offers the programme when the child is under five, in which case the parameter
to estimate is the intention-to-treatment effect; or if the child’s household head
reported being affiliated to SP during the window period, in that case, the relevant
parameter would be the average treatment effect on the treated. This study uses the
first definition of exposure – municipality-level affiliation –as the main strategy to
estimate treatment effects; and individual-level affiliation is used to complement the
analysis as an alternative strategy.
Municipality-level-affiliation As selection into participation is voluntary, people
who decide to enrol into Seguro Popular may be different to people that choose
not to participate in ways that are not observable from the data. For example,
eligible people who choose not to enrol may expect higher benefits from enrolling
than those who choose not to enrol. In order to reduce the self-selection bias,
intention-to-treat effects are estimated by comparing the outcomes of children living
in municipalities that participate in the programme to children from municipalities
that do not participate, regardless of household enrolment status.
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Using information of affiliation on municipality level, the treated population is
defined as children who were under 2 years of age when the municipalities of residence
implemented the programme. According to childhood growth biology, a healthcare
intervention would have the highest effect on that window period. Children who
were 3 years old or more when their municipality got affiliated were the control
population. The programme’s impact is estimated by taking differences in height
between treated and untreated children of similar age before and after treatment. This
means comparing treated and controls before five in the pre-treatment period and
after five years old in the following period. This design controls for the differences in
height due to differences in age and for any differences between treated and untreated
areas at the baseline. The remaining differences in height would be the effect of the
exposure to SP, given that the parallel trends assumption hold. In this context, it
means that, in absence of treatment, the differences in outcomes between groups
remains constant in time.
Linear differences-in-differences
The first estimation of treatment effects follows a simple difference-in-differences
approach. Programme’s intent-to-treat effects on children from participating munici-
palities are estimated and compared to children from eligible households (without
social security) but from non-participating municipalities. As participation is vol-
untary, there may be positive selection as affiliates potentially have unobservable
differences with respect to people that choose not to participate. For that reason,
and taking into account the biology of childhood growth, the definition of treated
population are children whose municipality of residence implemented the programme
when they were 2 years old or younger, regardless if their household decided to
enrol in Seguro Popular. This definition ensures that treated children were exposed
to the programme in the window period in which healthcare has the most impact.
Intention-to-treat effects are estimated by taking the differences in enrolment over
time (pre- and post-treatment), using a model specified as:
yimt = αtt + γgi + τSPimt + x′imtβ + ηi + πm + δt + θst + εit (3.1)
where yimt refers to height-for-age z-score of child i from municipality m at
time t; αtt are the time-specific group-invariant effects; γgi are group-specific time
invariant-effects; the programme effect is the coefficient τ of the interaction SPimt
between group and time; the covariates ximt are municipal characteristics, household
and individual socio-demographic confounders, plus child gender and age in months;
additional controls are individual fixed effects ηi, municipality fixed effects πm, year
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fixed effects δt, and state-year trends θst; and finally, εit is a random error term that
captures all omitted factors.
Non-linear differences-in-differences
The interest of this analysis is in the impact of Seguro Popular on the entire health
outcome distribution. In contrast to average effects, distributional effects allow to
assess programme impacts in the presence of heterogeneous effects according to
outcome levels. It is reasonable to believe that a programme like Seguro Popular
that targets the poor – generally the population with the worst health outcomes,
could have different effects on different quantiles of the health distribution. Children
with the worst health status would probably benefit the most from Seguro Popular
and therefore, will have a larger change in outcomes. The programme effect on
children’s health inequality is assessed by comparing the distribution of height-for-age
for treated and control populations.
Let F IY be the distribution of height-for-age z-scores of treated children in time
t; and F NY , the distribution of control children at time t, where t = 0 means pre-
programme period and t = 1, post-programme period. The quantile treatment effect
(QTE) for any quantile τ ∈ (0, 1), of a randomly assigned programme, would be
the difference at the τth quantile of the treated children’s health distribution and
the distribution in controls for a given year. However, in a natural experiment
setting, we need to construct a counterfactual distribution of outcomes that would
be the outcome of the treated on the second period had they not been treated. The
treatment effect would be the difference between the distribution of outcomes of the
treated population at the second period and the counterfactual distribution.
The treatment effects are estimated using the changes-in-changes method, a
non-linear difference-in-differences design proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006) and
extended by Melly and Santangelo (2015) to allow for covariates. The method takes
the change in the distribution of the comparison group from before to after treatment
to estimate the counterfactual, i.e. the distribution of the treatment group in the
absence of treatment.
A child belongs to group G = {0, 1} where group 1 is the treatment group and is
observed in periods τ ∈ {0, 1}. We assume that only children in group 1 and time 1
are affected by the policy. We also observe a vector of covariates X. Following Melly
and Santangelo (2015) and Athey and Imbens (2006), the realised outcome is defined
as:
Y = (1 − I) · Y N + I · Y I (3.2)
Where Y N denotes the outcome if the individual does not participate in the pro-
gramme, and Y I if the individual participates. In the two-period standard model,
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I = G ∗ T . Such that, I = 1 only for the treatment group on period 1. I = 0 for
comparison group G = 0 and/or for period 0 T = 0. The outcome of an individual
in the absence of treatment satisfies,
Y N = h(X, T, U) (3.3)
Where U is the unobservable component of Y and the production function h(t, x, u)
is strictly increasing in u for t ∈ {0, 1} and for all x ∈ X. The identifying assumption
of this model is that the distribution of unobservable characteristics U within groups
is constant over time. This assumption is analogous to the parallel trends assumption
in the linear DiD design. We need similarity of distribution over time to be able
to extrapolate ranks from one period to another. We can identify the conditional
distribution Y N11x over the quantiles 0 < τ < 1 as:
F −1Y N |11x(τ) = F
−1
Y |01x
FY |00x(F −1Y |10x(τ)
) (3.4)
Intuitively, equation 3.4 states that an individual at the τ quantile of the outcome







the outcome distribution in the same period if it were in group 1. The conditional
quantile treatment effect for group 1 in period 1 for the covariates x:
∆QE(·|x) = F −1Y I |11x(·) − F
−1
Y N |01x(·) (3.5)
= F −1Y I |11x(·) − F
−1
Y |01x
FY |00x(F −1Y |10x(τ)
) (3.6)
However, conditional treatment effects are not useful in this context and given that
the coefficients can be difficult to interpret, we are interested in the unconditional
treatment effects. The unconditional distribution of outcomes for group 1 in period 1
is obtained by integrating the conditional outcome distribution over the distribution
of covariates.














The unconditional treatment effects on the potential outcome are given by:
∆QE(·) = F −1Y I |11(·) − F
−1
Y N |11(·) (3.9)
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Fig. 3.1 Changes-in-changes distribution transformations
Figure 3.1 illustrates the estimation of a counterfactual distribution: for any
quantile, we find the level of outcome y for the distribution of the treated before
treatment; then, we find the quantile associated to that level of y on the control
group before treatment distribution, and the outcome level y′ on the controls after
treatment for that quantile.
These results could provide evidence about any differences in inequality derived
from the implementation of Seguro Popular by looking at the effects on different
quantiles. We can also calculate inequality indices using the distributions estimated.
In this study, the change in inequality is estimated by comparing the Gini coefficient
of the outcome distribution for the treated group on the after-treatment period and
the Gini coefficient counterfactual distribution.
Alternative estimators
To perform a further sensitivity analysis of the methods used, estimations are
performed using an alternative non-linear DD estimator. Quantile DD (QDD) is
similar to CIC as it uses the change in the comparison group health distribution to
construct a counterfactual distribution of treated children post-programme in the
absence of treatment. However, their assumptions differ. QDD assumes that the
counterfactual distribution is:


















QCIC transformation differs from QDD, as depicted in Figure 3.1. The parallel
trends assumption in QDD means that quantile τ in the treated distribution in
absence of treatment would have follow the same trend to quantile τ in the controls.
In comparison, the assumption in CIC is less restrictive: quantile τ corresponding to
y in the treated distribution is assumed to have evolved similarly to quantile τ ′ in
the controls corresponding to the same level of y. In that way, the population on
each side of a level of health y can be different, which allows for heterogeneity in the
distribution of unobservables (Athey and Imbens, 2006).
3.4 Empirical results
3.4.1 Municipality level roll-out
Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics of both samples of treated and controls. The
treated population are children who were living in a municipality that offered SP
during their 4 first years of age. The mean value of height-for-age z-score is the
same for treated and controls, however the distribution is slightly skewed to the
left in the treated sample. Controls are 10 months older on average; boys represent
slightly above half of the population in both samples. Households in rural areas
are 54% in controls and 57% in treated; parents’ education was slightly higher in
treated population; households had 6.65 members in average for controls and 6.47
for treated. Treated households were richer and parents’ were taller on average. The
marginalisation index is defined from -3, the lowest marginalisation value to +3 the
highest. The treated sample in average lived in less marginalised areas compared to
controls.
Table 3.2 describes the sample from the ENSANUT repeated cross sectional
dataset. Height-for-age z-score was lower on average on the treated sample. Controls
are younger by definition, they were born after the programme was implemented,
while treated children were born before roll-out. Half of treated and controls were
boys; parent’s height and education were similar; household size was slightly greater
for controls; mean income decile was greater on treated but both groups had similar
median. On average, 65% of treated population lived in rural areas, while only 48%
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of treated and controls (MxFLS)
Controls Treated
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
Height-for-age z-score 4,219 -0.64 -0.64 1,840 -0.64 -0.61
Age in moths 4,934 61.52 59 2,164 51.78 54
Sex (boys=1) 4,934 0.51 1 2,164 0.52 1
Mother’s height 4,798 155.09 155.5 2,098 157.37 157.2
Father’s height 3,912 166.93 167 1,733 168.59 168.5
Parents’ education 4,759 7.12 6 2,101 7.45 8
Household size 4,934 6.65 6 2,164 6.47 6
Asset index 4,662 5.49 5.82 2,099 5.83 6.12
Rural area 4,934 0.54 1 2,164 0.57 1
Marginalisation index 4,933 -0.84 -0.96 2,164 -1.04 -1.27
Notes. This table shows descriptive statistics of MxFLS data. The treated population
are children up to 9 years old who were exposed to Seguro Popular from 0-4 years of age.
of controls did. Treated population lived in slightly less marginalised areas in average,
however the medians of both populations are similar.
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics of treated and controls (ENSANUT)
Controls Treated
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
Height-for-age z-score 16,524 -0.57 -0.58 19,488 -0.65 -0.64
Age in moths 16,524 72.88 77 19,488 45.49 42
Sex (boys=1) 16,524 0.5 1 19,488 0.5 0
Parents’ height 12,843 157.3 156.6 15,280 157.68 157
Parents’ education 14,088 2.12 2 16,421 2.17 2
Household size 16,524 5.34 5 19,488 5.2 5
Income decile 16,524 3.82 4 19,488 4.99 4
Rural area 16,524 0.48 0 19,488 0.65 1
Marginalisation index 16,524 -0.78 -1.03 19,488 -0.85 -1.07
Notes. This table shows descriptive statistics of ENSANUT data. The treated population
are children who were born before Seguro Popular was implemented.
Figure 3.2 displays the evolution of height-for-age z-scores by age of treated and
controls for different percentiles for both surveys. Here, treated refers to all children
up to 9 years old exposed to the programme from under 2 years old while control
refers to all children of 0 to 9 years old exposed to the programme after the age of
two. In the MxFLS panel, treated children, represented with the dashed line had a
rise from age 6 in average and in all percentiles shown. The increase persist to age 9
and maybe longer in the lower percentiles (P10, P25 and P50) and declining after 8
years old until matching the controls for percentiles P75 and P90. This could be an
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indication that the programme had a higher effect on children with worse nutritional
status. The cross sectional survey in the lower panel, shows that, on average, z-scores
of the treated and control groups follow a very similar path throughout the different
percentiles.
Fig. 3.2 Percentiles of height-for-age z-scores
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Programme impacts
Table 3.3 shows the difference-in-differences estimations of mean effects of SP on
childhood height-for-age using the model described by equation 3.1 on data from the
MxFLS three waves. There was no impact of the programme on children’s height-
for-age z-scores on average. Differences in height are explained by children’s age and
sex and fathers’ height, household size and asset index. The effect of household size
and socioeconomic status measured with an asset index were absorbed by individual,
municipality and year fixed effects.
Table 3.3 Intention-to-treat effects of SP on height-for-age scores (MxFLS)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intention-to-treat 0.0390 0.0417 0.124 0.0860
(0.0728) (0.0793) (0.119) (0.138)
Age in months -0.00211 -0.0974*** -0.102***
(0.00142) (0.0111) (0.0114)
Sex (boys=1) -0.0760* -0.421** -0.400**
(0.0417) (0.193) (0.197)
Mother’s height 0.0364*** -0.00241 -0.00287
(0.00361) (0.0297) (0.0334)






Asset index 0.138*** 0.0444 0.0517
(0.0265) (0.0627) (0.0566)




Individual FE X X
Year FE X X
Municipality FE X X
State x year X
Constant -0.766*** -11.95*** -3.484 -3.979
(0.0623) (0.834) (7.510) (8.642)
Observations 6,058 4,419 3,753 3,739
R-squared 0.010 0.167 0.732 0.753
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4 shows intention-to-treat effects of SP on height using the data from
ENSANUT 2006 and 2012. From the four models, only the second shows any
impact; however, when controlling for year and municipality fixed effects, the impact
disappears. All the effect is absorbed by the parent’s height, number of people living
in household and income decile. The cross sectional structure of the survey data,
does not allow for individual fixed effects. Data from the panel survey allows to
control for self-selection and reducing bias.
Table 3.4 Intention-to-treat effects of SP on height-for-age z-scores (ENSANUT)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intention-to-treat effects -0.00863 0.0643* 0.0383 0.0330
(0.0325) (0.0335) (0.0331) (0.0337)
Age in moths -0.00108** -0.000604 -0.000622
(0.000497) (0.000505) (0.000509)
Sex (boys=1) -0.0123 -0.0131 -0.0133
(0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152)
Parents’ height 0.0270*** 0.0217*** 0.0217***
(0.000992) (0.000928) (0.000931)
Parents schooling 0.0349** 0.0193 0.0183
(0.0171) (0.0169) (0.0168)
Household size -0.0522*** -0.0410*** -0.0406***
(0.00521) (0.00513) (0.00509)






Year FE X X
Municipality FE X X
State x year trends X
Constant -0.804*** -5.033*** -4.200*** -4.204***
(0.0289) (0.155) (0.150) (0.151)
Observations 27,926 21,555 21,551 21,551
R-squared 0.006 0.128 0.207 0.208
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
While these mean impacts of the programme are informative, there may be
heterogeneous effects through height distribution. The particular interest of this
analysis is on the programme effects on the lower tail of the distribution, the children
with the worst nutritional health status. In contrast with the lack of impact on
height-for-age z-scores shown in Table 3.3, the quantile treatment effects displayed in
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Fig. 3.3 Quantile treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals
the left hand side panel of Figure 3.3, show a significant impact. Moreover, the effect
is higher in the lower segment of the distribution, between the .2 and .5 quintiles,
implying a greater effect on the children with worse nutriotnal health. The right hand
side panel, using the ENSANUT dataset, in comparison, shows a mild positive effect
of less than half standard deviation in the z-score; however, the impact is greater on
the higher tail of the distribution implying an improvement on the better-off. The
discrepancy in the results is due to the difference in dataset structures. In this case
the panel dataset, even though less precise, due to the lower sample size, provides
less biased results.
Table 3.5 reports both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Cramer-von-Mises-
Smirnov statistics. The first null hypotheses tests that there is no effect at all; and
the second, if those effects are constant. There is evidence of a marginal treatment
impact different than zero on height-for-age in both cases, MxFLS and ENSANUT;
and there is evidence of constant effects for different quantiles. Moreover, there is
evidence of stochastic dominance illustrated on Figure 3.4 showing the counterfactual
and the empirical cumulative distributions. The counterfactual is the hypothetical
outcome distribution of the treated if they had not been treated. The treatment effects
are represented by the horizontal distance between those curves for each quantile.
The counterfactual distribution is always to the left of the empirical distribution for
both the cross-sectional sample and on the panel data survey, which means positive
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Table 3.5 Statistical tests of treatment effects and stochastic dominance
Null-hypothesis MxFLS ENSANUTKS-statistic CMS-statistic KS-statistic CMS-statistic
No effect: QTE(tau)=0 for all taus 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Constant effect: QTE(tau)=QTE(0.5) for all taus 0.21 0.26 0.42 0.73
Stochastic dominance: QTE(tau)>0 for all taus 1 1 1 1
Stochastic dominance: QTE(tau)<0 for all tau 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.0
effects of the programme. These results suggest that the roll-out of Seguro Popular
did reduce health inequalities using the MxFLS data as the improvement was higher
for the children in the lower segment of the distribution (i.e. lowest height-for-age
z-score); however, according to the analysis on the ENSANUT dataset, inequality
incrased as impacts are greater on the upper end of the distribution (i.e. children
with greater height-for-age z-score). The next section examines the change in health
inequality resulting from the introduction of Seguro Popular.
Fig. 3.4 CIC estimated and counterfactual distributions
Changes in inequality
Health inequality has been defined as variations in health across individuals in the
population (WHO, 2000). This study is interested in the change in health inequality
in the distribution of nutrition status across individuals resulted from the introduction
of SP. Those changes are explored by calculating Gini coefficients of the treated and
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Table 3.6 Generalised Gini coefficients of CIC distributions
MxFLS
Distribution N Index value Std error p-value
Counterfactual 81 0.55578867 0.00602909 0.0000
Estimated 81 0.46362859 0.00453672 0.0000
Test for stat. significant differences H0: diff=0
F-stat p-value
149.18708 0.0000
Test for stat. significant differences H0: diff=0
Diff Std. error z-stat p-value
-.09216008 .00754531 -12.21 0.0000
ENSANUT
Distribution N Index value Std error p-value
Counterfactual 81 0.45226353 0.00287878 0.0000
Estimated 81 0.69722972 .0053918 0.0000
Test for stat. significant differences H0: diff=0
F-stat p-value
1606.2708 0.0000
Test for stat. significant differences H0: diff=0
Diff Std. error z-stat p-value
0.24496619 0.00611219 40.08 0.0000
counterfactual distribution at the post-treatment period. The Gini coefficient is a
relative measure that compares each individual’s health to every other individual’s
health. It ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (maximum inequality). Inequality
can be reduced by increasing the health status of the sickest by a larger magnitude
than the healthiest.
Table 3.6 shows the change in Gini coefficients. On the upper panel, using the
MxFLS dataset, the Gini coefficient of the counterfactual distribution obtained by the
changes-in-changes model was 0.09 greater than the Gini coefficient of the estimated
distribution. This means that there is a decline in inequality as those with relatively
lower health status (i.e. lower height-for-age) had the greatest effect comparatively.
Moreover, the difference in inequality is statistically significant. In contrast, on the
lower panel, the Gini of the estimated distribution is 0.24 higher than that of the
counterfactual, which means an increase in inequality which is statistically significant.
Main results from the panel survey MxFLS provide concluding evidence of Seguro
Popular effect on reducing health inequality. The longitudinal structure of the data
allows to reduce selection bias controlling for individual unobserved characteristics
to a greater degree than the strategy using cross sectional database that compares
different children across time.
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Fig. 3.5 QTE of alternative non-linear DiD estimators: QDD
Alternative estimators
Figure 3.5 shows the quantile treatment effects of SP on the nutritional status
of children using the QDD estimator for both survey datasets. The difference in
assumption between models lead to different results. In comparison with results
obtained by changes-in changes, results from QDD design on the left hand side panel,
shows no effects, while results on the right hand side panel, shows positive impacts
on the lower tail and no effects on the rest of the distribution.
3.5 Alternative estimation strategy
3.5.1 Individual-level affiliation results
Identification strategy Estimations of average treatment effects using the actual
indicator of population that opted into the programme are presented to complement
the intention-to-treat effects estimation. In this case, the definition of the treatment
group is children living in households where the head of the household declared being
enrolled on Seguro Popular and who were under 60 months of age on the first period;
conversely, children from eligible households who reported not participating in the
programme comprise the comparison group. The programme’s treatment effect is
estimated by comparing height-for-age of children in families who decided to enrol in
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the programme, to children born to families who were eligible but decided not to
participate in the programme. Households that enrolled when the child was five or
older belong to controls as they were considered beyond the critical age to benefit
from the programme.
Descriptive statistics
Table 3.7 shows descriptive statistics for the children from households enrolled to SP
and from households eligible but not enrolled. Children from enrolled households
had lower height-for-age z-score. However, both groups had similar age and sex. The
proportion of children from rural areas was double in controls; that population also
had higher education; while treated population had larger household sizes; controls
households were also richer and controls’ parents were taller.
Table 3.7 Descriptive statistics of treated and controls (MxFLS)
Controls Treated
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
Height-for-age z-score 2,679 -0.46 -0.47 2,481 -0.77 -0.74
Age in moths 3,159 58.93 58 2,902 58.32 58
Sex (boys=1) 3,159 0.51 1 2,902 0.51 1
Mother’s height 3,062 157.09 157.2 2,825 155.17 155.2
Father’s height 2,578 168.73 169 2,283 166.63 166.3
Parents’ education 3,027 8.27 9 2,835 6.31 6
Household size 3,159 5.97 5 2,902 7.41 7
Asset index 3,028 6.16 6.39 2,769 5.23 5.43
Rural area 3,159 0.72 1 2,902 0.39 0
Marginalisation index 3,159 -1.23 -1.5 2,901 -0.67 -0.71
Notes. This table shows descriptive statistics of MxFLS data. The treated population
are children from households enrolled to Seguro Popular.
Descriptives for children on the ENSANUT dataset are shown in Table 3.8.
Treated children have lower average height and are older than controls. However,
the design offsets the baseline level of height-for-age and the age effect. Samples
are balanced between sexes, parents’ height and education are similar across groups;
household size is slightly greater for the treated; income decile is higher for controls;
treated are more likely to live in rural areas; while controls were less likely to live in
marginalised areas.
Using actual enrolment status as the definition of treated population, Figure 3.6
shows the evolution of height-for-age z-scores by age for different percentiles. In the
figure, treated refers to children up to 9 years old from households that reported
being affiliated, while controls refer to all children of 0 to 9 years old from eligible
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Table 3.8 Descriptive statistics of treated and controls (ENSANUT)
Controls Treated
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median
Height-for-age z-score 25,353 -0.56 -0.56 10,659 -0.75 -0.75
Age in moths 25,353 55.43 54 10,659 64.31 68
Sex (boys=1) 25,353 0.5 1 10,659 0.5 1
Parents’ height 19,291 157.89 157.15 8,832 156.68 156.05
Parents’ education 21,061 2.2 2 9,448 2.03 2
Household size 25,353 5.19 5 10,659 5.44 5
Income decile 25,353 4.62 4 10,659 4.05 4
Rural area 25,353 0.52 1 10,659 0.69 1
Marginalisation index 25,353 -0.96 -1.26 10,659 -0.47 -0.59
Notes. This table shows descriptive statistics of ENSANUT data. The treated population
are children from households enrolled to Seguro Popular.
households who reported not being enrolled. On the upper panel, results of the
MxFLS survey show than on average, children at 0 years old start with similar
z-scores, then controls remain taller for a few years, until eventually the treated
group catches up with the controls, and by age 9 the treated have same height for
age scores. This is also true for ENSANUT, treated catch up and end up with
same height as controls. From these simple averages, we may hypothesise that the
programme could have a long-term effect on childhood as treated height-for-age
increases over time relatively more than controls.
Programme impacts
The first estimation of treatment effects follows a simple difference-in-differences
approach. Seguro Popular treatment impacts on nutrition of children from households
that declared being enrolled are compared to impacts on children from eligible house-
holds (without social security) that declared not being enrolled to the programme.
Table 3.9 presents difference-in-differences estimations of Seguro Popular mean
effects on childhood height-for-age using data from MxFLS. There were no effects of
the programme found on children’s height-for-age z-scores. Interestingly, differences
in height that were explained most importantly by income level and parents’ height
and less importantly by household size and rural residence, are no longer significant
when adding fixed effects; marginalisation index and age explain all the variation
in height-for-age z-scores. Table 3.10 shows the same results using the ENSANUT
dataset. Positive treatment effects are strong, however, not clinically significant
as the change is below 0.1 standard deviations. In this case, important factors to
explain differences in height were genetics, age, household size and income; while sex
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Fig. 3.6 Percentiles of height-for-age z-scores
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Fig. 3.7 Quantile treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals
and education were not relevant. Rural residence and marginalisation index were
dropped due to collinearity, as they became redundant when including municipality
fixed effects.
The quantile treatment effects in Figure 3.7, show a slight impact on the upper
tail of the distribution of less than 0.5 standard deviation on the right panel and
no-effects on the left panel. Table 3.11 confirms this with Kolmogorov-Smirnov and
the Cramer-von-Mises-Smirnov statistics. There is evidence to suggest that the
effects are different from zero and there is stochastic dominance as shown in Figure
3.8, right hand side panel. With higher effects on the right tail of the distribution,
results suggest an increase in health pure inequality. These results may imply that
the roll-out of Seguro Popular increased health inequalities by improving the health
of children with a better nutritional health outcomes at baseline to a greater extent.
Changes in inequality
Results from the section above are confirmed in Table 3.12. Consistent with the
main results obtained with the municipality-level affiliation indicator, there was a
reduction in inequality found when using MxFLS data. Moreover, with ENSANUT
data, results are consistent with those from the previous section and changes in the
Gini coefficients of the treated and counterfactual distribution at the post-treatment
period appear to indicate an increase in inequality.
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Table 3.9 Average treatment effects of SP on height-for-age scores (MxFLS1-3)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment effect 0.126 0.204** 0.212 0.129
(0.0821) (0.0998) (0.157) (0.162)
Age in months -0.00150 -0.0954*** -0.101***
(0.00201) (0.0151) (0.0164)
Sex (boys=1) -0.0862 -0.440* -0.435
(0.0565) (0.252) (0.291)
Mother’s height 0.0347*** -0.0238 -0.0272
(0.00519) (0.0272) (0.0281)






Asset index 0.0986*** -0.0117 -0.00200
(0.0315) (0.0738) (0.0658)
Rural area -0.0942 0.140 -0.00862
(0.0771) (0.360) (0.354)
Marginalisation index -0.0189 -0.0908 0.829***
(0.0478) (0.484) (0.258)
Individual FE X X
Year FE X X
Municipality FE X X
State x year X
Constant -0.606*** -12.01*** 3.299 3.234
(0.0748) (1.069) (5.733) (6.118)
Observations 3,553 2,540 1,830 1,815
R-squared 0.021 0.144 0.740 0.774
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.5 Alternative estimation strategy 88
Table 3.10 ATET of SP on height-for-age z-scores (ENSANUT 2006-12)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Average treatment effects 0.142*** 0.0567* 0.0972*** 0.0973***
(0.0302) (0.0343) (0.0348) (0.0350)
Age in moths -0.00142** -0.00146** -0.00148***
(0.000569) (0.000570) (0.000570)
Sex (boys=1) -0.0126 -0.0132 -0.0127
(0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0176)
Parents’ height 0.0275*** 0.0217*** 0.0216***
(0.00118) (0.00115) (0.00115)
Parents schooling 0.0297 0.0104 0.00804
(0.0231) (0.0228) (0.0227)
Household size -0.0554*** -0.0409*** -0.0404***
(0.00598) (0.00596) (0.00596)






Year FE x x x
Municipality FE x x
State x year trends x
Constant -0.709*** -5.096*** -4.161*** -4.165***
(0.0190) (0.187) (0.184) (0.185)
Observations 27,926 21,555 21,551 21,551
R-squared 0.011 0.132 0.228 0.230
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.11 Statistical tests of treatment effects and stochastic dominance
Null-hypothesis MxFLS ENSANUTKS-statistic CMS-statistic KS-statistic CMS-statistic
No effect: QTE(tau)=0 for all taus 0.36 0.26 0.0 0.01
Constant effect: QTE(tau)=QTE(0.5) for all taus 0.61 0.43 0.3 0.4
Stochastic dominance: QTE(tau)>0 for all taus 1 1 1 1
Stochastic dominance: QTE(tau)<0 for all taus 0.15 0.1 0.0 0.01
3.5 Alternative estimation strategy 89
Fig. 3.8 CIC estimated and counterfactual distributions
Table 3.12 Generalised Gini coefficients of CIC distributions
MxFLS
Distribution N Index value Std error p-value
Counterfactual 81 0.54059659 0.00523442 0.0000
Estimated 81 0.47755768 0.00508294 0.0000
Test for stat. significant differences H0: diff=0
F-stat p-value
74.647595 0.0000
Test for stat. significant differences H0: diff=0
Diff Std. error z-stat p-value
-.06303891 .00729627 -8.64 0.0000
ENSANUT
Distribution N Index value Std error p-value
Counterfactual 81 0.46151452 0.00352156 0.0000
Estimated 81 0.62864396 0.00489626 0.0000
Test for stat. significant differences H0: diff=0
F-stat p-value
767.90211 0.0000
Test for stat. significant differences H0: diff=0
Diff Std. error z-stat p-value
0.16712944 0.00603115 27.71 0.0000
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Table 3.12 shows the change in Gini coefficients and tests of significant differences.
On the upper panel, for MxFLS, the Gini coefficient of the counterfactual distribution
is slightly higher than the Gini of the estimated distribution. The difference in the
Gini coefficients is 0.06 and statistically significant, implying there is a marginal
decline in inequality. In the lower panel, the Gini coefficient of the counterfactual
distribution obtained by the CIC model was smaller than the Gini coefficient of the
estimated distribution. This implies an increase in inequality as the policy has a
greater effect on the upper tail comparatively. The greater treatment effect on the
children with the better health status increase the health pure inequality.
Alternative estimators
This section presents an alternative non-linear DiD estimator as a sensitivity analysis
of our choice of model. Quantile DiD is similar to CIC as they use the change in
the comparison group health distribution to construct a counterfactual distribution
of treated children post-programme in the absence of treatment. However, their
assumptions differ. QDiD assumes that the change in population shares around a
given level of health is the same in the comparison group and in the treatment group
in the absence of treatment, but CIC relaxes that assumption.
Figure 3.9 shows the quantile treatment effects of SP on the nutritional status
of children using QDD estimator for both surveys. These results are not similar to
those obtained by CIC. The alternative designs have positive effects on the lower
tail of the height distribution, zero effect on the mid segment and negative effects on
the higher part of the distribution.
3.6 Mechanisms
There are two paths through which healthcare interventions can have an impact
on childhood health-for-age z-scores: by improving nutrition directly through pro-
grammes providing supplements; or by providing immunisation, hydration solutions,
treatment of infectious diseases or any health issues that hinder the adequate absorp-
tion of nutrients and affect nutrition and growth (WHO, 1995). Seguro Popular did
not have a specific nutrition intervention, as there were other social programmes like
Oportunidades providing nutrition supplements to mothers and children. However,
SP may have an impact on the nutritional status of children through improvements
in their health status, specifically prevention and treatment of gastrointestinal or
respiratory infectious diseases. According to the literature on childhood nutrition and
health (Abramovsky et al., 2019; De Cao, 2015), infectious diseases as diarrhoea and
respiratory diseases are the most prevalent conditions that have an impact on malnu-
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Fig. 3.9 QTE of alternative non-linear DiD estimators: QDD
trition, and stunting in particular. De Cao (2015) found that an episode of diarrhoea
reduced the height of Filipino children by 2 to 3.5 cm. Based on these findings, an
assessment of the impact of Seguro Popular on infectious diseases is proposed as a
possible explanation of the channel through which the programme has an impact on
childhood height-for-age. Equation 3.11 describes the difference-in-difference model
to estimate the causal effect of SP on infectious disease:
yimt = αtt + γgi + τSPimt + x′imtβ + πm + δt + θst + εit (3.11)
where yimt is a binary indicator of whether the child in household i, municipality
m and year t had an episode of diarrhoea, influenza or parasites in the last four weeks.
The estimation of the programme effect is the coefficient τ on the interaction between
group and time SP = g ∗ t. The treated population is defined as children from
municipalities affiliated to SP when estimating intent-to-treat effects; when estimating
average treatment effects on the treated, the treated population are children from
households that reported being affiliated. The covariates xit are the household
and municipality characteristics plus child gender and age in months; αt are the
time-specific group-invariant effects; γi are the group-specific time invariant-effects;
and εit is a random error term assumed to be uncorrelated with other regressors that
captures all omitted factors.
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Table 3.13 Intention-to-treat effects of SP on infectious diseases (MxFLS1-3)
(1) (2) (3)
Influenza Diarrhoea Parasites
Intention-to-treat 0.0666* -0.0545** 0.00168
(0.0365) (0.0254) (0.0170)
Age in months -0.000117 -0.000442 3.28e-05
(0.00178) (0.00103) (0.000986)
Sex (boys=1) -0.0287 0.00737 0.000503
(0.0608) (0.0497) (0.0362)
Asset index -0.00544 -0.00677 -0.00582
(0.0166) (0.00913) (0.00973)
Rural area 0.00372 -0.0978** 0.00148
(0.0476) (0.0423) (0.0405)
Constant 0.302** 0.179** 0.0944
(0.142) (0.0763) (0.0803)
Observations 6,135 6,135 6,074
R-squared 0.513 0.502 0.493
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.13 shows intention-to-treat effect of the programme on influenza, parasites
and diarrhoea. Having the opportunity to enrol in Seguro Popular, regardless
of affiliation status, reduced the likelihood of having a diarrhoea episode by 5.4
percentage points among children under 10 years of age. However, there is a
marginally significant effect of increasing the likelihood of influenza by 6.6 percentage
points. The impact of being affiliated to Seguro Popular on the same outcomes is
shown in Table 3.14. The average treatment effects on the treated were marginal on
parasites. The programme reduced the likelihood of having gastrointestinal parasites
by 2.8 percentage points. Nevertheless, the effect is only marginally significant
(p<0.1). These non conclusive effects reflect the also mixed effects of the programme
found on childhood height for age. Results do not provide evidence of a clear causal
path of the policy on height mediated by its effect on children infectious diseases.
3.7 Discussion
Malnourishment continues to be a public health issue in certain communities, and it
is also an indicator of income inequality. Poor nutritional status is a serious health
problem that causes inadequate physical and mental development on children with
consequences that persist through adult age (Black et al., 2008). The period between
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Table 3.14 Average treatment effects of SP on infectious diseases (MxFLS1-3)
(1) (2) (3)
Influenza Diarrhoea Parasites
ATET -0.0227 -0.0290 -0.0286*
(0.0298) (0.0211) (0.0162)
Age in months 0.000534 -0.000136 0.000284
(0.00137) (0.000905) (0.000875)
Sex (boys=1) -0.00106 0.0211 0.00243
(0.0681) (0.0531) (0.0380)
Asset index 0.00384 -0.00736 -0.00500
(0.0183) (0.00959) (0.00941)
Rural area 0.0106 -0.0696* -0.00418
(0.0483) (0.0365) (0.0407)
Marginalisation index -0.104** -0.0799** -0.0183
(0.0462) (0.0343) (0.0165)
Constant 0.0893 0.0677 0.0596
(0.140) (0.0818) (0.0730)
Observations 5,296 5,296 5,242
R-squared 0.506 0.480 0.490
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0-5 years of age is crucial in children nutrition (Frankenberg et al., 2005). During
that time, nutritional status is highly sensitive to nutrition and health interventions.
Seguro Popular does not have specific interventions focused on children’s nutrition.
However, it can have an indirect effect on nutrition by reducing out-of-pocket
healthcare expenditures; or a direct effect by reducing the prevalence of infectious
diseases.
Exploiting the exogenous variation in timing of the roll-out, this study assessed
average and distributional impacts of Seguro Popular public insurance on childhood
nutrition with data from two different surveys. Depending on the affiliation level
data, two different specifications were used to find average impact: intention-to-
treatment-effects were estimated using a municipality level affiliation; and average
treatment effects for individual-level affiliation to Seguro Popular. Intention-to-treat
effects were preferred as they had more credible assumptions.
Quantile treatment effects were estimated by two alternative methods: changes
in changes and quantile difference-in-differences. The main difference between CIC
and QDD approaches is the assumption in the counterfactual evolution. QDD
assumes that a treated child in the τ th quantile in the distribution before treatment
will be at the same quantile after treatment in the absence of treatment. This
restrictive assumption is relaxed in CIC. Results were consistent across methods;
impact was greater on the lower end of the distribution, indicating a reduction on
health inequality as individuals with lower height are better off.
In this study, timing is important in two ways; first to evaluate the impact of a
childhood intervention, there is a critical period before 5 years of age; second, the
programme has to be well established for a few years to accurately assess it. The
greater impacts using ENSANUT, a more recent dataset, are compatible with the
fact that SP impacts on health are only evident after the programme has been rolled
out for a few years. Early evaluations suggested limited impacts on health outcomes
(Barros et al., 2008; King et al., 2009, 2007), while recent studies that find clear
health effects (Conti and Ginja, 2017; Pfutze, 2014). These results contribute to the
debate on the benefits of expanding universal coverage in developing countries.
This study contributes to the literature of public health insurance, particularly
related to childhood health and nutrition. While there are previous studies on
childhood health, these are mainly focused on oncology outcomes (Ribeiro, 2013)
or mortality (Celhay et al., 2019; Conti and Ginja, 2017; Pfutze, 2014). There
is limited evidence of Seguro Popular on childhood nutrition. Only Turrini et al.
(2016) investigate the impact of Seguro Popular on height-for-age z-scores. Using
the Mexican Familiy Life Survey, with a different approach to the current study,
they estimate intention-to-treat-effects of the programme. The authors, instead of
following children through time, compare different children at different ages. In
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contrast, the present analysis takes advantage of the longitudinal structure and
follows children through time. This approach compares treated and control children
at a young age, before the programme has had an impact; and at an older age after
children have received most to the benefit according to the biology of growth.
Another contribution is the examination of heterogeneous impact according to
different outcome levels through quantile treatment effects. While most of the
policy evaluation literature is concerned with average treatment effects, this study
estimates the distributional impact of Seguro Popular. Averages do not provide
information whether different groups receive different benefits. From this study
perspective, it is more desirable that a public health policy raises the lower tail
of the distribution – the individuals with greater need, rather than the median
or the upper tail. The only study that estimates distributional impacts explores
supply-side outcomes (Huffman and van Gameren, 2019). Moreover, the present
study compares approaches for estimating quantile treatment effects varying the
assumption to construct counterfactual distributions. These approaches examine
the whole health distribution and allow to measure the policy impact on individuals
with different health status.
There are certain limitations in this study. The sample size obtained from
the panel Mexican Family Life Survey is limited, which makes it difficult to draw
conclusions as large standard errors cause lack of precision in estimations. The
sample size of the cross sectional Encuesta Nacional de Salud y Nutrición does not
have that problem. However, impacts of Seguro Popular estimated with ENSANUT
data should be taken with caution as the households surveyed are different across
years. Each of the datasets used on this analysis has advantages. While both provide
rich survey data, the panel configuration of MxFLS allows to follow individuals
through three waves over 7 to 10 years, although with a comparative smaller sample
size. ENSANUT is a repeated cross section that, accounting only for the two waves
used in this study, has roughly five times the sample size of MxFLS. Therefore,
confidence intervals are substantially narrower. The larger sample size allows for
more precision in the estimation of SP impact effects.
Another limitation related to data availability regarding the roll-out of Seguro
Popular. There is no information of the exact moment of affiliation to the programme
in either survey. Given that early health interventions in children are mediators of
health outcomes later in life, such as height for age, the timing of a health intervention
such as SP is critical. Without information of the precise time in affiliation, it is not
possible to know whether a child was exposed to the programme during a specific
window period. The issue is partially solved taking the municipality-level roll-out
indicator by assuming that the programme is present in a municipality after 10
families are affiliated (Bosch and Campos-Vazquez, 2014; Conti and Ginja, 2020;
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Del Valle, 2014). In that case, it is clear whether the programme was available during
a child specific age. The limitation of the approach is that the Seguro Popular was
not randomly rolled-out, but based on arbitrary factors. The consequence is that,
if areas with greater need were given priority, then estimates would be potentially
downward biased. Therefore, SP impacts would be underestimated.
Overall, these results suggest an increase in height-for-age associated with the
affiliation in Seguro Popular ; moreover, the benefits were greatest for children in the
lower tail of the nutrition distribution which are those with worse health status. These
findings suggest an decrease in the pure inequality in childhood nutrition. The policy
implication is the usefulness of non-linear DD methods for programme evaluation
in the presence of heterogeneous effects. These results highlight the importance of
taking into account that the effects of health policies may vary systematically along
outcomes distributions.
Chapter 4




The purpose of this chapter is to assess the financial protection mechanism of
Seguro Popular. Using a repeated cross-sectional dataset on households’ income
and expenditure, this study estimates the programme’s impact on out-of-pocket
healthcare payments, catastrophic payments, impoverishment and its anti-poverty
and distributional effects. Average treatment impacts are estimated by fixed effects
and instrumental variables models; while distributional effects are estimated using
non-linear difference-in-differences methods and quantile regressions on instrumental
variables. Results show a decrease in the amount of out-pocket-payments, but no
effect on the incidence of catastrophic payments or on impoverishment due to out-of-
pocket healthcare payments. There were no important effects on the overall income
distribution derived from participation in Seguro Popular.
4.1 Introduction
By 2000, over half of the population in Mexico did not have health coverage. The
health system was subdivided into three different subsystems: social security institu-
tions covered the formally employed and their families financed by contributions from
workers, employers and the federal government; government services provided by the
Ministry of Health and financed by general taxes and user co-payments according to
socio-economic status; and a private sector almost entirely financed by out-of-pocket
payments.
The proportion of the population that declared not having access to social
insurance in 2000 was 58.9% (57 million); while the proportion with social protection
was only 39.6% (38 million) and 2.7% reported having private health insurance
(Valdespino et al., 2003). The population with no social protection needed to pay
out-of-pocket for healthcare any time they received services. Paying for healthcare
out-of-pocket can have serious negative effects on welfare. Out-of-pocket (OOP)
healthcare expenditure of 30% of available income or higher is considered catastrophic.
In the extreme, a large enough OOP expenditure caused by a negative health event
may push a household into poverty. Vulnerable and uninsured households face
the serious risk of OOP healthcare expenditures driving them into a poverty trap
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restricting access to an adequate quantity and quality of healthcare (O’Donnell et al.,
2007).
Lack of financial protection is a major barrier to health care in settings where out-
of-pocket expenditures constitute the main source of health care financing. According
to the World Health Organisation (WHO, 2010) out-of-pocket payments are the
most inefficient and unfair method of financing healthcare as it violates the principle
of financial justice which states that individuals should contribute to their health
financing according to ability to pay and receive services according to health need
(Jaimes and Flamand, 2016). Seguro Popular was the government’s strategy to
respond to this situation.
In 2003, the Sistema de Protección Social en Salud (System of Social Protection
in Health) was created as a financial mechanism to protect the poor and uninsured
population from the financial burden of out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures. The
paramount aim of Seguro Popular was to expand financial coverage to the 50 million
people that had no social security by reducing out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures
and completely eliminate them for the poorest 20% of the population. The pro-
gramme started with a basic set of 91 health interventions and 142 medicines from
the Universal Health Services Catalog (Catálogo Universal de Servicios de Salud,
CAUSES) that covered over 90 percent of the disease burden in Mexico (Popular,
2007). The catalog was complemented with the Fund for Protection Against Catas-
trophic Expenditures (Fondo de Protección contra Gastos Catastróficos or FPGC)
that covered costly interventions which may result in catastrophic consequences for
households affected. By 2019, the CAUSES catalog covered 294 interventions and 633
medicines and other healthcare inputs associated to them, including 65 interventions
covered by FGPC1.
This study investigates if the drop in out-of-pocket healthcare payments was
caused by the introduction of Seguro Popular ; and if the financial protection mech-
anism for uninsured households had an effect on the incidence and intensity of
catastrophic and impoverishing expenditures; and their consequences on poverty lev-
els and income inequality on the population. Seguro Popular can have an antipoverty
effect through a reallocation of resources in the household. A reduction in OOP would
increase available income for households to use for additional savings or consumption.
Moreover, Seguro Popular can improve the productivity of households by reallocating
human resources to labour. The additional healthcare coverage available to workers
in the informal sector of the economy incentivise labour which will increase available
income in the household. Evidence suggests that individuals already working in the
1Comisión Nacional de Protección Social en Salud. https://www.gob.mx/salud/seguropopular/
documentos/catalogo-universal-de-servicios-de-salud-causes-2018-153111
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formal sector do not switch to the informal economy, probably due to the additional
benefits and better quality of social security for salaried workers (Barros et al., 2008;
Conti et al., 2018). This additional income might have a larger effect on poorer
population. The programme, by having a higher effect on the lower tail of the income
distribution, might reduce income inequality in the population.
Using 10 waves from the Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares
(National Survey on Households Income and Expenditure or ENIGH), this study
presents the impact of Seguro Popular on out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures,
catastrophic expenditures, impoverishment, welfare and inequality. Policy impacts
are estimated by a model of instrumental variables to find local treatment effects;
a linear difference-in-differences design to find the programme average treatment
effects; a non-linear difference-in-differences approach; and, a quantile instrumental
variable model to estimate the policy’s distributional effects.
4.2 Previous studies
There are several studies on the financial protection mechanism of Seguro Popular.
The majority analyse its effect on out-of-pocket and catastrophic payments, most of
them finding a positive effect of the programme on financial protection. Neverthe-
less, most studies are conducted on cross-sectional data and, therefore, unable to
completely correct the endogeneity of the voluntary decision to enrol. The present
study examines data from 2000 to 2018 and addresses the endogeneity using linear
and non-linear fixed effects and instrumental variable models.
Knaul et al. (2005) predicted that with complete affiliation, out-of-pocket ex-
penditures would drop 40% and catastrophic expenditures would decrease by half.
However, these are results from simulated data assuming full affiliation. Gakidou
et al. (2006) found that catastrophic expenditures for Seguro Popular affiliates are
lower than for uninsured people; while Scott (2006) shows that the incidence of
catastrophic health expenditures is lower across deciles for SP beneficiaries than for
the rest of uninsured. However, these are descriptive studies and, therefore, only
present associations and do not find causal relationships.
Intention-to-treat estimates by King et al. (2009) indicated a 23% reduction in
catastrophic expenditures from baseline and a causal effect of 915 pesos on the com-
plier group, but did not find any impact on medication spending. Despite its design
being robust against political factors that could influence outcomes, results suffer
from external validity issues according to the authors. Using the same original Seguro
Popular evaluation data, Hernández-Torres et al. (2008), find that the likelihood of
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incurring catastrophic healthcare payments was 8% lower in affiliated households.
This work was only conducted in two Mexican studies during the pilot phase.
Barros et al. (2008) found that SP led to substantial decrease in household health
expenditures; and an increase of 4.2% in the amount of money beneficiaries spent in
non-health consumption or savings. However, there was no redistributive impact.
Moreover, the analysis was conducted during the early years after roll-out. Grogger
et al. (2015), using the original experimental data from King et al. (2009) and similar
data to the current study, found that SP has reduced out-of-pocket expenditures in
rural areas and sharply reduced catastrophic spending among urban households with
access to well-staffed health facilities.
Nikoloski and Mossialos (2018) using an instrumental variable model, analyse
the effect of Seguro Popular and social security on out-of-pocket and catastrophic
healthcare expenditures. They found no link on SP membership and OOP health
spending, but a robust although small effect of SP on reducing catastrophic and
impoverishing health expenditures. They attribute the lack of impact on OOP
spending to a high and persistent spending on medications. However, the instrument
used (municipality-level enrolment as a share of total potential membership) may have
endogeneity issues as unobserved factors affecting both the individual decision to enrol
and outcomes, could be also present in the instrument. Wirtz et al. (2012) offer some
explanation for the high spending on medications even though these are covered by SP.
They argue that the medications included in the package of interventions do not match
the clinical needs of households, there are medication shortages in public facilities,
and households continue to use private providers despite the fact of being affiliated to
SP. Knaul et al. (2018) using propensity score matching and instrumental variables,
found an impact of SP on reducing the likelihood of households to incur impoverishing
expenditures but no effect on catastrophic spending. However, propensity score
matching may not address endogeneity completely if unobservable factors correlated
with membership status influence out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures. Moreover,
they use the same instrumental variable as Nikoloski and Mossialos (2018) which
may not satisfy the exogenous condition.
In a different context, Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) found that the establish-
ment of Medicare 1965 in the United States had no impact on elderly mortality but
was associated with a 40% decline in OOP healthcare spending for the top quartile
of the OOP healthcare spending distribution. In the context of developing countries,
Aji et al. (2013) study health insurance programmes in Indonesia using ordinary least
squares, instrumental variables and fixed effect approaches and find that coverage of
two insurance programmes had a negative statistically significant impact on OOP
expenditures of between 11% and 50%. Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003) present
and compare catastrophic and impoverishment approaches to measure fairness in
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healthcare OOP payments. They apply their methods using data from Vietnam
in 1993-1998 and find a reduction in both incidence and intensity of catastrophic
payments; moreover, the poverty impact of OOP payments both in incidence and
intensity declined over time.
4.3 Methods
4.3.1 Data
The main dataset used is the National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure
from Mexico (Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares, ENIGH).
It is a cross-sectional dataset conducted every two years with varying number of
households surveyed. ENIGH provides data on the amount, source and distribution of
households’ income and expenditures. Additionally, the survey includes information
about occupational and socio-demographic characteristics of household members;
infrastructure characteristics of dwellings and household assets. For the 10 waves used
for this study (the even years from 2000 to 2018) sample sizes increased each year
from around 9,000 to 75,000 households surveyed per wave. The data is representative
at the national and state levels. In addition to income and expenditure data, the
survey also includes information about household access to public policies such as
Seguro Popular and Oportunidades, a conditional cash transfer programme.
In addition to survey data, two administrative datasets were used for the analysis.
The first is a dataset with the total number of people enrolled to Seguro Popular
by municipality for each year. This information is used to construct an indicator
for the municipality-level roll-out. A municipality is assumed to being enrolled after
10 families living in that municipality have affiliated (Bosch and Campos-Vazquez,
2014; Conti and Ginja, 2020; Del Valle, 2014). The second is an administrative
dataset on a marginalisation index by that summarises development indicators on
the municipality-level such as percentage of population with no access to education,
services, or low income, that resides in small communities, among other indicators
that may hinder development2.
4.3.2 Identification strategy
This study investigates the effect of the expansion in coverage introduced by Seguro
Popular on households’ out-of-pocket healthcare payments and the financial protec-
tion effect of the programme on poverty levels and on the income distribution in the
2http://www.conapo.gob.mx/work/models/CONAPO/Resource/1755/1/images/01Capitulo.pdf
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population. By simply comparing outcomes from enrolled to not enrolled but eligible
population we would get biased results as treatment status is not randomly assigned.
Instead, people voluntarily enrol into the programme. It is likely that individuals
who decide to enrol would expect to have greater benefits than those who decide not
to enrol. Therefore, treatment effects would have an upwards bias caused by positive
selection on unobservables (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2009).
To address the potential bias resulting from endogeneity (i.e. non random) in
the decision to enrol, the strategy used is to instrument the endogenous treatment
variable with the municipality level roll-out. Specifically, the instrument takes a value
of one after more than 10 families are enrolled in a specific municipality in a year from
2002 to 2018 (Bosch and Campos-Vazquez, 2014; Conti and Ginja, 2020; Del Valle,
2014). To verify the results obtained with the instrumental variables model, a second
identification strategy to account for the endogeneity in enrolment is to estimate
intention-to-treat effects with a fixed effects model exploiting the geographical
variation in the timing of Seguro Popular ’s roll-out. Outcomes in municipalities
where the programme was already rolled-out are compared to households from
municipalities not yet enrolled, regardless of their participation status. Both strategies
provide average impacts of the programme. Additionally, quantile treatment effects
are estimated along the distribution of outcomes using changes-in-changes and
instrumental variables quantile regression models.
4.3.3 Outcomes
Let wi be defined as the total income of household i, and Ti its total out-of-pocket
healthcare spending. If household i spends on healthcare 20% or more out-of-pocket
of its monthly available income, then Ti is considered catastrophic. The indicator Ci
is equal to one if a household exceeded the OOP healthcare catastrophic payment
threshold and 0 otherwise. Such an indicator does not take into account if the
household with catastrophic spending is ’rich’ or ’poor’. Wagstaff and van Doorslaer
(2003) propose a weighted measure that is sensitive to the relative income level of
households. Poorer households will have relatively higher importance. Thus Ci is
weighted by the households rank (from poorest to richest) in the income distribution
as:
si = 2
N + 1 − ri
N
(4.1)
where ri is the absolute ranking of household i and N is the population size. The
weight, si for poorest will be 2 and for the richest will be 2/N .
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Catastrophic OOP payment can lead to impoverishment: a non-poor household
may fall under the poverty line z as a result of OOP healthcare spending3. Household
income is divided by number of members to get a per capita measure. The indicator
pprei equals 1 if household i’s per capita income gross of OOP healthcare payments is
below a poverty line PL and 0 otherwise. Similarly, pposti indicates that a household
per capita income is below the poverty line after substracting OOP healthcare
spending. A household had impoverishing OOP healthcare expenditures if its per
capita income level is above the poverty line before payments pprei = 0, but falls
below the poverty line as a result of OOP healthcare payments pposti = 1. These
poverty headcount indicators simply provide information on whether a household
is poor but do not account for how far below the poverty line the household falls.
In contrast, the poverty gap calculates the degree of poverty of a household as the
distance between the poverty line and a household’s per capita income (PL − wi).
The poverty gap before OOP healthcare payments is defined as gprei = p
pre
i (PL − wi).
Similarly, we define gposti = p
post
i (PL − (wi − Ti)) as the distance between the poverty
line and the household per capita income after OOP healthcare payments.
In order to explore the financial protection impact of the programme, this study
estimates the effect of the change in OOP healthcare expenditures both on the
poverty headcount and the poverty gap – i.e. if the establishment of Seguro Popular
reduces the likelihood of a household to fall below the poverty line; and also if
there is a reduction in monetary terms on the distance between poverty line and the
household income level as a result of OOP healthcare spending. First, to assess the
effect on the poverty incidence, ∆pimt is defined as the change in poverty status due
to healthcare payments as the difference between before and after OOP payment
poverty headcounts ppostimt − p
pre
imt for household i. In other words, the indicator ∆pimt
equals 1 if the household had impoverishing healthcare expenditures and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, to estimate the impact of the programme on the poverty intensity, ∆gimt is
defined as the difference in poverty gaps before and after health expenses g1imt − g0imt.




0 , if ppostimt = p
pre
imt = 0
Ti , if ppostimt = p
pre
imt = 1




3The standard poverty line for upper-middle income countries used here is defined by the World
Bank at 5.50 USD a day per capita measured at 2018 prices and adjusted for PPP.
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The first case in equation 4.2 refers to non-poor households, both their before and
after healthcare payments income is zero, and therefore, their difference is 0 too; if
household i is poor before and (necessarily) after health expenses, its difference in
poverty gap will be Ti, precisely the household OOP health expenditures; and the
last case, the most interesting in this context, is when a household is non-poor before
health expenses, but falls below the poverty line because of OOP health expenditures.
In this case, the difference in poverty gaps will be precisely the poverty gap after
OOP healthcare payments.
To explore the impact of Seguro Popular on households’ welfare, the share of food
expenditure of households’ budget is examined. This widely used welfare measure
(Deaton, 1997) is based on the assumption that food expenditure share in budget
identifies welfare for households with different demographic composition. Engel’s
Law4 states that there is a negative relationship between food share and total income.
Therefore, food share of budget is assumed to be an inverse measure of welfare.
4.3.4 Econometric analysis
Instrumental variables
To estimate the effect of Seguro Popular on the outcomes of interest, this analysis
assumes a linear model where outcomes depend on households’ affiliation status and
on socio-demographic characteristics. The model is estimated as:
Yi = α + x′iβ + δDi + εi (4.3)
where x′ is a vector of covariates and β a vector of associated coefficients; Di
is the indicator of programme enrolment of household i, and δ is the coefficient
of the treatment effect of SP on the outcome Yi; εi represents the unobservable
individual heterogeneity assumed to be random, and uncorrelated with the regressors.
The decision to affiliate, Di, is endogenous. As households decide voluntarily to
enrol in Seguro Popular, treatment status is correlated with the error term. This
would introduce a bias in the estimates as affiliates are potentially different from
households that decide not to participate. One way to address the selection bias
is to instrument the endogenous affiliation status variable. In the first stage, the
households’ probability of enrolling is estimated as:
D∗i = z′iγ + vi (4.4)
4Engel, E., 1857. Die productions-und consumtionsverhältnisse des königreichs sachsen.
Zeitschrift des Statistischen Bureaus des Königlich Sächsischen Ministeriums des Innern, 8, pp.1-54.
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where D∗i is the probability of household i to enroll in SP; z′i represents the
vector of instruments with associated coefficients γ, and vi is the residual term. The
instrument is a binary variable that equals one if the programme is present in a
municipality. The instrument indicates if the programme is available for households
to enrol, in that sense one would expect that the instruments will cause health
expenditures to change only through enrolment status.
An instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction if it is not correlated with the
error term conditional on the household and municipal covariates. In other words,
if individual level enrolment status and municipal level enrolment are correlated to
another factor that is also a determinant of households’ out-of-pocket healthcare
payments, the instrument would not be valid. An example of such a factor might
be the availability of healthcare facilities in a municipality. Evidence suggests
that, indeed, healthcare availability is one of the main influences for municipalities’
adoption of Seguro Popular and therefore households’ affiliation (Conti and Ginja,
2017). Seguro Popular was originally rolled-out in municipalities with the required
infrastructure for effective implementation. The first municipalities to enrol were the
ones that already had healthcare facilities; followed by the ones that had to invest
in healthcare infrastructure to comply with the requirements to implement. The
availability of hospitals and clinics in a municipality would drive local governments
to introduce the programme and also for households to enrol; and at the same
time, healthcare service availability influences families in their decisions to spend
out-of-pocket on healthcare. These differences in healthcare availability across
municipalities are accounted for with the inclusion of municipality’s characteristics,
healthcare infrastructure, marginalisation index, and rural or urban area of household
location. These variables would measure the degree of development and therefore
the availability of healthcare facilities. Moreover, the validity of the instruments
is tested using endogeneity tests and the Cragg-Donald-Wald F statistic for weak
instruments.
Fixed effects
To verify the robustness of the results to different specifications, this section presents
a model to estimate intention-to-treat effects by exploiting the variation in the
timing of SP’s implementation at the municipality level. The roll-out began in
2002 with a pilot in 26 municipalities from 5 states and the official start was in
2004. Full implementation at the municipal level was 99% complete by 2007, while
at the individual level full enrolment took roughly a decade. Even though the
implementation was not random, the natural experiment created by the progressive
roll-out is useful for evaluation purposes. The specification in this section is a flexible
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event-study approach that allows for heterogeneous treatment effects in time of
exposure to treatment after roll-out, while looking for any trends in the outcomes in
the pre-treatment periods. The treated population is defined as households located
in municipalities where the programme is ongoing and the reference period are
households situated in municipalities the year prior to implementation. The data is
from every two years starting in 2000 through 2018 which means there are households
from 7 years before treatment (2000 data on municipalities rolled-out in 2007) to 16
years after treatment (2018 data on municipalities rolled-out in 2002). The relevant
parameter is the intention-to-treat effects (ITT) to address selection bias introduced
by the individual’s decision of whether or not to enrol on the programme. Outcomes
are modelled using the following specification:
Yimt = µm + δt + x′imt +
−2∑
j=−7
τ 0j SPmt +
16∑
j=0
τ 1j SPmt + εimt (4.5)
where SPmt, j = (−7, 16) are indicators that together with j represent the event
of a municipality implementing Seguro Popular ; τj is the effect of the programme
being available on a municipality j years after roll-out. The dummy for the period at
one year before treatment j = −1 is omitted and taken as the base year similarly to
Conti and Ginja (2017) and Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2015). The period j = 0
is assumed to be part of the period under treatment. The first set τ 0 captures all
the differences if any by year before the programme, and the second set τ 1 are the
differential effects by year under treatment. All effects are estimated with respect to
j = −1. Thus, if any of the pre-treatment τ coefficients are statistically significant,
we have a violation of the parallel trends assumption. The fixed effects terms
are µm, a set of dummy variables to account for the permanent municipality-level
differences; and δt is the effect of any time patterns common to all units. The vector
covariates ximt account for time-varying household and individual socio demographic
characteristics; and the error term εimt that captures all the remaining omitted
factors is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with other regressors.
Non-linear difference-in-differences
When the policy expansion may have heterogeneous treatment effects, the average
treatment effect on the treated may miss important information along the outcomes
distribution. While there may be heterogeneous impacts of the programme arising
from individuals’ differences in observed characteristics like income or residence
strata; or heterogeneity according to unobserved expected gains from the policy
(Heckman, 1979), this section explores heterogeneity in the effect according to outcome
levels. To find differences in the impact of Seguro Popular across the distribution
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of out-of-pocket and impoverishing healthcare payments, the approach used is the
changes-in-changes model, a non-linear difference-in-differences design introduced by
Athey and Imbens (2006) and extended by Melly and Santangelo (2015) to allow for
covariates. The method is a generalisation of the difference-in-difference approach
that uses the change in the distribution of the control group over time to estimate
the counterfactual, i.e. the distribution of the treatment group in the absence of
treatment. The parameter estimated is the quantile treatment effect on the treated
(QTT) defined as the difference of the two potential outcome distributions for the
treatment group at any quantile τ ∈ (0, 1). In a randomly assigned programme,
the QTT would be the difference at the τth quantile of the treated households’
income distribution and the distribution in controls for a given year. However, in a
non-experimental setting, the treatment effect would be the difference between the
distribution of outcomes of the treated population in the post treatment period and
the counterfactual distribution of outcomes constructed as the treated distribution
had they not been treated.
A difference-in-differences two-period framework is used as the general identifi-
cation strategy for estimating the quantile treatment effects of the programme. A
household belongs to group G = {0, 1} where group 1 is the treatment group and
is observed in periods τ ∈ {0, 1}. Where only households in group 1 on period 1
are affected by the policy. The treated population is defined as the households who
declared being enrolled in the programme and the control group are households
who were eligible for the programme but decided not to enrol. An advantage of the
approach is that it allows for selection on unobservables as long as they do not vary
across time within groups.
Because the dataset used is a repeated cross-section, there is no available informa-
tion on individuals across time. Thus, instead of the two-period standard model, all
years of the repeated cross-sectional are pooled in the analysis. The indicator τ = 0
is defined as the outcomes before OOP healthcare payment, while τ = 1 refers to the
same year-observation but after OOP healthcare payments. This approach allows to
give the effect of Seguro Popular on out-of-pocket payments a causal interpretation
and allows for heterogeneity according to the income distribution. In particular,
the goal is to investigate if the policy has a greater impact on lower tail of the
distribution, the poorer households.
Following Athey and Imbens (2006) using potential outcomes notation literature
(Rubin, 1974, 1978), the realised outcome is defined as,
Y = (1 − I) · Y N + I · Y I (4.6)
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Where Y N denotes the outcome if a household is not enrolled in the programme,
and Y I if the household participates; and I is the interaction, I = G ∗ T . There is a
vector of covariates X whose distribution has support X. The outcome of a household
in the absence of treatment satisfies,
Y N = h(X, T, U) (4.7)
where U is the unobservable individual characteristics of Y and the production
function h(t, x, u) is increasing in u for t ∈ {0, 1} and for all x ∈ X. The identifying
assumption of this model is that, in the absence of treatment, the distribution of
unobservable characteristics U can vary across groups, but within groups is constant
over time. This assumption is analogous to the parallel trends assumption in the
linear DiD design. As each group has a different production technology, the expected
benefit may vary across groups.
Let F IY be the distribution of available income of treated households in period t;
and F NY , the distribution of control households at period t, where t = 0 means pre-
payments period and t = 1, post-payments period. We can identify the conditional
distribution Y N11x over the quantiles 0 < τ < 1 as:









Intuitively, equation 4.8 says that a household at the τ quantile of the outcome





the outcome distribution in the same period but in group 1. The conditional quantile
treatment effect for group 1 in period 1 for the covariates x:
∆QE(·|x) = F −1Y I |11x(·) − F
−1
Y N |01x(·) (4.9)









However, given the difficulty to translate the conditional treatment effects in the
context public policy, unconditional treatment effects are more relevant. The uncon-
ditional distribution of outcomes for group 1 in period 1 is obtained by integrating
the conditional outcome distribution over the distribution of covariates:















The unconditional treatment effects on the potential outcome are given by:
∆QE(·) = F −1Y I |11(·) − F
−1
Y N |11(·) (4.13)
Figure 4.1 illustrates the estimation of a counterfactual distribution: for any
quantile, we find the level of outcome y for the distribution of the treated before
treatment; then, we find the quantile associated to that level of y on the control
group before treatment distribution, and the outcome level y′ on the controls after
treatment for that quantile.
Fig. 4.1 Changes-in-changes distribution transformations
Quantile local average treatment effects
This section presents the methods used to estimate the quantile treatment effects of
Seguro Popular on welfare. The measure of welfare used here is the food expenditure
share of total household expenditure. There is a negative relationship between food
share and total expenditure. This means that holding everything else constant, the
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households with the smaller income will have a larger food share. Distributional
impacts of the programme are particularly informative as average effects can have
ambiguous interpretations. A positive average effect on the food expenditure share
could be an increase or decrease in overall well-being depending on which part of the
distribution it has the most impact. An increase in food share in the lower tail of the
distribution could mean a positive effect on welfare if households are spending more
on food resources that would have been used on healthcare in the absence Seguro
Popular. It is of particular interest in this study to find the effect of Seguro Popular
on lower income households, being the policy’s main target population.
To analyse the distributional impact of Seguro Popular on welfare, quantile
treatment effects are estimated using a non-parametric instrumental variables model
proposed by Frölich and Melly (2013). The model considers the effect of a binary
treatment variable D on a continuous outcome variable Y . Let Y 1i and Y 0i be the
potential outcomes of individual i where Y 1i would be observed if individual i receives
the treatment, and Y 0i would be observed otherwise. The observed outcome Yi is
defined as Yi ≡ Y 1i Di +Y 0i (1−Di). The quantile treatment effect of the policy (QTE)
represents the distributional impact and is defined as:
∆τ = QτY 1 − QτY 0 (4.14)
where QτY 1 is the τ quantile of Y d. The treatment variable D is endogenous and
identification is by a binary instrumental variable, Z. In this case, the municipality
level indicator of affiliation to Seguro Popular. Thus, the QTE is identified under the
assumptions that there is a complier population who respond in the intended way to
Z; that no individuals who defy their treatment status; that common support of X
exists for Z=0 and Z=1, and that the instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction
and is conditionally independent. The quantile processes for τϵ(0, 1) are identified
and estimated separately. The distribution function of Y 1 for compliers:
E[1(Y ≤ u)D|Z = 1] − E[1(Y ≤ u)D|Z = 0
E[D|Z = 1] − E[D|Z = 0] (4.15)
This unconditional distribution function is inverted to obtain the unconditional
quantile function. Conditional on X:
FY 1|c(u) =
∫
(E[1(Y ≤ u)D|X, Z = 1] − E[1(Y ≤ u)D|X, Z = 0]) dFx∫
(E[D|X, Z = 1] − E[D|X, Z = 0]) dFx
(4.16)




W = Z − Pr(Z = 1|X)Pr(Z = 1|X){1 − Pr(Z = 1|X)}(2D − 1) (4.18)
The distribution of Y 0 for the compliers is identified analogously replacing D
with 1-D. Thus, the QTE is identified as the difference between the quantiles:






Table 4.1 summarises some characteristics of the sample. There are over 300,000
households in the sample combining ten waves over 18 years5. Household monthly
total income was 14,676 Mexican pesos (MXN) in constant terms from 2018 (≈US$
732); household expenditure was 11,361 MXN (≈568 US$), monthly average house-
hold food expenditure was 3,295 MXN (≈165 USD). Households had 3.82 members
in average; 28% of whom were over 65 years olds and 42% were children under
5. Monthly average OOP healthcare payments were 302 MXN (≈15 US$), which
represent 2% of total income. Thirteen percent of the sample had catastrophic
expenditures of at least 20% of their income. Before OOP healthcare payments, 15%
of the sample were below the poverty line, and 16% after payments. The poverty
gap before OOP payments was 68 MXN (≈3.4 USD) and after OOP payments, the
poverty gap was 79 MXN (≈4). Taking the mean of all waves with information on
affiliation (2004-2018), 44% of households had at least one member enrolled in Seguro
Popular. Heads of household were 75% male, 48.5 years old in average, 73% of them
had completed primary school, 27% also high school. About 70% of households lived
in a low marginalised area, while 10% lived in a highly marginalised area; 36% of
the sample lived in a rural location.
Graphical analysis of OOP healthcare payments
This section explores out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures. Figure 4.2 shows OOP
payments for health care as a percentage of total household expenditure for years
2000 to 2018. On average, OOP payments account for between 2 and 3 percent of
52000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018
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Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics, 2000-2018
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Household total income (MXN) 299,318 14,676.79 35,077.45 0 13,557,326
Household total expenditure (MXN) 303,202 11,631.53 14,279.19 0 2,874,399
Household size 301,267 3.82 1.94 1 43
OOP healthcare payments (MXN) 300,973 302.77 1,749.74 0 327,032
OOP share of total income 300,972 0.02 0.05 0 1
Catastrophic payments (≥ 20%) 303,202 0.13 0.33 0 1
Headcount poverty before OOPHE 303,202 0.15 0.36 0 1
Headcount poverty after OOPHE 303,202 0.16 0.37 0 1
Poverty gap (MXN) before OOPHE 299,318 67.96 198.94 0 1,491.15
Poverty gap (MXN) after OOPHE 299,038 79.61 607.16 0 279,324.40
Food expenditure (MXN) 300,973 3,295.92 2,701.08 0 600,611.40
HH enrolled in Seguro Popular 274,005 0.44 0.50 0 1
Head of household’s sex 300,628 0.75 0.43 0 1
Head of household’s age 300,628 48.51 15.87 12 110
HH completed primary school 300,628 0.73 0.44 0 1
HH completed high school 300,628 0.27 0.44 0 1
Number of 65+ year olds in HH 301,267 0.28 0.58 0 5
Number of 5- year olds in HH 301,267 0.42 0.70 0 9
Rural area 301,253 0.36 0.48 0 1
Marginalisation index, 2010 %




Very high 300,965 5.03
Note: 2018 Mexican pesos, 1 USD=20 MXN.
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Fig. 4.2 OOP Payments as a Percentage of Total HH Income-Average by year, Mexico,
2000-2018
household expenditure in the nine years in the sample. The share of OOP payments
do not show a trend over time but the average appears to decrease after 2006. This
could be an effect of Seguro Popular coverage if the decline in OOP healthcare
payments are attributable to the reform.
Figure 4.3 explores the progressivity of health payments by examining their share
of total income when income varies. Out-of-pocket payments for health care are
displayed as a percentage of household income by quintile groups of equivalent income
for years 2000 to 2018. Out-of-pocket payments show a negative relationship with
income as they seem to decrease their share when income rises. This indicates some
degree of regressivity in OOP payments. A health system where OOP payments
represent a large source of health financing is expected to be regressive as poorer
people would necessarily use a larger share of income in healthcare.
Figure 4.4 explores income inequality descriptively between affiliates and non-
affiliates. The Lorenz curves compare the total income distribution after OOP
payments for households enrolled in the programme with eligible households that
are not enrolled for the nine waves. The Lorenz curve of the treated dominates the
curve for controls, implying that the total income distribution after OOP payments
is more equal for treated households. This may be attributable to the programme if
poor people among beneficiaries are spending a smaller proportion of their income
on healthcare than richer people due to the coverage of Seguro Popular. Coverage
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Fig. 4.3 OOP Healthcare Payments as a Percentage of Total HH Income - Income
Quintile
against financial risk means that money that would have been spent on healthcare
in the absence of Seguro Popular is now additional income for the household. If SP
is effectively targeting poorer population, then there is more additional income on
the left of the income distribution, reducing inequality.
Figure 4.5, presents a summary on poverty dominance between treated and
controls. The device known as the three ’I’s of poverty (TIP) curves, provides a
summary on incidence, intensity and inequality dimensions (Jenkins and Lambert,
1997). The figure shows the cumulative poverty gaps of households ranked by income
from poorest to richest. The curve for the treated dominates the curve of controls.
Hence, the poverty after out-of-pocket healthcare payments of the treated is higher
than the control households in a pooled sample of nine years. The incidence is
measured in the horizontal axis as the length of the non-flat section. In Fig 4.5,
the non-flat section of the treated curve goes beyond the 0.3 in the horizontal axis,
implying a poverty incidence over 30%; for controls, the poverty incidence is around
20%. The intensity is measured as the vertical distance to the flat section. Poverty
intensity of controls is slightly over 100 MXN (≈ 4 USD); while the intensity among
the treated is slightly below 150 MXN (≈ 7 USD). Taking together these preliminary
results give some indication that treated households have lower income inequality
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Fig. 4.4 Lorenz Curves for Household Inome for affiliates and non-affiliates
but also lower income. These descriptive findings can be confirmed by estimating
the programme’s causal effects on income distribution and poverty.




Table 4.2 presents results for the instrumental variables models. Column (1) shows
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results of enrolling in SP on the different
outcomes; column (2) shows the programme’s effects when including municipality
and year fixed effects (FE); column (3) shows local average treatment effects (LATE)
estimated via instrumental variables (IV); and column (4) estimates treatment
effects using a fixed effect instrumental variables approach (IVFE). The instrumental
variable is the municipality level roll-out indicator that takes values of one if the
municipality participates in SP in a given year and zero otherwise.
Being enrolled in the programme reduced monthly households’ OOP healthcare
expenditures in 105.7 MXN (≈5 US$) according to OLS estimates, and by 251.1 MXN
(≈12 US$) using IV. The difference between the two results indicates the relevance
of IV. However, there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of regressors’
exogeneity as χ2 pval>.1. Columns (2) and (4) include fixed effects in the analysis
to account for persistent differences in municipalities and for time-variant factors
common to all households. Fixed effects estimations show a smaller effect of 78
MXN (≈4 US$) and weaker relationship (p< 0.1) of SP enrolment on out-of-pocket
healthcare spending. The last column shows the results of the IVFE approach.
The coefficient shown is the largest among the different approaches, however, it is
not statistically significant, moreover, there is no evidence of endogeneity in the
treatment variable. The difference between the models when adding fixed effects,
provide evidence for the relevance of fixed effects. There are important differences
across municipalities and there are factors evolving through the years.
The second panel in Table 4.2 shows the programme’s effect on catastrophic
payments. According to IV estimates in column (3), being enrolled in the programme
reduced the households’ probability of having catastrophic expenditures in healthcare
by almost 12 percent points in average. The OLS result in column (1) was less than
2 percentage points suggesting endogeneity of enrolling in the programme. Moreover,
the test statistic for weak instruments (F-stat=10268), and endogeneity (χ2 p-val
<0.01) confirm the relevance of IV estimation. Nevertheless, when accounting for
time and municipality fixed effects, the programme’s impact goes to zero.
Panel 3 shows the effect on weighted catastrophic payments that give a greater
importance to poorer households as described in equation 4.1. The impact of SP
is a reduction of 19.9% and 1.8% for IV and linear model respectively. The greater
coefficients on the weighted indicator implies that the policy had more impact on the
poorer households. The estimations satisfy F-statistic test for weak instruments and
χ2 test for endogeneity. However, when controlling for fixed effects, the impact of
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enrolling to the programme is only 1.5 percentage points in the likelihood of having
a catastrophic healthcare payment. Given the importance of accounting for fixed
effects, and the irrelevance of the instrument in the IVFE approach, column (2)
provides the most credible estimates of treatment effects.
Panels 4 and 5 in Table 4.2 show the impact of Seguro Popular on the incidence
of impoverishing out-of-pocket healthcare payments ∆pi, described as the difference
between gross and net of OOP payments poverty headcount; and intensity ∆gi,
defined as the difference between gross and net of OOP payments poverty gaps.
There is no impact on impoverishment associated to being enrolled in SP. According
to IV estimates, SP reduced the likelihood of having impoverishing OOP expenditures
by 0.7 percent points. However, the approach does not control for municipality and
year fixed effects.
Programme impacts on poverty headcount ppost and poverty gap gpost overall
are examined in panels 6 and 7 of Table 4.2. It is reasonable to think that Seguro
Popular has an effect on income other than through a reduction in out-of-pocket
healthcare payments. According to IV estimations, being enrolled in SP has an effect
of reducing the likelihood of being poor by 14.5 percent points and on reducing
poverty intensity by 144 MXN (≈7 USD$). However, when including fixed effects,
column (3) reports an increase of impoverishment associated with the programme of
2 percent points. These results together with an increase in the pro-poor weighted
catastrophic expenditure indicator, may be explained by an inadequate targeting of
Seguro Popular on poor population. Evidence suggests that even though healthcare
expenses in some categories of expenditure decreased, others, like medications persist.
Shortage of medication in the programme, forces users to pay out-of-pocket and this
situation would affect poorer population relatively to a greater degree.
Table 4.3, breaks down out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures in 9 different
categories of expenditure: outpatient services, prescription drugs, hospitalisation,
antenatal care, obstetric services, non-prescription drugs, alternative medicine, or-
thopaedic services and medical insurance.
Panel 1 in 4.3 refers to the total of out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures as panel
1 in table 4.2. The second panel shows impacts of the programme on outpatient
services using the same model specifications as in 4.2. Column (1) shows OLS
estimates of 63 Mexican pesos (≈3 USD$). Column (2) shows results of adding
fixed effects to control for time-invariant differences in municipalities and for changes
occurring each year common to all households. Average treatment effect on the
treated is 32 MXN (≈2 US$). IV estimates indicate a local average treatment effect
of 23 MXN (≈ 1 US$), moreover, the relevance of this result is confirmed by the test
statistic for weak instruments (F-stat=18,347) and endogeneity (χ2 p-val <0.05).
Nevertheless, the IV approach does not include fixed effects that, as described above,
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Table 4.2 Seguro Popular enrolment impact on households’ financial risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE IV IVFE
OOP HE -105.7*** -78.18* -251.6*** -649.3
(38.79) (39.94) (75.12) (521.7)
Observations 122,951 122,947 122,951 123,084
IV-F stat 18,347.5 119.6
χ2 pval 0.1104 0.235
Catastrophic OOP HE -0.0192*** 0.00197 -0.119*** 0.0946
(0.00300) (0.00329) (0.0109) (0.134)
Observations 123,065 123,061 123,065 123,198
IV-F stat 18,382.5 119.1
χ2 pval 0.000 0.300
Poor-weighted -0.0184*** 0.0149*** -0.181*** 0.209
catastrophic OOP HE (0.00510) (0.00553) (0.0170) (0.227)
Observations 123,065 123,061 123,065 123,198
IV-F stat 18,382.5 119.1
χ2 pval 0.000 0.189
OOP HE poverty headcount -0.00102 0.000166 -0.00732** -0.0121
(0.000802) (0.000882) (0.00354) (0.0298)
Observations 123,065 123,061 123,065 123,198
IV-F stat 18,382.5 119.1
χ2 pval 0.066 0.667
OOP HE poverty gap -16.59 -17.25 6.689 55.06
(10.18) (12.43) (7.666) (59.59)
Observations 122,951 122,947 122,951 123,084
IV-F stat 18,347.5 119.6
χ2 pval 0.1279 0.731
Poverty headcount -0.00268 0.0197*** -0.145*** 0.00268
(0.00403) (0.00451) (0.0108) (0.147)
Observations 123,065 123,061 123,065 123,198
IV-F stat 18,347.5 119.6
χ2 pval 0.000 0.914
Poverty gap -47.90*** -26.58** -144.6*** -3.070
(10.39) (12.74) (10.59) (145.0)
Observations 122,951 122,947 122,951 123,084
IV-F stat 18,382.5 119.1
χ2 pval 0.000 0.856
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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are relevant in this study for addressing bias. Column (4) including fixed effects,
finds no effects of the programme on outpatient services. However, the statistics of
instrument validity are not satisfied.
The third panel, in contrast to previous studies (Nikoloski and Mossialos, 2018;
Wirtz et al., 2012), shows a decrease in prescription drugs expenditures caused by
Seguro Popular enrolment. However, the effect is below 2 US$. Results of panel 4
indicate no effect of SP on spending on hospitalisation. Panels 5 and 6 of Table 4
4.3 indicate a marginal effect of the programme on antenatal care and obstetrical
expenditures. These results are consistent with previous studies suggesting an
increased utilisation of antenatal and obstetrical care (Harris and Sosa-Rubi, 2009;
Sosa-Rubi et al., 2009). Expenditures on non-prescription drugs and alternative
medicine also slightly declined as a result of enrolling in SP. There seems no effect
of enrolling in SP on orthopaedic services. Finally, there was a drop in medical
insurance spending of less than one US$ associated with SP uptake.
Results of Tables 4.3 and 4.2 together, suggest a decline in out-of-pocket healthcare
expenditures. Participants in Seguro Popular spent less in most of healthcare
categories of expenditure. However, the decline in out-of-pocket spending does
not protect the insured against the financial risk of catastrophic healthcare events.
Moreover, the programme does not protect against impoverishment caused by out-of-
pocket healthcare spending, and it does not seem to be targeting the poor adequately.
Distributional impacts
Figure 4.6 presents the distributional impact of Seguro Popular on household income
as described in section 4.3.4. The quantile treatment CIC approach estimates the
change in income xi that would have happen in the affiliate group in the absence of
SP, using the change in income that did occur in the control group at the quantile
that corresponds to that level of income xi. The programme had positive effects for
all quantiles along the income distribution. In terms of policy evaluation, the interest
lies on the lower tail, the changes in the available income of the poorer population.
The impact between the quantiles 20 and 80 remains practically constant at 100
MXN (5 US$); on the tails the impact is higher: on the left tail of the distribution,
the poorest 20%, the effect increases and goes over 200 MXN; while on the right tail
of the distribution raises to 300 MXN. The conclusion from Figure 4.6 with respect
to income inequality is not clear.
Table 4.4 reports both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Cramer-von-Mises-
Smirnov statistics. The first null hypotheses tests whether there is no effect at any
quantile τ ; and the second, if the effect is constant for all τ . There is statistical
evidence of Seguro Popular having a positive effect on available income; and that
4.4 Results 121
Table 4.3 Seguro Popular enrolment impact on households’ OOP health spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE IV IVFE
OOP HE -105.7*** -78.18* -251.6*** -649.2
(38.79) (39.94) (75.12) (521.7)
Observations 122,951 122,947 122,951 122,947
IV-F stat 18,347.5 121.0
χ2 pval 0.110 0.252
Outpatient services -63.79*** -32.46*** -23.73*** -174.9
(15.23) (5.409) (5.544) (124.6)
Observations 122,951 122,951 122,947 122,947
IV-F stat 18,347.5 121.0
χ2 pval 0.049 0.190
Prescription drugs -43.33*** -14.02*** -6.552** -115.4
(9.988) (2.516) (2.696) (303.6)
Observations 122,951 122,951 122,947 122,947
IV-F stat 18,347.5 121.0
χ2 pval 0.003 0.157
Hospitalisation -7.907 -23.59 -24.31 0.896
(40.95) (19.36) (20.53) (366.2)
Observations 122,951 122,951 122,947 122,947
IV-F stat 18,347.5 121.0
χ2 pval 0.753 0.936
Antenatal care -8.091* -2.246*** -0.477 -59.10
(4.637) (0.833) (0.892) (41.79)
Observations 122,951 122,951 122,947 122,947
IV-F stat 18,347.5 121.0
χ2 pval 0.200 0.128
Obstetric services -42.12** -14.89*** -12.36*** -242.6
(16.88) (2.519) (3.015) (148.9)
Observations 122,951 122,951 122,947 122,947
IV-F stat 18,347.5 121.0
χ2 pval 0.097 0.099
Non-prescription drugs -8.036** -5.924*** -3.527* 11.88
(3.261) (1.740) (1.809) (26.10)
Observations 122,951 122,951 122,947 122,947
IV-F stat 18,347.5 121.0
χ2 pval 0.621 0.563
Alternative medicine -21.79** -2.591*** -0.249 -66.84
Observations 122,951 122,951 122,947 (53.51)
IV-F stat 18,347.5 121.0
χ2 pval 0.060 0.196
Othopaedic services -44.84* 5.042 9.716 -191.4
(25.79) (13.17) (13.91) (144.5)
Observations 122,951 122,951 122,947 122,947
IV-F stat 18,347.5 121.0
χ2 pval 0.160 0.158
Medical insurance -14.43 -14.48*** -15.63*** 188.8
(15.90) (4.336) (4.623) (155.9)
Observations 122,951 122,951 122,947 122,947
IV-F stat 18,347.5 121.0
χ2 pval 0.998 0.172
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Fig. 4.6 Distributional impact of Seguro Popular on income
Table 4.4 Bootstrap inference of treatment distribution effects
Null-hypothesis KS-statistic CMS-statistic
No effect: QTE(tau)=0 for all taus 0 0
Constant effect: QTE(tau)=QTE(0.5) for all taus 0.08 0.42
Stochastic dominance: QTE(tau)>0 for all taus 1 1
Stochastic dominance: QTE(tau)<0 for all taus 0 0
the effect is constant and equal to the median for all τ . Moreover, there is evidence
of positive stochastic dominance shown in Table 4.4. Figure 4.7 displays the coun-
terfactual and the empirical cumulative distributions. The treatment effects are
represented by the horizontal distance between those curves for each quantile. The
counterfactual distribution is always slightly to the left of the empirical distribution
implying a positive marginal effect on income. Moreover, the effects seem to be
constant along the distribution. These results seem to suggest that enrolling in
Seguro Popular had a positive on income but this effect seems to be constant along
the income distribution.
Table 4.5 shows the difference in Gini coefficients of the income distribution
derived from the change in OOP healthcare payments induced by Seguro Popular.
The Gini coefficient of the counterfactual is slightly higher than the one estimated by
the model implying that inequality drops due to the introduction of Seguro Popular.
Although the difference is statistically significant, the drop is only 1 point in the Gini
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Fig. 4.7 Cumulative distributions of income
Table 4.5 Gini coefficients of CIC transformation distributions
Distribution No. of obs. Index value Std. error p-value
Counterfactual 81 0.17617176 0.00190081 0.000
Estimated 81 0.1654153 0.00147743 0.000
Test for stat. significant differences with Ho: diff=0 (assuming equal variances)
F-stat = 19.96272 p-value= 0.0000
Test for stat. significant differences with Ho: diff=0 (large sample assumed)
Diff. = -.01075646 Std. err. = .00240746 z-stat = -4.47 p-value = 0.0000
coefficient. Figure 4.8 illustrates the change in inequality through comparing the
Lorenz curves for affiliates and non-affiliates (and social security non-beneficiaries)
and confirms the slight change in inequality as the difference is indiscernible.
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show quantile treatment effects estimated by the non-
parametric instrumental variables model described in 4.3.4. According to the results,
there is no evidence of an effect of Seguro Popular until the .4 quantile of the
distribution. After that, the decline, especially in the top quartile is very sharp and
increasing until the top of the distribution. Results indicate that, on average, SP
is associated with a 50% drop on out-of-pocket spending at the .75 quantile of the
distribution. For the top decile, the programme is associated with a 64% decline,
with an average of 495 MXN (≈25 USD) reduction per household.
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Fig. 4.8 Lorenz curve by affiliation
Fig. 4.9 Impact of Seguro Popular on OOP health expenditures
Fixed effects
This section uses an alternative definition of the treated population as those living
in treated municipalities, therefore the estimated parameter is the intention-to-treat
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Fig. 4.10 Impact of Seguro Popular on OOP health expenditures share of income
Fig. 4.11 Impact of Seguro Popular on households’ share of food expenditure of total
budget
effect as described in section 4.3.4. Figure 4.12 shows SP’s impacts on financial risk
variables using the event study approach described by equation 4.5. This parameter
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estimated is the intention-to-treat effect that can be interpreted as the effect of having
the opportunity to enrol. The programme did not have an intent-to-treat effect on
any of the outcomes related to financial risk: OOP health expenditures referred to
in section 4.3.3 as Ti, catastrophic payments or impoverishment expenditures, both
incidence defined as the difference between poverty headcount before and after OOP
payments ∆pi, or intensity defined as the before and after OOP payments poverty
gaps ∆gi (eq 4.2). There was no impact on after OOP payments poverty measures,
both incidence pi or intensity gi; or on food expenditures. Any impact on the outcome
variables is absorbed by the fixed effects of years or municipalities. Household size
and composition have an impact on OOP payments and impoverishment as well as
household income level.
Figure 4.13 shows intention-to-treat effects of Seguro Popular on out-of-pocket
healthcare expenditures broken down into categories of spending. No impact of
Seguro Popular was found on any of the nine categories, namely outpatient services,
prescription drugs, hospitalisation, antenatal care, obstetric services, non-prescription
drugs, alternative medicine, orthopaedic services, and health insurance.
These results refer to the effect on having the opportunity to enrol on financial
risk. In contrast to the results found in section 4.4.2 that reflect the impact of
actually enrolling in Seguro Popular, and therefore the difference in impacts found.
Results found in this section may be due to a low number of actual affiliates and the
possible effect is not reflected on the average of eligible population.
4.5 Discussion
This study assessed the impact of the introduction of Seguro Popular, the most
ambitious policy expansion towards universality of healthcare coverage in Mexico.
Using 10 waves of the National Household Survey on Income and Expenditure
(ENIGH), impact of programme affiliation was estimated through different empirical
specifications and results showed a decline in out-of-pocket healthcare payments.
However, the policy had no effect on catastrophic payments or impoverishing, neither
on incidence nor intensity. On average, Seguro Popular enrolment was associated with
a reduction of 78 MXN ( ≈4 USD) of household’s average OOP health spending and
a 50% decline in the top quartile of the payments distribution. Moreover, according
to results, the introduction of Seguro Popular was responsible for reducing poverty
incidence by 2 percentage points and poverty intensity by 26 MXN (≈1 US$). The
introduction of Seguro Popular had a modest reduction effect on income inequality.
The mixed findings from the current study, specifically reductions on OOP
healthcare spending, but no effect on catastrophic spending or impoverishment are
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Fig. 4.12 Impact of Seguro Popular on households’ financial risk
comparable to those found in previous studies. There is extensively documented
literature on the impact of SP on OOP healthcare spending and catastrophic pay-
ments. Most studies find some degree of financial protection impact, although in
some cases results found are limited. King et al. (2009) estimates Seguro Popular
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Fig. 4.13 Impact of SP on households’ OOP HE for different spending categories
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intention-to-treat effects of 23% reduction in catastrophic expenditures, and 30% on
poorer population. For OOP healthcare spending, overall the impact found was a
reduction of 31% but only on poorer population. Moreover, they found no effects
on medication spending or health devices. Sosa-Rubí et al. (2011), using data from
the Seguro Popular Survey evaluation, found protective effect of Seguro Popular
on out-of-pocket payments in outpatient services and hospitalisation in rural and
urban areas; and an impact on catastrophic payments only in urban zones. Nikoloski
and Mossialos (2018), using the Encuesta Nacional de Salud y Nutrición (National
Survey on Health and Nutrition ENSANUT) 2006 and 2012, analyse the effect of
Seguro Popular and social security on out of pocket and catastrophic healthcare
expenditures; and found no link on SP membership and OOP health spending, but
a robust although small effect of SP on reducing catastrophic health expenditures.
On healthcare categories of spending, Wirtz et al. (2012), using the same data as
this study, but examining a shorter period (2004 to 2008), analyse the effect of health
insurance on households’ probability and amount of OOP spending for medicines.
They found that SP reduced the probability of out-of-pocket health spending by
9.7% (P < 0.05) and the annual amount spent by US$24.51 but showed no significant
effect on out-of-pocket spending on medicines in comparison to households without
health insurance. In contrast, the present study finds an impact of SP on healthcare
OOP payments in prescribed and non-prescribed medications, but also for outpatient
services, obstetric, antenatal services and alternative medicine (see table 4.3). The
difference in findings may be due to the difference in the study time frame, while this
study considers 8 waves over 16 years, almost the whole duration of the programme,
previous studies look at shorter periods. It is possible that having additional data
increasingly available, allows for analyses with a higher level of precision. As the
programme was replaced recently, it is expected that more analyses covering the
whole period will be available soon.
Compared to the extensive literature on Seguro Popular ’s impact on OOP health-
care spending, evidence on impoverishment is limited. Knaul et al. (2006), in an
early study on SP, found an association between the expansion of Seguro Popular
and the decline of catastrophic and impoverishing spending. However, they had
insufficient data to determine a causal relationship. Nikoloski and Mossialos (2018)
found some effect of Seguro Popular sheltering households from impoverishing; how-
ever, the magnitude was small. Knaul et al. (2018), in contrast, find a statistically
significant impact of Seguro Popular on reducing the likelihood that households
will incur impoverishing expenditures by 42%. García-Díaz and Sosa-Rubí (2011)
find that Seguro Popular affiliates have the lowest distributional poverty impact
compared to other poverty reducing policies. The present analysis found that Seguro
Popular had an impact of reducing the incidence of impoverishment by 0.8 percent
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points; this is an important reduction as incidence was estimated in 1.1% in average.
This finding has broad implications on how to design health insurance policy to
reduce impoverishment. Knaul et al. (2018) using the same dataset as this study for
years 2004-2012 applied propensity score matching methods on affiliated population
and found statistically significant effects on reducing impoverishing out-of-pocket
healthcare expenditures but not on catastrophic expenditures. Those results are
consistent with the current study.
There are some limitations to this study, mostly related to the availability of data.
While the data used for this study is a repeated cross section, panel methods would
be preferable to pooled regression. A panel would account for part of the bias caused
by the endogeneity on the individual decision to enrol. A repeated cross-section
provides a time dimension, and the individual dimension. However, differences across
households over time are not observed. Being able to control for such differences
would improve estimations, specially long-run SP effects. Moreover, there is no data
on the exact time households enrolled in Seguro Popular. Knowing that variable
would allow us to explore differences in exposure to treatment. Another limitation is
related to the programme’s design. The nature of the voluntary insurance introduces
bias as described before. Moreover, the roll-out at the state and municipality level was
not random, but rather arbitrary (affected by political considerations and constrained
by logistics). Finally, even though self-selection issues were addressed, there may
be households, especially in the lower income deciles, that suffered health shocks
but were unable to pay out-of-pocket for a service and, therefore, forgo or postpone
health care. In those cases, self-selection persisted.
This study contributes to the literature on public health insurance in different
aspects. This is one of the few analyses on the long run effects of Seguro Popular,
covering almost its entire duration, from the pilot phase in 2002, to 2018, one year
before its cancellation. A contribution to the methodological approach has been
to combine instrumental variables with fixed effects approaches. Previous analyses
have relied on those methods separately on multiple occasions but there is no study
using an IVFE approach. Another contribution is the analysis of heterogeneity in the
outcomes using non linear models. Existing analyses of Seguro Popular are almost
entirely on the average effect using linear causal inference approaches. In this study,
quantile treatment effects of the policy are estimated by two approaches changes in
changes (Athey and Imbens, 2006) and an instrumental variable quantile approach
proposed by Frölich and Melly (2013). Quantile treatment effects were seldom used
to analyse Seguro Popular, only Huffman and van Gameren (2019) who focused on
the supply-side factors and Barofsky (2011) on the early years of the programme.
Finally, this work contributes to examining alternative paths through which
Seguro Popular may have an impact on welfare. Most poverty analysis of Seguro
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Popular focus on the OOP impoverishing impact. However, the causal path is not
necessarily through reduction in OOP healthcare payments. There are different
channels in which Seguro Popular could impact households’ income. The coverage
expansion has the direct effect of transferring income through free healthcare, but
the indirect effects on health could have impacts on households’ income and welfare.
Two of the channels through which improved health can have a positive impact on
income are: improved health increases productivity of individuals; and, reducing
the time individuals spend taking care of household members after health shocks.
Del Valle (2014) finds that SP increases labour supply by allowing caregivers to
continue working by reducing the burden of caretaking dependants when facing
illness. This increase in productivity will positively impact labour and welfare. This
study explores the impact of Seguro Popular on poverty incidence and intensity
through time and finds that the policy expansion reduces both. Moreover, these
results suggest an additional impact of on households’ ability to smooth consumption
through time, a poverty reduction effect and an increase in welfare.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an evaluation of Seguro Popular, an ambitious
policy reform introduced by the Mexican government to address inequity in access
to healthcare services. Its goal was to grant healthcare coverage to the population
without social security protection from the lowest deciles of income. This work
examines the effectiveness of Seguro Popular in achieving this aim over three main
chapters: the first is an assessment of SP impacts on health outcomes and healthcare
utilisation; the second examines its distributional impacts and health inequality;
and the third analyses the financial protection effect of SP against out-of-pocket
healthcare payments, catastrophic spending and impoverishment.
Seguro Popular operated from 2004 to the end of 2019, including an initial two year
pilot phase. Over that period, there were important improvements in health outcomes,
healthcare utilisation and financial protection in Mexico. Evidence suggests that
some of those advances are directly associated to the healthcare coverage expansion
of Seguro Popular. Before the implementation of Seguro Popular, in 2000, 58.6% of
people did not have any healthcare coverage; by 2018, that proportion was reduced to
16.2%1. Seguro Popular was implemented progressively at the geographical and the
individual level. Moreover, the package of interventions covered increased over time.
It is possible that the sequence in the introduction of the programme on individual
and geographical enrolment and on the interventions covered is the cause for the
differential timing in impacts.
Evaluations can be misleading if timing is not taken into account. For example,
if an evaluation is conducted before the treated group has been exposed to treatment
long enough to benefit from it, the impact would be underestimated. Moreover, if
there are differences in timing of exposure to treatment across groups, estimates of
1Coneval. Evolución de las dimensiones de la pobreza 1990-2018. https://www.coneval.org.mx/
Medicion/Paginas/Evolucion-de-las-dimensiones-de-pobreza-.aspx
133
impacts may vary. King and Behrman (2009) identify three sources of variation in
impact evaluations estimates; the first is leads and lags in the implementation caused
by organisational factors; the second are spillover effects, the programme effects may
intensify over time affecting estimates of programme impact; the third source is
heterogeneity in impact on populations from different cohorts, or with differences
in other characteristics. In the case of Seguro Popular, timing is crucial to estimate
treatment effects.
To account for organisational lags in the implementation and spillover effects, in
Chapters 2 and 4, programme impacts were estimated using the progressive timing
in the implementation as an identification strategy. Municipalities were rolled-out
in phases but also people within municipalities were affiliating gradually. Intensity,
measured as the level of penetration at the population level, varies in time: in
general, the longer a municipality is exposed, the more families become beneficiaries.
Finally, the number of interventions covered by the programme rose over time. SP
started with a basic set of 90 essential health interventions and 142 medications
associated with them. By 2018, the number of interventions had risen to 294 with
664 medications (Chemor Ruiz et al., 2018). Chapter 3 also accounts for operational
lags and also for heterogeneity in impact on population from different cohorts by
measuring impacts on children who were exposed to Seguro Popular during a critical
period that occurs before five years of age.
Taking all these elements into account, one would expect that the impacts might
not be immediate, but instead it would take time for the full impact of the reform
to manifest. Moreover, there may be different for people from different cohorts or
with different characteristics. Ignoring these sources of variation may introduce a
downward bias on treatment effect estimations. Figure 5.1, adapted from King and
Behrman (2009), shows how programme impact can change over time. In the case of
Seguro Popular, programme impacts on health outcomes may behave like the upper
panel in Fig 5.1, suggesting that an early evaluation might provide a misleading
conclusion. Therefore, later evaluations would provide more reliable estimates of
Seguro Popular true impact.
Evidence confirms that Seguro Popular ’s impact on health outcomes varied with
the timing in introduction. Early studies found that the programme had from non-
existent in most cases to very mild treatment effects. Barros et al. (2008) and King
et al. (2009) did not find any effects of SP on health outcomes among the eligible
population. More recent studies find positive impacts of SP on health outcomes.
Pfutze (2014) finds a reduction in infant mortality rate by 5 in 1000 births; while
Pfutze (2015) finds evidence of reduced risk of a miscarriage of 0.04% for each
percentage point in crease in coverage. Conti and Ginja (2020) estimate intent-to-
treat effects and find that SP reduced infant mortality by 10% in poor municipalities.
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Fig. 5.1 Timing of Impacts and Evaluations
The results in this study are consistent with the existent evidence. The estimated
programme impact on health outcomes found in Chapter 2 are comparable with the
early evaluations literature with data from the early years of the programme; while
the effect on mortality rates found using data for the whole period, is similar to the
evidence from later studies. There is a positive impact of Seguro Popular on infant
and adult mortality after the programme has been operating for at least 10 years in
the municipality.
In contrast to the timing in the impact on health outcomes, evidence suggests
that Seguro Popular had immediate impacts on reducing out-of-pocket healthcare
payments, catastrophic and impoverishing expenditures. Seguro Popular as a public
health insurance, its priority was to protect the population against healthcare shocks
with catastrophic consequences. For that reason, the package of interventions
included in the programme by the time it was implemented, covered 90% of disease
burden (Ruvalcaba and Vargas, 2010). Early descriptive studies find associations
between Seguro Popular membership and decline in catastrophic healthcare payments
(Gakidou et al., 2006; Knaul et al., 2006; Scott, 2006) and a reduction in the likelihood
to incur impoverishment (Knaul et al., 2006). Later on, several studies found causal
relationships of SP and reduction of out-of-pocket healthcare payments (Barros
et al., 2008; Sosa-Rubí et al., 2011), substantial decline in catastrophic payments
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(Galárraga et al., 2010; King et al., 2009; Sosa-Rubí et al., 2011) and protection
against impoverishment García-Díaz and Sosa-Rubí (2011). However, programme
impacts found in more recent studies seem to be waning, suggesting that impacts
are similar to those illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 5.1. A more recent
study found no relationship between affiliation to Seguro Popular and out-of-pocket
spending for medicines (Wirtz et al., 2012); other studies report limited impacts
on catastrophic healthcare spending (Grogger et al., 2015; Nikoloski and Mossialos,
2018) or no effect at all (Knaul et al., 2018); another study found limited effects on
impoverishment (García-Díaz et al., 2018). Consistent with the timing of impacts
found in those studies, the results of Chapter 4 of this thesis suggest an impact
of Seguro Popular in reducing out-of-pocket healthcare payments, but no change
catastrophic healthcare payments and impoverishment, implying immediate and
fading effects.
One of the advantages of this study compared to previous literature could be
the availability of more recent data. While this study looks at the programme in its
entire duration, past studies look at shorter periods, missing the last years of the
programme. Seguro Popular has been implementing improvements and amendments
to the original design over the years as problems arise. From 2014, a number changes
and adjustments were implemented on regularisation of transferences, management
of funds, financial monitoring, among others (Chemor Ruiz et al., 2018). From 2012
to 2018, 142 medicines and 9 interventions were included (Chemor Ruiz et al., 2018).
Despite the continuous expansion of Seguro Popular in the last years, the impacts
on out-of-pocket expenses have shown decreasing returns.
The use of longitudinal data on individuals in Chapters 2 and 3 has an advantage
over most evaluations of Seguro Popular on health outcomes using cross-sectional data
as self-selection bias is not completely corrected. Chapter 4 analysing repeated cross-
sectional data addresses the endogenity controlling for unobservable characteristics of
individuals through instrumental variables. The model specifications used in Chapter
2 take into account heterogeneity in time of exposure and in programme intensity
on time and space and heterogeneity according to income level. Examining several
years of data in Chapters 2 and 4 captures the long-term policy impacts missed by
earlier studies. The comparison of two different data structures and two different
methods in Chapter 3 provides insight on different biases on the conclusions due to
sensitivity of results. Examining distributional as opposed to average effects provides
valuable information for policy design on the importance of programme targeting.
Seguro Popular left major healthcare challenges unresolved. Universal coverage
was not attained. Between 2008 and 2018, the proportion of population with no
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access to healthcare fell from 38.4% to 16.2%2. However, in the last years enrolment
in Seguro Popular has been declining, falling to 45% of affilition after reaching almost
60%, perhaps related to the low quality perception. Despite substantial expansion,
there is still a highly vulnerable proportion of the population with no healthcare
coverage (Reyes-Morales et al., 2020).
Another limitation of SP was the catalog of services provided (CAUSES). Even
though there were important additions over the years, the inventory of primary-care
and ambulatory services were not adequate to serve the demand for preventive
services (Chemor Ruiz et al., 2018). This situation was especially serious for the
poorest sector of the population. Colchero et al. (2019) found that in small localities
only 32% of people reporting a health problem received care in a public institution.
Moreover, belonging to a higher income group was associated to higher likelihood of
receiving healthcare.
Out-of-pocket healthcare payments are still problematic. According to Shamah-
Levy et al. (2020), 60% of people reported paying out-of-pocket for medications
the last time they needed them. Overall, 40% of health spending is out-of-pocket.
Medication shortages are another persistent challenge for general population but are
more serious for poorer population. In 2014, the share of out-of-pocket healthcare
spending of total income in the poorer quintile was 16%, while that share for the
richest quintile was only 4% (Bautista-Arredondo et al., 2014).
Challenges related to the transfer and allocation of funds remain pending. Nigenda
et al. (2015) identified delays in the transfer of funds from the federal to the state level
up to six months; lack of adherence to expenditure targets of states and unauthorised
use of financial resources for contracting personnel without adequate training, paying
excessive prices for drugs and other goods, among other inappropriate use of resources.
The unmet goals of Seguro Popular together with documented cases of corruption
and, importantly, ideological and political reasons provided the rationale to replace
the programme with another system (Reich, 2020).
On January 1st 2020, Instituto de Salud para el Bienestar (INSABI), a system of
universal and free access to health services and associated medicines, was introduced
to provide healthcare coverage to 57%3 of citizens (71.7 million4 people) with no social
security protection. INSABI is a centralised health system with integrated public
2Coneval. Evolución de las dimensiones de la pobreza 1990-2018. https://www.coneval.org.mx/
Medicion/Paginas/Evolucion-de-las-dimensiones-de-pobreza-.aspx
3Coneval. Medición de la pobreza. Evolución de las dimensiones de la pobreza 1990-2018.
https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/Paginas/Evolucion-de-las-dimensiones-de-pobreza-.aspx
4These 71 million people include the 53.5 million previously covered by Seguro Popular.5
5Seguro Popular. Personas afiliadas: http://www.transparencia.seguro-popular.gob.mx/index.
php/transparencia-focalizada/21-pesonas-afiliadas.
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financing and delivery, where the single funder and provider is the federal government.
In contrast, Seguro Popular had a different structure. It did not provide healthcare,
but instead was a financial mechanism that transferred resources to state-based
agencies (REPSS6) that in turn managed the resources and local authorities provided
healthcare. The set of services covered were defined by a federal agency (CNPSS7)
and included a catalog of services with 294 interventions (CAUSES8) provided by
primary and secondary level health facilities; and 66 catastrophic conditions delivered
in tertiary institutions with resources from a separate fund (FPGC9). In addition, it
provided all health services to children up to 5 years old (SM SXXI10) (Reich, 2020).
The new system starts operating with uncertainties about the services included,
its operation rules and financial sources. SP covered 294 interventions but some
others were not financially feasible to be included in its scope. Some examples
are myocardial infarction for individuals older than 65 years and management of
renal failure with dialysis (Chemor Ruiz et al., 2018). Including some of those
interventions could collapse the whole system. However, the reform is not specific
about an intervention package; but only explicitly states that the coverage includes
at least primary level outpatient services, as well as outpatient consultation and
hospitalisation for basic medical specialties, internal surgery, general surgery, obstet-
rics gynaecology, paediatrics and geriatrics, at the secondary level, and associated
medicines11. However, the cost to deliver the promised services is five times the
budget assigned to INSABI in 2020.
An important lesson to draw from Seguro Popular was its constant monitoring
and evaluation. Seguro Popular had well defined financial and operation rules; it
was tested in a two-year pilot phase in 5 states; and was constantly monitored and
evaluated. An experimental evaluation previously described was conducted at the
time of introduction of Seguro Popular, with promising findings. Currently, INSABI
has no clear plans for evaluating impacts of the new policies (Reich, 2020; Reyes-
Morales et al., 2020). There are many challenges ahead for the new system and the
entire Mexican health system especially in the context of an epidemiological transition,
with and increasing prevalence of resource-intensive conditions as cardiovascular
diseases, diabetes and cancer. It is crucial to assess new policies in contrast to the
6Régimen Estatal de Protección Social en Salud
7Comisión Nacional de Protección Social en Salud
8Catálogo Universal de Servicios de Salud
9Fondo de Protección contra Gastos Catastróficos
10Seguro Médico Siglo XXI
11Act Project for reforming the Ley General de Salud de Mexico. https://infosen.senado.gob.mx/
sgsp/gaceta/64/1/2019-07-03-1/assets/documentos/Ini_Delgado.pdf
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ones that precede them. Impact evaluations should be the basis for informing the
decision to introduce, reform or cancel public policies.
Finally, whether INSABI can face the major challenges in healthcare for the
uninsured is uncertain, it may not address the most important cause of inequality in
healthcare access in Mexico, namely, the fragmented health system between social
security and social assistance. Social security affiliates receive higher quality and
more effective healthcare than non-affiliates due to the fact of being employed in
the informal sector. One step towards a more equal system would be to match the
per capita federal spending on health between the uninsured and social security
affiliates. To achieve that, it would be necessary to increase health spending by
1.5 GDP points (Antón et al., 2012). However, during Seguro Popular years health
spending increased only 1 GDP point. As long as the health system continues to
be linked to labour status and uninsured population do not have access to the full
package of social security benefits, the deeply engrained problem of inequality will
not be addressed. Without a restructure of the health and financial systems the
challenge seems unrealisable.
Future research should focus on the previously describedchallenging main areas
to inform policy on how to improve the health system. Immediate assessments of
INSABI specifically on access, out-of-pocket expenditures and health outcomes are
necessary to analyse its short term performance. Moreover, further research on
the persistent problems in the Mexican health system like catastrophic payments,
out-of-pocket spending on medications, and the reasons behind the low healthcare
affiliation and its recent decline should be prioritised. Another line of research should
focus on the quality of healthcare; the perceived low quality of Seguro Popular
compared to social security. There is not enough evidence on the quality aspects
of the recently disappeared scheme. A comparison to INSABI may inform decision
makers. Lastly, it is important to dig deeper to understand the problem of inequity
the health system. This research agenda will provide with scientific evidence that
may be useful to set the basis for a truly universal healthcare system in Mexico.
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